

JPRS-WER-85-032

25 March 1985

West Europe Report

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25 March 1985

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ARMS CONTROL

DENMARK/GREENLAND

ISLAND PEACE MOVEMENT ALIGNING WITH 'TREATY NOW' ON ZONE

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 6 Feb 85 p 29

[Article: "Greenland to Participate in Nordic Nuclear Free Zone"]

[Text] Sorsunnata [Greenland peace movement], which has joined the council for "Treaty Now," believes that in the coming years there will be efforts for making the Nordic area a nuclear free zone.

"Treaty Now" is a common Nordic movement with one demand: the Nordic area as a treaty-bound nuclear free zone. The movement is open to all who can and will support this demand. "Treaty Now" has a council with members from all the Nordic countries. It is in this council that Sorsunnata is being challenged to join with a representative from Greenland.

In addition to this council, "Treaty Now" has a group of leading Nordic jurists to provide advice on legal and international relationships, as well as a group of Nordic politicians to advise on parliamentary issues. Sorsunnata believes that Greenland also should be represented in these groups.

During the period from Hiroshima Day--6 August 1984--to Nagasaki Day--9 August 1985 (named after the two atomic bomb explosions 40 years ago), "Treaty Now" is holding an action year.

The objective is to have the Nordic area established as a nuclear free zone before the end of 1985 through parliamentary decisions in the various Nordic countries.

Sorsunnata has received the invitation from "Treaty Now" positively. Simultaneously, Sorsunnata's executive committee has made clear in an open letter that Greenland must be a part of this nuclear free zone since it believes that it is unreasonable that the boundary line of the zone should lie somewhere in the Danish Strait between Iceland and Greenland. This letter also was sent to home rule government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt and to ICC president Hans Pavia Rosing.

Sorsunnata has named teacher Baltser Andersen from Qasigiannnguit as the movement's representative to "Treaty Now." The first meeting of the council will be held on 9 March in Oslo and Sorsunnata will participate if the movement can obtain a subsidy for the trip from the home rule government.

12578

CSO: 3613/117

POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

PAPER REVIEWS LATEST SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST NORDIC PRESS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Bobo Scheutz, AFTENPOSTEN correspondent: "Moscow Not Very Satisfied with AFTENPOSTEN"]

[Text] Moscow, 17 January. In November of last year the Soviet labor union newspaper TRUD and the Soviet federation of journalists periodical accused SVENSKA DAGBLADET's and AFTENPOSTEN's correspondents in Moscow of dealing with criminals and black marketeers.

The reason was an article which was included in the newspapers in August of last year and which dealt with Soviet youth, its increasing indifference to the official ideology, its endeavors to identify itself with other lifestyles, and how Western youth culture is seeping into the society, not least via the Soviet upper class.

In a new attack against correspondents, the periodical ZHURNALIST in its January issue returned to the same article, which obviously must have made a deep impression on the editors. This time they received help from the Swedish communist newspaper NORRSKENSFLAMMAN and from some workers at a factory in Moscow who, it is claimed, sent in letters to the editor in which they pointed out how indignant they became over the fact that the correspondents are writing lies about Soviet youth.

The November article in TRUD and ZHURNALIST was repeated in its entirety in NORRSKENSFLAMMAN and even was read in Soviet radio's propaganda broadcasts in Swedish, and in the January issue of ZHURNALIST it was claimed that it "has aroused sympathy in Sweden."

ZHURNALIST cites and comments on the account of the article which appeared in SVENSKA DAGBLADET and the newspaper's leading article regarding the matter several days later. And claims, among other things, that correspondents are continuing their newspapers' global strategy, which aims at painting a black picture of life in the Soviet Union."

8985

CSO: 3639/71

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

KYPRIANOU URGED TO RESIGN, PAPANDREOU TO STEP BACK

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 1-7 Mar 85 p 8

[Excerpts] The black clouds of discord have been darkening the island of Aphrodite. And it avails us nothing to hide this fact. The way things have been going, an appeal must be made to the only competent judge without further delay: the Cypriot people, the appeal must be made immediately, before the crisis deepens and before the mind of the protagonists gets further muddled.

Of course, an indispensable presupposition for all this is Spyros Kyprianou's resignation. A resignation that became unavoidable following the vote of the Cypriot Parliament, but more specifically, following the reaction of the president of the Cypriot Republic to this vote. Elected with the votes of an admittedly borrowed majority, which is, at this time, clearly a minority in the eyes of the people, Kyprianou is denouncing his opponents as...coupists, and the Parliament as...incompetent! It is obvious that the president of Cyprus, having lost his self-control together with the people's confidence in his handling of the situation, has become unable--if nothing else--to express the will of the Cypriot people in the talks that are so critical and decisive for the future of the island and of the Greek Cypriots.

Spyros Kyprianou is now under the influence of his passion against his opponents, whom he is denouncing by stating that they are offering an alibi to Denktas and Ankara... And there he is, the sole fighter for an honest solution based on the foundation of an elementary justice....

However, things would not have reached this point had there been no catastrophic encouragement and absolute solidarity and approval of the Cypriot president's handling of the New York conferency by the prime minister of Greece. When the two great parties of Cyprus, the Right and the Left, who represent 65 percent of the electorate, were expressing their reservations, the Greek prime minister's alignment with the handling of President Kyprianou appeared like a curious as much as personal intervention. How could Greek officialdom disagree with the majority of the Cypriot people by standing behind the president of the Republic who had been elected with the votes of those he was now calling plotters and coupists?

The fact that Mr Kyprianou was denounced by the Cypriot leaders and that he henceforth lacked a majority should have pushed him to an immediate

resignation for reasons of personal sensitivity. Instead, he chose to enter the field of battle and to stand on particularly slippery ground. But Mr Kyprianou is no longer the man of Cyprus, but only the leader of a small part of it. He must follow the dictates of the majority, or he must resign. Surely Cyprus will be able to make its choices after he steps aside.

As for Greece, which cannot be interested in personalities and must not link them with the fate of the holy cause, it must find the means to compel them to reach an agreement. Only thus could the battle be won. Otherwise, we are just building the triumphal arch under which the New Attila will pass....

CSO: 3521/207

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

TANKER ATTACKED IN GULF HEADED TOWARD DUBAI

NC020622 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 0530 GMT 2 Mar 85

[Text] An 18,500-ton merchant ship, the "Athenian Xenofon," registered in Cyprus, was hit by four rockets yesterday while sailing northeast of Qatar in the Arab Gulf. A statement by the Greek Merchant Marine Ministry notes that the ship was headed toward Kuwait, was empty, and had a crew of two Greeks--the captain and the first engineer--and 24 foreigners. The statement adds that the entire crew is well, with the exception of the Polish first mate, who was taken by helicopter to a Dubai hospital.

Despite the serious damage it sustained, the "Athenian Xenofon" is now sailing under its own power toward Dubai. It is not clear which country's planes attacked the vessel, but shipping sources in Manama, Bahrain, believe the planes were Iranian.

CSO: 3521/203

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

PAN-CYPRIOT CONFERENCE URGED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 5 Feb 85 p 1

/Text/ No more margin exists...Time flies swiftly...The internal confusion leads with geometrical accuracy to serious confrontations regarding the Cyprus question. The confusion will lead to chaos and chaos can only bring suffering. All political leaders are now facing enormous responsibilities. The people are justifiably concerned...

This time President Kyprianou cannot go to Athens alone. The Greek government should invite all the Cypriot leaders to Athens. The issue is no longer about misunderstandings and disputes about procedural questions. There now exist substantial differences. This time President Kyprianou is confronted by the conjectural majority of the Cypriot Hellenism.

Now is the time for a Pan-Cyprian conference in Athens. A conference about which we shouted for the last 7 years without our voices being heard. This time the responsibilities of all people are heavy. Kyprianou must not go to Athens alone. What must be done must be decided there and now...Now, before new misfortunes befall this unfortunate land...

7520

CS0: 3521/189

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

RUMORS ON TERRORISM REGRETTABLE--A part of the Athenian press reported with impressive conjectures that the bombing of the Glyfada bar where Americans frequent was the work of the Cypriot secret service. Besides the strong denial of the Nicosia government we are compelled to regretfully observe that such reports can create inestimable damage to the efforts being exerted for the solution of our national problem. We would indeed expect a greater sense of responsibility on the part of the Greek media which must avoid using the Cypriot problem either as commercial news or for serving the domestic political and partisan expediencies. /Text/ /Athens Nicosia I
SIMERINI in Greek 6 Feb 85 p 3/ 7520

CSO: 3521/189

POLITICAL

DENMARK

FUROR IN COMMUNIST PARTY OVER EFFORT TO REINSTATE DEFECTOR

CP Organ Denies Invitation

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 16 Jan 85 p 2

[Article: "We Will not Admit Preben Moller Hansen into the DKP"]

[Text] There are no plans to readmit the leader of the Danish Seamen's Union, Preben Moller Hansen, into the Danish Communist Party (DKP), states the party's leader Jorgen Jensen. Preben Moller Hansen was excluded from the DKP in 1979 for activities injurious to the party.

In Saturday's EKSTRA BLADET he confided that it seems persons in the DKP leadership encouraged him to seek readmittance to the party. According to the same paper, he himself does not seek new membership in the Communist Party but insists that the exclusion of him be annulled.

"I don't know whether it is Preben Moller Hansen himself or EKSTRA BLADET that has served up this canard, but regardless of who it is, it is no more true for it," says Jorgen Jensen. He also declares that no one in the Communist Party's leadership has conducted negotiations with the Seamen's leader on the subject. The Communist leader says further that the overwhelming feeling in the party is against readmitting Preben Moller Hansen. "And if he will not submit an application for admission, then there is not much to talk about anyway," he says.

Quite the contrary, says Jorgen Jensen, adding that there is talk of members of the Common Course Club--whose leader Preben Moller Hansen is--seeking admittance to the Communist Party. This is due to discussions in the club about the actual formation of a party.

EKSTRA BLADET's journalists, however, got all this information about the false story at a Monday press conference which the Communist Party had called to discuss two totally different subjects. Nonetheless, the paper did not hold back from simmering the "canard" further in its Tuesday edition.

District Initiative Blocked

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 16 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by Peder Munch Hansen: "Revolt in DKP on Funen"]

[Text] The revolt in the Danish Communist Party and the attempt at getting the seamen's boss Preben Mollen Hansen back in the fold started in Svendborg. With the Red Folk High School as the point of origin, part of the DKP's Funen constituency is responsible for the revolt.

As far as AKTUELT has learned, yesterday's failed attempt at getting the central committee to readmit Preben Moller Hansen resulted in the resignation of Ole Hjort, a central committee member and teacher at the Red Folk High School.

Last evening it was impossible to get in touch with Ole Hjort, however, Preben Moller confirms that he has had meetings with Ole Hjort and other central DKP members on Funen.

"We have had meetings in Svendborg really quite recently. It is also true that it is first and foremost the Funen constituency who backs the idea that I should be readmitted to the party. At the same time it is certain that I myself do not seek admittance. The central committee must rescind the exclusion," says Preben Moller.

He doesn't expect the DKP's leadership to do so.

"I know the party. Now the question has been brought up. The attempt failed, so they won't move a finger. I'll wait a little yet because the tired old men are slowly fading away."

12819

CSO: 3613/102

POLITICAL

DENMARK

PAPER ON PROBLEM OF FINDING SUCCESSOR TO SDP'S JORGENSEN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Mar 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Successor"]

[Text] There was never any discussion about who should replace Hans Hedtoft, H.C. Hansen, Viggo Kampmann or Jens Otto Krag. For the first three, the order of succession was a given, and in the case of Krag, under surprising circumstances, he was replaced by himself. But who will succeed Anker Jorgensen as the Social Democratic Party leader and forthcoming prime minister? It is difficult to imagine that Anker Jorgensen, if he like his predecessors unexpectedly decides to step down, will have the same coup-like ability to name his successor. He lacks the authority and command in a party which has become ungovernable under his leadership.

There is always more turmoil in the Social Democratic parliamentary delegation than is good for the party. There is much talk about clubs and groups which cannot agree. And after Knud Heinesen's irrevocable decision to leave politics, there are even more waves in the water. The election of Svend Auken as the new vice chairman of the party is possible, but he is not a candidate. There are those who would have a vice chairman from within the labor movement and Bjorn Westh's widely publicized desires in that regard were other than personal comments. This hides the play for power which has been going on for so long. From time to time, some reprimands are issued since the party, for obvious reasons, cannot be well served by the uncertainty which surrounds it. And the party chairman himself speaks openly on the lively party which is so open and desirous of debate, and he attempts thereby to bring about a resolution. But this helps equally little in reality.

Two simple explanations can be given for this permanent crisis condition which so easily gives the party a high fever. The first is that the Social Democrats have difficulty in finding themselves without the likelihood of returning to power at the moment. The second is that Anker Jorgensen does not have the ability to give the party the confident leadership which each party needs if it wants to exert authority over and above playing the role of an actor. Personal accusations are inappropriate for those who should lead a large party which ought to exist as an alternative possibility for a government. There is a need for abilities and talents which Anker Jorgensen does not possess.

would have had such confidence in him that the debate would have been just small talk. And respect for him would have been so great that one word from him would have been sufficient to decide where the vice chairman should come from and what his name would be.

12578

CSO: 3613/122

POLITICAL

DENMARK

BRIEFS

CP NEWSPAPER REINSTATES CARTOONIST--On Saturday cartoonist Herluf Bidstrup resumed his collaboration with the daily LAND OG FOLK which he had left in anger last March after 40 years of collaboration. This happened after the editorial staff had rejected a satirical cartoon dealing with a couple battling over their child. Herluf Bidstrup says that he has compromised by consenting to draw for the paper again, even though the editorial staff has never given him the required explanation for rejecting the cartoon. He says moreover that he draws for the readers and not for the paper's management and that the many appeals from readers induced him to change his mind. Herluf Bidstrup is 72. Besides his connection with LAND OG FOLK he has drawn for SOCIAL DEMOKRATEN. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 21 Jan 85 p 2] 12819

CP YOUTH GROUP CONGRESS--At a national congress in Vallensbaek on Sunday, about 300 delegates and guests from the Danish Communist Youth (DKU) voted to make contract agreements a main task for the DKU in the future. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 21 Jan 85 p 6] 12819

CSO: 3613/102

POLITICAL

DENMARK/GREENLAND

GOVERNMENT LEADER MOTZFELDT VIEWS IMPACT OF EC QUITTING

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 16 Feb 85 pp 10-11

[Op Ed Article by Jonathan Motzfeldt: "Greenland Has Received 'Lift'"]

[Text] On 28 January 1985, the Italian Embassy in Copenhagen notified the Danish Foreign Ministry that France, Ireland and FRG were the final parties to have signed the ratification documents in Rome and that therefore, the treaty on Greenland's withdrawal would take effect on 1 February 1985.

It has been a long and difficult journey to reach the end of the road after a nerve-racking period, including an unnecessarily nerve-racking final spurt during the final days of last year, and more recently in connection with the uncertainty concerning EC's ability and willingness to live up to its portion of the agreement on economic compensation for the fishing agreement, which at the moment gives EC the right over a five-year period to fish, possibly in excess of quotas.

But the battle is over now and it is with great relief and satisfaction that we take up the challenge of a Greenland outside of EC.

We now have the unlimited ability to impose rules for fishing in our fishing territory--applicable to our own fishermen as well as to non-Greenland fishermen. Simultaneously, we are taking over the production and sales activities from KGH [Royal Greenland Trade Company], and thereby achieve the ability to control the development of an important aspect of the fishing industry.

Our fishing-policy situation within EC has been that the controlling decisions on regulating fishing were made in Brussels. That pertained to the setting of the total overall allowable catch, establishment of our own quotas, quotas for EC countries and other countries--including our neighbors, Iceland, the Faeroes and Norway--and the establishment of rules for control and technical preservation arrangements, and the like.

All of this was changed on 1 February 1985 when a new and far more comprehensive plan for the use of fishing rules took effect. Instead of the present series of laws by the Greenland Parliament and home rule government proclamations, Danish parliamentary laws, proclamations by the Greenland Ministry and EC regulations, there now will be essentially only one law by the Greenland Parliament, with related regulations issued by the home rule government relating to fishing.

The law contains a new system with regard to fishing licenses for all non-Greenland ships and respecting control over fishing. We have, after all, a recollection of the violation of fishing rules which we have experienced in recent years in our navigable waters. It is obvious that we must guarantee, to the greatest extent possible, against a repetition of that and therefore, it is our intention to focus on three areas:

First, in the forthcoming control regulations, we will establish stricter rules than today. Up to now, EC has prevented us from doing that.

Second, it is recommended that the fishing inspectorate will be able, to a reasonable degree, to require fishing ships to be at a particular place instead of using way too much time trying to track them down.

Third, we recommend the building up of a minimal Greenland fish-licensing control which, primarily, will undertake certain control functions on behalf of the home rule government in cooperation with the Greenland military command and the police.

Given our limited business opportunities, we have a very strong interest in ensuring a harmonious interplay between utilization of resources and the extremely fragile biologic situation here. We have simply no other known basic industry.

For this reason, achieving this authority has been the determinative motivation for our desire to loosen the connection with EC by means of the OLT [expansion unknown] status which has been accomplished. On the other hand, it does not mean that we can be self-sufficient in relations either with EC or the rest of the outside world. Through a long process, we have made friends and connections with a large number of people and institutions and we have come to know the outside world a bit better. And if we previously had dreamed about a "splendid isolation," the blinders have been removed from our eyes at any rate and we see that there can only be a future in cooperation with others where we also live up to our obligations if we are to be able to survive politically, economically and culturally in this world. We have great expectations that through the OLT arrangement, we can establish a more natural relationship with EC, while at the same time our connections with the rest of the Arctic area, on the one hand, and with our Nordic neighbors, on the other hand, can be developed for the benefit of Greenland, and in all modesty, to the satisfaction of these other areas. Our relationship to Denmark and the commonwealth is a given and is not affected by our altered connection with EC. I am convinced that by far the majority of my countrymen share this view and also do not see their withdrawal as a step toward tearing loose, but rather, as a possibility for giving home rule a more real substance.

The withdrawal has given us a psychological lift, partly because we could accomplish it at all, but also by reason of the fact that the challenge which exists in having freedom in a series of decisions to a certain degree gives a strong boost to society's "production of adrenalin" through the solving of the issues which exist. We are really a very young society in

terms of modern industry and administration and do not have very many organizational institutions to stand in the way of our own efforts at building up and developing our social structure, and we feel that outside of EF, we now have far greater possibilities for putting our own mark on areas such as business development, energy supply, labor market conditions, as well as our school and educational system, which to a certain degree has been required to conform to EC's regulations.

We also believe that we can manage the economic separation from EC. First, because there is included in the agreement that EC, in payment for continued access to our fish resources, must pay Greenland an annual fee of 26.5 million ECU's over the next five years--or measured by the current exchange rate of the krone, 210 million kroner. This is an amount which exceeds what EC up to now has paid us on an annual basis, but it is a reasonable price for the value of the anticipated fish catch and it corresponds to what EC pays in other places for similar arrangements. Additionally, the amount is owed irrespective of whether the organization takes a lesser quota than is allowed.

From the Greenland point of view, it is important to strive toward building up and renewing our own fishing capacity in order that we ourselves can catch and process larger and larger amounts, since it is obvious that this is far more beneficial for the economy of the society, including the derivative employment in the country. We of course do not know for sure whether we will succeed, but fishing is our best possibility for establishing a profitable foundation for our own economy.

In connection with EC's previous subsidy for Greenland, there has been discussion of refunds for capital investments, primarily in the infrastructure and according to very strict rules, together with subsidies in the area of commercial training on which we are concentrating very hard and which will be financed by means of the current agreement with EC. In addition, as concerns capital investments, we will continue to be dependent on the transfer of money from Denmark--and we will be that way irrespective of whether or not we are a member of EC. It may prove necessary, however, to borrow some of the very large investment amounts which we continue to need in Greenland, possibly through the European Investment Bank, which continues to be available to us notwithstanding the withdrawal. The home rule government up to now has not borrowed one krone and we also will be as reserved and careful as possible in utilizing this possibility. The investment needs over and above the most important--the fishing sector--involve energy investments in hydroelectric plants for electricity and heat involving about 4 billion kroner over the next 15-20 years, investments in housing -- partly because available housing does not correspond at all to the need, and partly because it is completely run-down--together with investments in villages in order to achieve reasonable living conditions. Those who have visited Greenland villages will know what is being talked about concerning 10 people in every room in small and poorly-heated houses--and as concerns nearly half of those--without electricity and with average household income, primarily welfare benefits, of 33-35,000 kroner per year.

These are just some of the matters we have ahead of us as the developing country which we still are, and we believe though, that we can solve them better on our own without the previous permanent connection to EC. But not without help--who can do that?

12578

CSO: 3613/117

POLITICAL

DENMARK/GREENLAND

HOME RULE GOVERNMENT ASKS TO TAKE OVER NEW AREAS FROM DENMARK

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 13 Feb 85 p 26

[Article: "New Areas for Home Rule Government"]

[Text] It appears from a report from Greenland Minister Tom Hoyem to the parliamentary committee on laws for Greenland, that according to the latest announcements from the home rule government, it wants to take over the following new areas as soon as possible within the timeframe of 1986-90:

The remaining portion of the Royal Greenland Trade Company, Greenland's Technical Organization, energy supply, Greenland's Fishing and Environmental Studies, environmental protection, housing, and authority respecting a special Greenland flag.

During the recent visit of the leader of the home rule government to Copenhagen in connection with a commonwealth meeting, he gave the indication that perhaps as soon as the forthcoming local parliamentary session, a position will be taken on which of the many proposals for a Greenland flag should be put up for a popular vote.

It also appears from Tom Hoyem's report that according to the previous announcements, there is not a desire to take over the Greenland health care sector prior to the year 2000.

The report also contains a summary of the areas which have been transferred to the home rule government since it was established in 1979. From 1 January 1985, this also includes KGH's [Royal Greenland Trade Company] production and export activities and business subsidy measures, as well as commercial laws and regulation of the remaining portion of commercial fisheries, and others.

12578

CSO: 3613/117

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SKDL FEUD OVER MOSCOW DELEGATION COMPOSITION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Feb 85 p 12

[Article: "Saarto Lost the Vote on Who Would go to Moscow"]

[Text] The chairman of the SKDL's representatives, Veikko Saarto (Communist), lost in the voting on which group members would go to Moscow. Saarto, balancing between the majority and the minority, tried to get a carefully adjusted delegation to Moscow, in which there would have been no room for the SKP's [Finnish Communist Party] current representatives.

What has traditionally been viewed as the majority in the parliamentary group, was dissatisfied with Saarto's suggestion and pondered the issue in its own meeting last week, separately for the first time in a long while. On Tuesday, the SKDL's group chose the delegates 9 to 8. Saarto's suggestion lost to Arvo Kempainen's list.

Pekka Leppanen, Niilo Koskenniemi and Kati Peltola from the Communist majority, the Socialist Esko Helle, and Ensio Laine from the Communist minority faction, will go to Moscow in addition to Saarto, according to Kempainen's winning proposal.

During the voting there was debate between central committee member Pekka Leppanen and the minority's Esko-Juhani Tennila. The majority dropped Tennila from Saarto's approved delegates and his place was taken by Peltola. Leppanen was chosen as a member of the current leadership, that is, of the central committee.

In the minority, the selections were viewed as a tightening of the majority's grip, and there was speculation as to whether the host would be interested in a visit from the chosen delegation. The invitation to visit was made to the SKDL group by the Soviet Union's Communist Party central committee. According to the invitation, the visit should happen next week.

12688

CSO:3617/74

POLITICAL

FINLAND

TENNILA PROPOSES NEW CP 'UNIFICATION' NEWSPAPER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Feb 85 p 12

[Excerpt: "A New Newspaper for "Unification"]

[Text] Overlapping with the parliamentary group's meeting, Esko-Juhani Tennila introduced the communist minority's and the Kajanoja-faction's new newspaper, which is being published in the name of unification before the SKP's extraordinary party congress March 23.

Before the party congress, three issues of the newspaper will be published; there is no information yet about a sequel. According to Tennila, the purpose of the paper named YHTENAISSYYS [Unification] is to encourage the SKP's unity, and to combat the hardened stances of the entrepreneurial circles as well as the drift toward the right.

The publisher of the newspaper is said to be "A committee initiated in support of SKP unity." According to those working for unity, they are trying to gather their forces during the party's combat-situation to guard against dissolution. This does not mean, however, that the minority would take part in the March party congress. The minority, which had demanded an extraordinary party congress, has announced that its eight districts will leave themselves out of the congress because of the dissolution-districts set up by the majority.

Tennila and Helge Talvitie, the implementing officer of the metal union, who lost in the 1979 parliamentary elections, are the chairmen of the initiating committee which is publishing the paper. According to Tennila, the newspaper will be distributed to the party's members and friends; the money for it is coming from "the many hands of the people."

At the same time as Tennila was introducing the new newspaper, the parliamentary group's majority dropped him from the Moscow train because of--among other reasons--the new dissolution paper. Tennila, unaware of this, was on his part thanking the parliamentary group as an example of the development of unity.

12688

CSO: 3617/74

POLITICAL

FINLAND

COMMUNIST MP PULLS OUT OF RACE FOR SKDL CHAIRMANSHIP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish Feb 85 p 12

[Article: "Pursiainen Withdrew from the Competition for SKDL Leadership"]

[Text] Representative Terho Pursiainen (Communist) is withdrawing from the competition for SKDL chairmanship. Pursiainen was irritated with governor Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat), who is leaving his office this spring, and who last weekend proposed some possible successors.

Earlier Pursiainen had nominated himself as a candidate. He was not included in Kivisto's list. Last Saturday, in an interview published in SAVON SANOMAT and TURUN SANOMAT, Kivisto mentioned representative Esko Helle and professor of law Antero Jyranki as equally strong successors. Both are SKDL socialists. Kivisto described Helle as an organization man and Jyranki as a theory-politician. If the selection were made from the Communist Party, Kivisto's name would be former representative Jarmo Wahlstrom.

In Pursiainen's view, Kivisto's public stand means that "on my part the matter is over and done with."

Pursiainen does not like chairman Kivisto bringing his authority to bear on the current debate over candidates, since the representatives for the party congress have not yet been chosen either.

"What would have been so horrible about them trying to ponder this issue on their own, not under someone's care," asked Pursiainen.

Pursiainen criticized Kivisto for taking part in individual speculation, and did not think Kivisto's list of names was the only correct one either. He wondered why Hilikka Aalto or MP Vappu Saillynoja, proposed by the Socialist chairman Ele Alenius, did not appear on the list.

12688

CSO: 3617/74

POLITICAL

FRANCE

GISCARD REVEALS POLITICAL PLANS FOR NEXT TWO YEARS

Prime Minister, President

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Jan 85 p 6

[Article by F. R.-L.]

[Text] Explaining how to prepare for and conduct France's "recovery" at a press conference yesterday, the former president outlined the role he plans to play in this matter: the Matignon in 1986 and why not the Elysee again?

Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who held his first press conference yesterday since 10 May 1981, did not, as was expected, dwell on the future of New Caledonia, nor on France's economic situation, but he above all outlined his political scenario for the next 2 years. Sketching a portrait of the ideal prime minister for 1986 in the event of an opposition victory, a portrait that resembles him like two peas in a pod, he did not reject the prospect of himself exercising the presidential mandate a second time.

The former president described the pivotal period of 1986 as a period of "recovery" and delivered his formula for ensuring the country's economic and social revival. It fits into one word: liberalism (read below).

In a preliminary statement Giscard declared: "In 400 days from now French men and women voters will be able — if they want — to put an end to the Socialist policy." "At any rate," he went on, "the present situation cannot continue," and "something else will happen." In short he felt that the choice would be reduced to one between "political confusion" and "recovery."

Very much at ease and relaxed and wearing a beige tweed jacket and a maroon tie, Giscard literally directed the press conference, sorting the questions and suggesting those that were not spontaneously forthcoming. The scene was played under the gilded moldings of a drawing room near his offices on the Rue Francois Premier in Paris.

Matignon 86: Self-Portrait

Giscard exposed himself most expansively on the subject of the situation after 1986. Not only did he not reject the idea of one day returning to the Elysee ("We'll see," he contented himself with replying with a smile), but he explained that the post-1986 prime minister would not be the leader of the biggest parliamentary delegation, that is, Jacques Chirac, but that "he would have to be the one the united opposition deemed to be best qualified to lead the recovery." Whom else could he be thinking of but himself?

Of course, Giscard finds it "normal" for Barre and Chirac "to think of one day running for president," but, when he speaks of De Gaulle, who returned to power in 1958 as president of Rene Coty's Council of State, it is the prime minister of the spring that he is thinking of. Moreover, he ended his talk with a quotation from the general: "The fine, good chance that our people sometimes gets — well here it is being offered to us again."

The deputy from Puy de Dome freely unveiled the scenario that has been running through his head by advancing the idea of organizing a referendum in 1987, proposed by the new majority in application of Article 89 of the Constitution. The issues might, according to him, involve different kinds of freedoms or... reduction of the president's term of office. We can easily imagine Giscard's dreams: Flattened by a crushing victory of the new majority, Mitterrand throws in the sponge and he himself, the prime minister of "recovery," proffers himself under the best of circumstances in the anticipated presidential elections.

He was asked whether his majority would, if need be, include Jean-Marie Le Pen. "The majority ought to be formed around government proposals," he replied, thus refusing to exclude the extreme Right.

Unity, Always Unity

"I have lived through the effects of disunity, not only in the race for the presidency — which is normal," he deplored the fact, "but above all in government actions."

Yesterday he also advanced "initiatives to strengthen unity at the top, where there is not enough of it": to invite Chirac, Barre and Lecanuet to an assembly of the Prospects and Realities Clubs and to jointly introduce bills next 8 June on freedom of communication, abrogation of the 1945 regulations governing economic controls and withdrawal by means of capitalization.

"Refusal to Change the Electoral Law"

In his latest book Giscard declared himself in favor of introducing a dose of proportional representation into parliamentary balloting, but he has changed his mind for reasons that are "not tactical, but have to do with democratic dignity." "You don't change the rules of the game in the middle of a match," he exclaimed.

Giscard also "advised" the opposition to introduce a motion of censure during the parliamentary debate over the change in voting procedure, but he also proposed that opposition deputies "not participate in the debate."

Giscard to New Caledonia, but "Not Tomorrow"

"Yes, I would go to New Caledonia to explain and defend the objectives of progress," Giscard said. "When, when?" his audience shouted, parodying Mitterrand's speech to A2 last Wednesday. "Not tomorrow," Giscard replied, not without irony. He hoped that a clearcut question would be posed for the referendum, like: "Do you want New Caledonia's progress to be pursued within the French Republic or outside it?"

Renouncing the plan for departmentalization he had unsuccessfully developed in the National Assembly, the former president limited himself to recommending for the territory "institutions that will protect this society's particular cultural status within the framework of the French Republic," associated with "very great autonomy."

Economic Problems

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Jan 85 pp 6,7

[Article by P. BR: "Big Words for Little Economic Remedies"]

[Text] The incipient drama of the opposition in France was without a doubt illustrated by Giscard d'Estaing yesterday. It stems from two obvious, contradictory facts. The Right has to propose to voters measures specific enough to illustrate its intention of doing something other than the Left is doing. This is the price of its credibility.

But at the same time, as indications improve, the opposition can with greater difficulty distinguish itself from a policy that is bearing fruit. The question as to what it would do very differently -- in terms of the economy, of course -- has been broadly raised following Giscard's press conference yesterday.

For lack of being able to propose sufficiently specific measures, which are nevertheless all the more necessary since, to cite Giscard, "in 1986 we will neither be able to discuss what has to be done nor fight over doing it," the refuge left to opposition leaders is to fight over words. By sticking to a degree of generality the disadvantage of which is that they have in principle already been uttered by the government.

This is the case with "France's three problems": unemployment, taxes and "the choice of a coherent economic system." Or with the "three irons in the fire" to be utilized to resolve the unemployment problem: "restore a rate of growth that is sufficiently high" (on the order of from 3 to 3.5 percent), "favor an overall change of the economic system" and, lastly, "put an end to the panic over hiring people" (particularly the small and medium-sized businesses).

Giscard himself recognizes that the problem as concerns the first iron is that it runs up against external constraints (particularly the debt, for which the assignment of responsibility to the government does not lessen its constrictive nature) and that, as concerns the second iron, we are still waiting for the precision that goes beyond semantics -- since Giscard prefers the term "overall change" to that of "modernization," which, he said, "cuts down on jobs."

And that, lastly, as concerns the third iron, it would gain in strength if Giscard himself had not admitted that he had only "recently" discovered it "in the field." If we have rightly understood it, putting an end to the panic over hiring people was, moreover, one of the stakes in the negotiations on "flexibility" that have just been overturned and which Giscard feels should take, or should have taken, place in a way that is "closer to reality."

As for the rest, we note with interest that we must "reduce the rate of obligatory appropriation" of the economy, which has become intolerable, but within the framework of a "coherent budgetary policy," and abrogate the 1945 price control regulations (a bill on the matter, which he hopes to see Chirac sign, is soon to be presented). Above all, we note this definition of an incontrovertible liberalism in answer to a reporter's question: "Liberalism, if you will, is the type of operation that suits a society like France."

Editorial Comment

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Jan 85 p 6

[Commentary by Fabien Roland Levy: "The Poincare Syndrome Strikes Again"]

[Text] Giscard is running for prime minister in 1986. At least this is the gist of what we could gather from his presentation yesterday. Weak on New Caledonia, vague on the economy, terse on the change of voting procedure, repetitive on opposition unity, the former president has never, on the other hand, been as explicit about his personal career plans. First, he set himself in perfect symmetry with Francois Mitterrand, as if there were no other candidates for the job. Then, he painted a self-portrait of the post-1986 prime minister, one extraordinarily resembling the opinion he has of himself: "the personality most qualified to assure France's recovery." Then, he did not hesitate to in advance appoint Francois Leotard minister of education of the future government: "I see him very effectively taking charge of our educational problems." The party concerned will appreciate this distinction. Yesterday he also developed a scenario in which we clearly distinguish the stratagem invented by him to get rid of Francois Mitterrand in 1987 through the expedient of a referendum half-way through their coexistence (what an extraordinary revenge, bringing down the man who on 21 May 1981 had accompanied him right up to the doorway of the Elysee!). At any rate, he has not in the press of affairs dismissed the theory that he may once again exercise the functions of the president of the republic. In short, here is Giscard again struck by the Poincare syndrome (Poincare, Giscard's model, who, after occupying the presidency, again became president of the Council of State). This would be nothing

if the patient were not stricken with a complication that is Gaullist in nature. He quoted the general several times yesterday in painting his grandiose picture of the "recovery" period he dreams of heading (over 400 days, he willingly exclaims). After all, there is nothing in the Constitution that bans dreaming.

11,466

CSO: 3519/160

POLITICAL

GREECE

POLITICAL SPECTRUM'S 'PRO'S, CON'S' OF KARAMANLIS REELECTION

Positive, Negative Effects Reviewed

Athens KYRIATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 17 Feb 85 p 40

/Article by Panos Loukakos/

/Excerpt/ One may with certainty suggest that during the month of March the Chamber of Deputies will reelect Mr K. Karamanlis president of the republic by an overwhelming majority. A reelection that under these circumstances constitutes a triumphant culmination to his long political career.

According to estimates made by leading officials of both parties, Mr Karamanlis' reelection contains positive and negative points both for PASOK and ND.

For PASOK, Mr Karamanlis' remaining in the presidency constitutes a kind of guarantee for conservative voters who today are vacillating between the government party and the major opposition party. These voters, who are not at all paltry in number, will more easily vote PASOK in the forthcoming elections with Mr Karamanlis as president of the republic over anyone else. On the other hand, a vote for Mr Karamanlis will certainly bring about some intra-party clashes within PASOK in a pre-election period when the role of the organized party grassroots is important.

As for ND, Mr Karamanlis' remaining in the presidency undermines from the very outset all of its arguments and talk on the dangers about PASOK's leading the country to the verge of ruin, at least to the extent when their main addressees are the vacillating centrist voters. However, on the other hand, Mr Karamanlis' remaining in office constitutes for the conservative wing the sole guarantee that if, as is evident, it loses these elections also the Greek state will not be altogether "in the hands of the green guards."

'Art of Possible' Examined

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 24 Feb 85 p 8

/Article by Giorgis Massavetas/

/Excerpts/ It is not particularly easy for one to explain why Andreas Papandreou does not have any other choice than proposing to the PASOK Central Committee the voting for Karamanlis.

Let us say that Andreas Papandreou does not make his proposal to the central committee by mentioning names, that he simply requests from its 140 members to vote for a man --whomever they want-- whose presence serves some specific needs. Indeed, what needs did the prime minister have in mind?

- Does the country, the government too --i.e. PASOK-- need or not need a president who could contain the excesses of ND's leadership? Inevitably, therefore, the central committee members will think of who can play that role.

- Today, the government has been led to an open front with the two biggest parties of Cyprus. Each of them has its counterpart in the two biggest parties in the Greek Chamber of Deputies, after PASOK. Which will bear greater authority in the handling of the Cyprus issue? A president of its "own" --if it could elect him-- but who could not, of course, as a personailty, be "above Andreas," or a president who would have possible broader acceptance?

- Today, PASOK has 165 deputies, the KKE another 12. Consequently, a total of 177. Together with G. Mavros, the president of EDA M. Glezos and the secretaries of the Agrarian Movement of K. Nasis and the ESPE /United Socialist Front of Greece/ of Sp. Panagoulis, they reach the critical number of 181 for the election of the president of the republic. However, it takes only two deputies to threaten this prospect, i.e. that they may not kowtow since the balloting is secret. And what political consequences would this have for PASOK? If Andreas proposes Karamanlis --whom ND voted for-- no one will ever learn what persons from one party or the other were disobedient. However, neither will the non-election of the president and recourse to early elections be endangered through having the presidential issue out in the open.

- Today, with the arithmetical facts that I mentioned above, the possibility of PASOK electing as president anyone other than Karamanlis hangs by a thread. A thread that quite a few people know is already cut. This is so because there are deputies who have stated that they will vote for Karamanlis anyway. What would happen if we went into electionsto elect a president? Following the publication of the electoral law, all studies that have been prepared have shown that there is no question of PASOK's seats increasing but actually decreasing. Even though if it were to come out the number one party. And what would happen then? It would be a comic situation where it would have to get together with ND for a joint candidate who, of course, would not be Karamanlis but someone else who Mr Mitsotakis would approve of. Or we would be in a situation where the president would be elected on a third ballot, whoever comes out first. In other words, purely factional. In the meantime, the attacks by the opposition will not be aimed at only the government but would be turned against the president of the republic too.

- If today, compared to Karamanlis and his statement over the assassination of Momferatos that was almost identical to that made by the prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis behaves like a "bull in a china closet," what kind of political atmosphere will the country experience, what with a Right that would also continually attack the constitutional "highest authority?"

- Will Andreas stand to depend on one single vote of Georgios Mavros? Quite a few ministers "are suffering torment" over his demands that go so far as to have one of our consulates general remain vacant for 3 whole years because Mr Mavros has been demanding that his wife's brother be assigned to that post. Officials too do not accept him because of some questionable accounts he had in a casino. Also, a regulation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not permit him becoming consul general because he is over 70 years of age.

- Can Andreas propose a candidate who would lend a sympathetic ear to the KKE --either now or after the elections-- when cooperation with the KKE is proving to be impossible even in the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor], as soon as any serious issue crops up?

Unfortunately, a few are said to be quite crafty. On the one hand they want Andreas to make Karamanlis president but these same persons have also recorded their disagreement. For reasons of political ulterior motives.

Those who completely and genuinely are against the Karamanlis reelection are the simple followers. The simple members of the grassroots. Just as genuine is the positioning of members and cadres who reject every compromise with the Right even if that means a return to the opposition ranks because they believe that authority "does not sanctify the means."

Whether we like it or not, politics is the art of the possible. Andreas Papandreou is obliged at every moment to measure everything with the yardstick of political responsibility. To measure not what appears agreeable or courageous, or what will satisfy the sentimentalities or the historical flotsam and jetsam of one person or the other but what serves his own plans. Short-term and long-term ones.

5671

CSO: 3521/195

POLITICAL

GREECE

BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SARTZETAKIS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 10-11 Mar 85 p 4

[Text] Khristos Sartzetakis was born in Salonica in 1929. His father was originally from Kriti and his mother was born in Makedonia. His entire student life was spent in Salonica, including his years at the University.

He first entered the field of law some 29 years ago, having won a competition in November 1955 for the position of justice of the peace and again in November 1956 for the position of president of the Court of First Instance.

He was an investigator during the famous affair of the murder of deputy Lambrakis in Salonica on 22 May 1963.

He was in Paris in 1965 for post-graduate studies when he was recalled by the junta right after the coup d'etat.

He was dismissed by the junta together with 29 other judges in May 1968. He was twice arrested during the dictatorship. The second time he was jailed for about one year, at first for approximately 50 days in the EAT-ESA [(first expansion unknown)-Greek Military Police] prison, where he was inhumanly tortured, and then in the Korydallos jail.

He was later released following international protests, mainly from legal circles, and authorities never dared to bring him to trial. He was reinstated in the legal field after the return of democracy in September 1974, having been appointed to the Court of Appeal in Athens.

He has been a member of the Supreme Court of Appeal since October 1982. He is married and has one daughter.

CSO: 3521/210

POLITICAL

GREECE

ORGANIZATION OF EFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ADVOCATED

Athens ELEVTHERTOTYPIA in Greek 23 Feb 85 p 9

/Article by Vasilis Filias; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Excerpts/ With the assassination of the publisher Nikos Momferatos, the issue of so-called terrorism has once again become a top issue that has overshadowed everything else, undoubtedly because this assassination is a political event of very great significance, an event that justly creates very serious concerns in public opinion.

Besides the human and emotional aspects, besides the disgusting criminal nature of the act, there is also the political dimension that is also the important one, and it is this dimension precisely that is looked at by many in a frivolous manner, superficially and irresponsibly, by those who presumably vaguely "interpret" the assassination by characterizing it as a terrorist act.

Terrorize means /frighten to an extreme extent,/ something that is judged in connection with the question: who and for what purpose? Who does the assassination a publisher terrorize? Other publishers, the political world, the police, the people? Of course not, so the use of the term terrorism in this instance not only says nothing but is most misleading.

Misleading because it prevents us from seeking the real motives of such an act and which have been referred to in various statements: political destabilization. And yet even this expression is vague because it does not make the simple citizen understand how the assassination of one man who is not directly a first line political personality can bring about destabilization.

Consequently, the political leadership should have referred specifically to the motives and to the consequences of such acts that are the dynamiting and poisoning of relations between political forces, the general contamination of the political atmosphere. Political stability is being undermined through this poisoning, something that only the prime minister clearly expressed when he said that /"they have a goal... of creating conditions for frontal clashes."/

No assassination, no "terrorist act" succeeds in its goal if it does not provoke conditions for frontal political clashes and one can only hail the restrained tone of all the leaderships' statements relative to the assassination of Nikos Momferatos.

With one single exception; K. Mitsotakis,' who literally played the game of whatever enemies of the republic are behind the assassination. He did exactly what they expected to be provoked, namely a destabilizing and political charge.

An exploitation endeavor by the opposition at a particularly sensitive moment, inadmissible and impermissible. A political error? There are no margins, no forgiveness for such grievous errors (worse than crimes, Tallyrand used to say), and, indeed, coming from a party leader. Something like this does not constitute political criticism --that I personally practice toward all factions-- but it is political grave robbing, exceptionally dangerous for peace in the country.

Assuredly, PASOK, since it is the government, bears responsibility, the same as ND, in connection with this matter. What? Namely, that they did not want or could not establish an invulnerable, nationally uncorroded and well-organized state intelligence service that would be capable of protecting the state and also of uncovering the threads of foreign apparatuses that guide the assassins' hands in our country just as elsewhere.

Let us therefore put aside nonsensical self-accusations that help the underminers but let us see to it that we be effective in the safeguarding of the interests of the people and the country.

5671

CSO: 3521/195

POLITICAL

GREECE

GRASSROOTS WEEKLY REJECTS KARAMANLIS CANDIDACY

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 1 Mar 85 p 6

[Text] Our magazine's views are clear:

NO to Karamanlis, NO to a second 5-year term!

YES with conditions, since the PASOK government has decided not to say NO!

We have been saying for a long time, we have been repeating, that if Andreas finally votes for Karamanlis, then he must bind him, and the binding should not be theoretical: no "papers" by constitutionalists and so forth....

A GENUINE "binding element" is a CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, which Andreas:

1. Promised us in 1975, right after the victorious vote on the Karamanlis-inspired constitution by the Karamanlis majority in the then all-powerful (215 deputies) New Democracy.
2. Is beginning to forget and DID NOT include in his--already sadly perforated--"Contract with the People."

THEREFORE, the present Chamber of Deputies MUST decide to REVISE the CONSTITUTION, and the next one (that will be the result of the next parliamentary elections) MUST implement this decision.

In order for such a decision to be made, a proposal by 50 deputies is needed.

If this proposal is approved (in two rounds, which would be "at least within a month of each other," as article 110 of the constitution states) by three-fifths of the deputies (180), then in the next Chamber 151 votes will be needed to approve it and, within 10 days to have it published in the Government gazette.

If this proposal is approved by more than 151 deputies (and less than 180), then in the next Chamber 151 votes will be needed to approve it and, within 10 days, to have it published in the Government gazette.

If this proposal is approved by more than 151 deputies (and less than 180), then 180 votes will be needed for approval in the next Chamber.

THUS, WHICHEVER WAY ONE LOOKS AT THE PROBLEM, 180 votes are needed in either Chamber....

THE GOOD PART is, in this case, that ALL THE ARTICLES giving the president such fearful powers, which the entire opposition had denounced and for which it had left the Chamber, can be revised!

CSO: 3521/20

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

NO INDEPENDENCE SEEN IN KKE (INT)--Because the KKE (int) is not represented in the Chamber of Deputies, it cannot participate in the election of the president of the Republic. However, this did not prevent the party from announcing its opposition to the candidacy of Mr Karamanlis.... A prisoner of a political opposition to the other KKE, the KKE (int) is unable to adopt courageously the kind of policy that would indeed prove its independence. The slavish following of the KKE (ext) and a small-minded perception (let's not say this so they cannot tell us that) deprive the KKE (int) of the freedom to outline a policy bearing its own personality that would be in the interest of the country without the shackles of competition with the sister party. But such perceptions do not make a party. The KKE (int) will always remain--as its small and timorous differentiations. [Text]
[Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 1-7 Mar 85 p 20]

CSO: 3521/206

POLITICAL

NORWAY

POLL SHOWS VOTERS MORE IN AGREEMENT WITH CONSERVATIVE STANDS

Support for Issues Measured

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Henry Valen: "Conservatives and Labor Fight for Confidence"]

[Text] In their judgment of questions of political conflict, the voters are astonishingly free in relation to their respective parties. In recent years it has appeared that the debate about conflict questions played an important role for the outcome of the election. The same can recur in the election this fall. In today's situation the Left-Right conflict dominates Norwegian politics. That is strongly apparent in the voters' opinions of political conflict questions.

The unflattering expression "blockhead voters" covers a rather widespread misconception of the relationship between the voters and the parties. The expression was meant for people who slavishly receive signals from their respective parties and share the parties' viewpoints through thick and thin. Modern election research has demonstrated that the so-called blockhead voters must be very few in numbers, if they exist at all.

Significant Deviation

When the voters are asked which party comes closest to their own opinion on concrete issues, they naturally have a tendency to name the party for which they usually vote. But deviations from this tendency are significant. The degree of unity with their own parties varies from issue to issue, and very few voters agree with their parties on all issues. There is another tendency which is at least as important: Regardless of party hue, voters are inclined to believe that one or two parties in the system best express their own opinions on individual issues, and that is not necessarily the same party they vote for. If the issue is sufficiently important from the viewpoint of the voter, and if he disagrees with his own party on the issue in question, that can lead to a change of party in the next election. The relationship of con-

fidence between the voter and the party which is expressed in the voter's opinion on concrete issues is therefore well worth a closer analysis.

In the Gallup/NOI/AFTENPOSTEN preelection poll those questioned were asked: "Which party or parties is closest to your opinion on the _____ issue?" The following issues were mentioned: security policy and Norway's membership in NATO, tax policy, improving the status of women, health care, employment. The results of the poll are presented in table 1.

[Key to political parties: A Labor Party
DLF Liberal People's Party
FRP Progressive Party
H Conservative Party
KRF Christian People's Party
RV Red Election Alliance
SP Center Party
SV Socialist-Left Party
V Liberal Party]

Table 1. Party closest to your opinion. (N = 945)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Security Policy</u>	<u>Tax Policy</u>	<u>Women's Status</u>	<u>Health Care</u>	<u>Employ- ment</u>	<u>Parties' Strength</u>
A	31	32	32	42	44	40
DLF	1	--	--	--	1	1
FRP	4	4	2	2	3	4
H	34	30	11	15	20	28
KRF	6	5	7	9	5	7
RV	--	--	1	--	1	--
SP	5	3	3	4	4	5
SV	6	4	11	6	4	4
V	2	1	3	4	1	2
No diff./						
Don't know	27	24	35	25	26	9
Total						
percent	116	105	106	107	108	100

Conservatives Lead

Because the question permitted several answers, the totals are more than 100 percent. About one-fourth of those questioned answered "don't know" or saw no difference between the parties. Those who named different parties should be compared with the voting strength of the party in question (right hand column in the table). The two largest parties were named the most often. The Conservatives had the relatively greatest confidence in security policy and tax policy. The Labor Party was the best on questions of employment and health care. This tendency became even more clear if we limit ourselves to the voters who consider those questions very important. Of the voters who

said that security policy is most important, 23 percent said that the Labor Party was closest to their opinion, while 42 percent said the Conservative Party and 12 percent said the Socialist-Left Party. Corresponding figures for tax policy are 28 percent for the Labor Party, 32 percent for the Conservative Party and 14 percent for the Progressive Party. Of those who say that employment is the most important, 47 percent said that the Labor Party was closest to their opinion on that question, while only 21 percent said the Conservative Party. The corresponding results for health care were 48 percent for the Labor Party and 13 percent for the Conservatives.

A and SV

Table 1 shows that in the question of the status of women, in which the "don't know" percentage is especially high, it was the Labor Party and the Socialist-Left which were relatively the strongest. The latter party also had a strong profile on security policy and health care. KRF enjoys relatively strong confidence in health care and the question of the status of women. The other parties did not distinguish themselves with especially clear profiles on any of the five issues.

The table tells about the confidence that the parties enjoy among the voters in general. The picture is more interesting when we look at opinions within different party groups. The first question then is: "What degree of confidence does each party enjoy among its own voters?" The answers are in Table 2.

Table 2. Voters who say that their own party is closest to their opinion, in percent.

Issue	A	FRP	H	KRF	SP	SV	V
Security	58	40	79	52	36	63	59
Tax	69	55	78	48	33	53	35
Women	58	38	33	44	22	70	39
Health	75	27	43	53	32	64	43
Jobs	75	40	56	46	31	59	25

Large Variations

This table clearly shows that no party enjoys 100 percent support among its own voters on concrete issues. In every party there is, however, a number of voters who do not have viewpoints on the individual issues. When 60-70 percent or more name their own party, that means that the party is strong on the issue in question. Table 2 shows large variations between the parties. The Conservative and Labor Parties have the relatively greatest confidence among their own voters. In the Labor Party agreement is strongest on the questions of health care, employment and tax policy. In the Conservative Party agreement is strongest in security policy and tax policies. The three middle parties, Liberal, Christian People's and Center have the relatively weakest support within their own ranks. But that could be because the named issues do not include those which are key questions for these parties. Previous polls

have thus demonstrated a very high agreement within the Christian People's Party with the party's standpoint on the abortion issue. The Progressive Party enjoys relatively high confidence on tax policy, but otherwise its opinions are weak. The Socialist-Left Party has overall strong support among its voters, with the strongest being on the issue of the status of women, the security policy and health care.

Draws Others

As a next step in the analysis we can ask how and to what extent voters in a given party are oriented in the direction of other parties. The general tendency is that when a party enjoys great confidence in a given area, not only the party's own voters but also the adherents of other parties feel themselves attracted by the party's viewpoint. The Conservative Party's position on security policy is a good example. All party groups with the exception of the Socialist-Left have a significant number who state that they agree with the Conservative Party. The numbers are 14 percent in the Labor Party, 32 percent in the Progressive Party, 21 percent in the Christian People's Party, 37 percent in the Center Party and 23 percent in the Liberal Party. Also the Labor Party is a leading party in people's awareness of security policy, but to a much lesser extent than the Conservative Party. The group which says that the Labor Party is closest to them on this issue is 11 percent for H, 12 percent for SP, 19 percent for SV, 36 percent for V but only 2 percent for FRP and 5 percent for KRF.

The pattern for tax policy is very similar to that for security policy. Here also the Conservatives attract considerable support from all party groups except for the Socialist-Left. But on the questions of health policy and employment it is the Labor Party which enjoys the greatest confidence across the entire party spectrum.

Clear Tendencies

The described tendencies become even clearer if the material is divided according to the voters' standpoints on the questions. In a previous article about tax policy it was shown that voters who support the demand for a progressive lowering of taxes are strongly inclined to support the Conservative tax policies. People who want to keep the existing taxing of high incomes on the other hand are more in sympathy with the Labor Party.

Defense Policy

Security policy is another outstanding example of the same tendency. Those questioned were asked about "reducing defense expenditures. Twenty-nine percent thought it was a good idea, 43 percent thought it was a bad idea, while 28 percent were neutral. The question about which party's voters agreed most closely with their own standpoint on security policy was studied separately for two groups: 1) those who want to reduce defense expenditures and 2) those who are against such a reduction. In the first group 44 percent named the

Labor Party and 17 percent the Conservatives as the party closest to them. In the second group 32 percent said the Labor Party and 39 percent said the Conservative Party.

A division according to the voters' opinions on women's equality does not give a significant result on opinions as to which parties most nearly represent the voters' opinions on this question. That must mean that this question has little relevance in the competition between parties. On the other hand opinions are especially clear on the issues of employment and health policies. In the case of health policies the voters are divided into two groups according to their opinions on the proposal to set up private hospitals on a private enterprise basis: 1) those in favor and 2) those opposed. In the first group 43 percent agree with the Conservative Party and another 8 percent agree with the Progressive Party, while only 23 percent agree with the Labor Party. In the second group the pattern is reversed, 52 percent agree with the Labor Party while only 16 percent agree with the Conservative Party.

Conservatives' Defense Policies Favored

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Feb 85 p 7


[Article by Henry Valen: "Conservative Attraction Also in the Labor Party"]

[Text] Material in the preelection poll indicates that more Labor Party voters are attracted to the Conservative Party than the opposite. That applies especially to the issue of security policy. It also shows strong polarization along the Right-Left axis between parties, where the Conservative Party and the Labor Party are the leading actors. The election campaign can have great importance for the Storting election in September, as can the issues in conflict.

In previous articles it was shown how the voters' viewpoints on concrete issues depend on their Right-Left positions. The same connection with the Right-Left axis becomes apparent when we look at the voters' confidence in the parties on individual issues. The three figures below illustrate that.

Conspicuous


Both when it applies to taxes and the health question it is conspicuous how the voters' confidence in the Right is tied to the Conservative and Progressive Parties. On the leftwing the Labor Party and the Socialist-Left Party are correspondingly dominant. In the political middle the parties named are weaker in the voters' awareness. That is partly due to the fact that the number who don't see any difference between the different parties is especially large in the middle, and partly that the middle parties are relatively strongest here.



Key: (1) Figure 1. Confidence in the parties:
 (2) Security policy. Party closest
 (3) Left
 (4) Left-center
 (5) Center
 (6) Right-center
 (7) Right
 (8) Self-placement on the Right-Left scale



Key to Figure 2 same as key to Figure 1 except:
 (2) Tax policy. Party closest



Key to Figure 3 same as key to Figure 1 except:
 (2) Health care system. Party closest

Same Pattern

The diagrams reflect the strong polarization along the Right-Left axis in the voters' opinions of the health question and security policy. The pattern is mainly the same for the other issues which are dealt with in this article. The parties included in the figures have a combination of voters, measured in the Right-Left position, which to a significant extent corresponds with the columns in the figures. In this the result is not surprising. But all the parties extend over a rather wide field along the Right-Left axis. The Right-Left opposition which is expressed in the figures is also present within the individual parties.

Let us look at the Labor and Conservative Parties. In the other parties the numerical foundation is too weak. Voters in the Labor Party are divided into two groups: 1) those who have placed themselves to the left of center, and 2) those who are in the center or to the right of center. The table below shows the percentage share in the two groups who consider the Labor Party, the Socialist-Left Party and the Conservative Party respectfully as closest to their own opinion.

Labor Party voters: percentage who say:

Party closest	Security policy		Tax policy	
	Left side	Right side and center	Left side	Right side and center
A	65%	34%	78%	53%
SV	6%	1%	5%	2%
H	6%	20%	3%	9%
N	(213)	(171)	(213)	(171)

On both questions voters on the party's leftwing are most inclined to name their own party and the Socialist-Left Party.

Those who placed themselves in the center or on the right side are somewhat less inclined to name the Labor Party. On the other hand the share which names the Conservative Party is more present in the latter group. In addition the Conservative Party is more attractive for Labor Party people in security policy than in tax policy. The difference is especially apparent in the middle and on the rightwing of the Labor Party.

Opposite Tendency

It is reasonable that the tendency is opposite in the Conservative Party. That party's voters are also divided into two groups: 1) those who have placed themselves to the right of center, and 2) those who are in the center or on the left.

Conservative Party voters: percentage who say:

Party closest	Security policy		Tax policy	
	Left side and center	Right side	Left side and center	Right side
H	44%	73%	60%	76%
FRP	0%	2%	3%	6%
A	13%	3%	3%	2%
N	(62)	(188)	(62)	(188)

Voters on the rightwing are most inclined to name their own party and the Progressive Party, while the Labor Party was named frequently in the middle and by the leftwing. The great polarization in security policy is also clear in the Conservative Party. Besides, the material indicates that voters in the Labor Party are more drawn by the Conservative Party than voters in the Conservative Party are drawn by the Labor Party. That applies particularly to security policy.

Conclusion

The above material shows that there is strong polarization along the Right-Left axis in the competition between the parties. In this competition the Labor and Conservative Parties are the chief participants. At the present time it is impossible to predict developments before the election. Polls show that the main blocs, the socialist parties and the Liberals on one side and the four nonsocialist parties on the other side, are rather even. Similar to the election of 1983, it looks like the election campaign can have great importance for the outcome of the election. Then the question will be which points of conflict will produce results. In a previous article it was shown that three questions occupy the voters most: employment, health care and care for the elderly. On all of these questions the Labor Party stands strong in the awareness of the voters. But it is by no means certain that these questions will be dominant up until the time of the election. Two other themes have played an important role in the political debate of recent years: tax policy and security policy. The conservative side has largely profited from them both. It is very possible that they will be the jokers in the coming election campaign. The outcome is unknown.

Uncertainty

The security policy debate has so far been divisive and damaging to the Labor Party. But it is clear that it can also be divisive within the government coalition. The same uncertainty exists in tax policy. The parties have so far avoided signalling their reactions to the report of the Tax Commission. It is tentatively open as to which tax questions will eventually come into focus. The only sure thing is that the voters largely want a lower tax, but they also want increased public expenditures in a number of areas. Will the election campaign lead to a connection between the expense side and the income side in the voters' awareness?

Paper Examines Poll Meaning

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Voters Out of Step"]

[Text] "Blockhead voter" is an unflattering designation for a voter who trots after his party on all questions. It often occurs in polls that attitudes toward new questions which come up have little relationship with party sympathy. But when the parties take their positions, the voters come along and assume

the same position. Now one should not necessarily blame people for that. Very few have the time and the interest to become involved in all the issues that might arise, and to the extent that one has registered confidence in a party, he has given a signal, and it is natural to follow it.

Now the preelection poll shows that the blockhead voter is a dying race. Obviously people are most often in agreement with their own party rather than with other parties, but opinions surprisingly often go contrary to party lines. Henry Valen's article in AFTENPOSTEN Wednesday showed for example that many Labor Party voters believe the Conservative Party position on security policy is most in agreement with their own opinion. On the other hand the Labor Party enjoys the confidence of many Conservative Party voters when it comes to health care and employment.

This lack of automatic position taking is healthy in a living democracy. Among other things, it leads to a more fruitful debate--both between and within the parties. But at the same time it is clear that a party which seldom has its own voters with it is in serious trouble. Valen's article confirms what we have said in a series of other polls, namely that the Center Party finds itself in such a situation. Here it is so little a question of blockhead voters, that it will be remarkable if the cows find their way back to the stalls. On the five issues which are included in this Gallup/NOI poll for AFTENPOSTEN, there were hardly one-third of the Center Party voters who said that the party was closest to their own opinion! That varies from 22 percent when it was a question of women's equality to 36 percent in security policy. In comparison, the poll shows that between 60 and 70 percent of the voters in the Labor Party and the Socialist-Left Party agreed with their own party, while Conservatives were just behind. Even the Liberals and the Progressive Party are more in step with their own voters than the Center Party.

The poll emphasizes that one of the main problems of the Center Party is a lack of a political profile on many questions. The voters find it easier to identify with the Conservative Party on tax policy, with Christian People's Party on moral questions, etc. The borders around the Center Party's land are often shifting, and many voters find other pastures. When most of the flock finds a home while the farmer himself is enticed by the election, the main reason is that they know where the grazing is best. The Center Party's character as the party of big business has become even more pronounced than before. That means that the party will totally disintegrate, but at the same time there is little hope of a significant number of voters.

9287

CSO: 3639/87

POLITICAL

NORWAY

CONSERVATIVES BUOYED BY POLLS

Young Males Boost 'Conservative Wave'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Ted Hanisch]

[Text] The trend toward neoliberal attitudes, the so-called conservative wave, shows no signs of coming to an end but it is not getting any stronger either. Between 15 and 20 percent of the voters seem to have a very clear conservative orientation. Too little attention has been given to the fact that between 30 and 35 percent of the voters have definite leftist attitudes. The conservative wave has hardly made a dent among younger women. The desire for lower taxes and lower public spending and the desire for private enterprise instead of state-owned firms are typical expressions of the conservative wave. Those who have the most definite conservative attitude are younger men working in the private sector. As shown earlier in the pre-election survey, support for typical conservative proposals on individual issues runs between 30 and 40 percent. Therefore a weaker but broader trend to the right can also be detected.

In this article we will try to clarify where the crucial areas for the conservative wave are located and where the Social Democratic tradition has its strongholds. One way to show the dividing lines more clearly is to combine the answers to several questions. In the pre-election survey we measured attitudes on taxes and public spending in two questions, namely whether the respondent agreed with the proposal to lower taxes on high incomes and the proposal to sharply cut public spending. On this basis respondents were put in three groups: those who had a conservative orientation on both questions, those who gave mixed answers and those who took a clearly leftist stand. The same thing was done with regard to the questions about the respondent's attitudes toward personal liability and private hospitals run on a commercial basis.

On this basis we see first a picture of the strength of the conservative wave as measured in terms of people's attitudes toward taxes and health policy.

Table 1. Orientation on Taxes and Health

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Taxes</u>	<u>Health</u>
Conservative	15	16
In between	56	48
Leftist	29	36
Total	100	100
Number responding	916	818

We see that the conservative trend is about equally strong on both issues but that the leftist orientation emerges more strongly because of the health issue. People seem to be more uncertain about tax policy, as well they might be.




Figure 1. Conservative Attitude on Taxes
Men and Women by Age

The diagram illustrates the extent of a clearly conservative attitude toward tax policy. And the young men are, the more conservative. Taxes seem to have less impact on women across the board.

Key:

- | | |
|---------------|----------|
| 1. Percentage | 3. Men |
| 2. Age | 4. Women |




Figure 2. Conservative Attitude toward Health
Men and Women by Age

Figure 2 shows the conservative orientation on health policy according to sex and age. Here is another striking contrast between young men and young women. Older women broke the "pattern" on their side of the scale.

Key:

- 1. Percentage
- 2. Age

- 3. Men
- 4. Women

One-Third of Men

We see that men are definitely more conservative the younger they are. Almost a third of the men surveyed between 18 and 29 years of age had a clearly conservative orientation. The picture is entirely different for women. The conservative wave does not seem to have had much effect on younger women. The difference is not as great between middle-aged and older men and women.

We get much the same impression when we study Figure 2, which shows the conservative attitude toward health policy according to age and sex.

Here too the difference between younger men and women is quite striking. Young women are much less conservative than others. When it comes to health policy, older women are actually somewhat more conservative in their attitudes than older men.

Social Background

Which social backgrounds promote a conservative or leftist orientation? In Table 2 we see how attitudes toward tax policy vary according to occupation.

The table shows that it makes a big difference in tax policy orientation whether one works for the private or the public sector, but the difference is more pronounced among men. One-third of the men working in the private sector have a clearly conservative orientation. We also see that the tendency to have a leftist orientation is definitely higher for those who work in the public sector. As expected, women working for private firms have the most unclear orientation. A great many of them have subordinate jobs, but at the same time they work in a business culture strongly dominated by conservative attitudes.

Table 2. Effect of Occupation on Orientation

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Women</u>
	<u>Private</u> <u>Sector</u>	<u>Public</u> <u>Sector</u>	<u>Private</u> <u>Sector</u>	<u>Public</u> <u>Sector</u>
Conservative	28	14	13	12
In between	46	45	62	52
Leftist	26	41	25	36
Total	100	100	100	100
Number responding	193	108	117	111

Thus we have confirmed that the conservative wave has much stronger roots in the private sector, especially among men. This picture is reinforced and deepened when we add the age factor. In Figure 1 we have shown the extent of a definite conservative orientation on tax policy for men and women according to age.

If we look at the material in context we have a very good basis for maintaining that the conservative wave has made a strong impact on young and, to some extent, middle-aged men working in the private sector. The wave has had almost no impact on young women. It is not unreasonable to explain this by pointing out that women have more direct contact with public services and that they also tend to work in the public sector. Therefore it is understandable that they are less affected by the conservative wave and that they have a more leftist orientation. It has long been possible to observe the difference between men and women in this area. However the interesting thing is that the difference seems to have been intensified. The impression that sex differences have a political impact is confirmed. A substantial group of women whose attitudes are in the center or left of center must be voting for non-socialist parties. We must assume that this is a relatively unreliable voter base.

When it comes to the inroads the conservative wave has made among young men--and apparently not just young men who have had vocational training or a higher

education--the explanation is not so easy to find. One thing that probably enters in is an interaction between a generally stronger orientation toward competition and the fact that men have substantially higher incomes than women and are thus more affected by progressive tax rates.

Break?

There can also be an element of a break with the traditional Social Democratic hegemony in Norwegian politics. Even after a good 3 years in the government the Conservative Party stands in a kind of attack position and the Labor Party is on the defensive.

Neoliberal Trend

This picture seems in turn to be connected with the relationship between the public and private sectors on the political and ideological levels. After many years of being on top as a creative sphere full of initiative, the public sector came on the defensive in the mid-1970's, not just in Norway but in a number of western countries. The setback in the western economy strengthened people's good feelings toward the private business sector. The new generations who are now starting to work in this sector are obviously sustaining the neo-liberal cultural trend. All in all this trend is turning out to be a good and reliable foundation for the Conservative Party.

The difference between young men and young women probably also reflects the simple fact that young women feel they have less to gain from the private business sector than young men. They have a greater chance than men of getting low-level jobs with lower wages. The public sector's ideology, which has strong elements of feminist culture in it, is much more attractive to women. What reduces the partisan effect of this difference is probably a certain adjustment of voting patterns within an individual family. Here too recent studies suggest that equality is having a certain effect since men are greatly affected by the political orientation of their spouses.

Conservative Party Membership Success

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Feb 85 p 9

[Excerpt] At this point the Conservative Party's recruitment campaign has produced more than 12,000 new members, according to organization secretary Sverre Granholt, who is part of the main organization of the Conservative Party. Last week they could point to an influx of 358 new members. Just since the first of the year the Conservative recruitment campaign has added 3000 members to the party.

Declining Voter Loyalty on Left

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Feb 85 p 6

[Article by Morten Malmo]

[Text] Labor Party voters from 1981 are less "firm in their belief" in the party than they were a year ago. The tendency is the same in SV [Socialist Left Party] and the Liberal Party. The Christian People's Party and the Progressive Party have approximately the same voter stability they had last year while the Conservatives and the Center Party can rejoice in a higher degree of voter stability than they had in January 1984.

In the survey Gallup/NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] conducted for AFTENPOSTEN, around 1000 people were interviewed. They were all asked this question:

"Did you vote in the 1981 Storting election? If so, are you absolutely certain you would vote for the same party again if we had a Storting election tomorrow? Or would you consider voting for another party, definitely vote for another party, not vote at all or don't you know for sure just what you would do?"

No Change for 76 Percent

The answers revealed that 76 percent would vote for the same party they chose in 1981 if we had a Storting election tomorrow. Some 11 percent said they might vote for another party, 4 percent said they would definitely vote for another party, 1 percent would not vote and 8 percent were in the "don't know" category.

Those Under 30 Less Stable

If we look a little closer at the group that said they would vote for the same party they voted for in 1981 if we had an election tomorrow, the figures show that women are just as stable as men. However young people under the age of 30 are very unstable. Only 59 percent of this group would definitely vote the same way next time. The corresponding figure for those over the age of 60 was 89 percent. Among those under 30, 22 percent said they might choose a different party than the one they voted for last time and 8 percent said they would definitely do so. It was also in this age group that the "don't know" response was heard most frequently.

Bleak Outlook for Labor Party

Of those who voted for the Labor Party in the 1981 election, 80 percent said they would definitely vote for the Labor Party if we had an election tomorrow. But a year ago this answer was given by 87 percent and the party also had a solid grip on its voters later on. Now there seem to be clear signs of defection. Some 74 percent of SV voters said they would definitely vote the same way now. Last January the figure was 84 percent. The situation is even

bleaker for the Liberals. A year ago 61 percent of Liberal Party voters said they would definitely vote for the Liberal Party again. Today the party does not "score" higher than 42 percent. The Progressive Party has about the same amount of voter stability as it had a year ago, namely 67 percent.

Increased Stability

The three government coalition parties have reason to be happy about this poll. The Conservative Party now has as much voter stability as the Labor Party and what is more, the stability has increased from 67 percent in January 1984 to 79 percent last month. Christian People's Party voters are just as stable as they were a year ago, with a rating of 77 percent.

The Center Party made big gains in last month's survey. Last January 72 percent of the party's 1981 voters said they would definitely vote for the same party. This January the figure was 85 percent.

The opinion institute noted that the survey included few voters for the Progressive, Center, SV and Liberal parties--and that the figure for these parties were therefore unreliable.

Voters Optimistic on Economy


Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Thomas Knutzen]

[Text] Optimism is rising. People have more faith that their own economic position will be improved in the months ahead than they had before. Expectations that the general economic situation will improve in the year ahead are also greater than similar polls have indicated for the last 4 years. This is shown by the MMI [Market and Media Institute] market barometer, with the January poll showing the highest level registered since the surveys were instituted in 1981.

As part of a larger project within EC, the Market and Media Institute makes a survey three times a year of people's expectations and attitudes with regard to some vital factors in the economy. The results show what people expect from developments and what they can predict about their own behavior on that basis. If there is a broad feeling that the economy will improve and that one's own economic situation will get better, people will embark on purchases and investments. That in itself creates economic growth. That is why their expectations are important.

The MMI January poll showed that there are fewer and fewer pessimists, so that the positive view of things has intensified. The total increase as summarized in MMI's market barometer was from 97 to 104 points, the highest ever measured since these surveys were introduced in Norway.



The market barometer is now at 104 points, the highest level ever recorded.

Key:

1. Index value
2. Month
3. Year

MMI specifically measures people's expectations of price developments, their own economic situation and economic developments in general. As early as the beginning of 1983 there was a shift in price expectations, with those expecting lower price increases becoming a majority. In May 1983 the majority believed their own economic situation would improve and since the beginning of 1984 there has also been a majority expectation that the general economic development would improve. What happened between the survey taken last October and the one taken this January is that the majority of those expecting improvement increased while those expecting the situation to get worse declined in number.

Here are the answers given to the main questions:

Expectations of Price Developments
in the Next 12 Months

Jan 85 Oct 84

Prices will rise faster than they have so far	5	9
Prices will rise at about the same rate as they have so far	64	64
Prices will rise more slowly than they have so far	14	14
(Other answers: Prices will remain the same as they are now, will decline or "don't know") [Figures not given]		

Personal Economic Expectations
in the Next 12 Months

	<u>Jan 85</u>	<u>Oct 84</u>
Substantial improvement	5	4
Some improvement	21	20
About the same	59	58
Somewhat worse	9	10
Much worse	1	2

Expectations of General Economic
Developments in the Next 12 Months

Substantial improvement	2	1
Some improvement	24	23
About the same	53	51
Somewhat worse	7	12
Much worse	1	2

Optimism Greatest in Government Parties

Those who support government coalition parties think the economy is going best, while Labor voters are more skeptical. This appears from the material on which the MMI market barometer is based. It is generally also true that men are more optimistic than women and that those with higher incomes have experienced a greater improvement in their personal economic situations in the last 12 months than those with lower incomes.

The picture is not entirely clearcut. In many instances the Center Party voters were the least optimistic, while in general the mood of Christian People's Party voters was cautious. The Liberals and the Socialist Left covered the entire spectrum. Within SV, however, there was overwhelming pessimism with regard to future prospects. The Progressive voters were the most optimistic.

This can be clearly seen with respect to expectations of one's own economic situation in the next 12 months. Some 44.5 percent of Progressive voters expect improvement, while the corresponding figures for the Conservatives and the Liberals are 37.5 and 31.6 percent. These three parties help to pull up the average, while SV with 24.1 percent showing optimism, the Labor Party with 19.7, the Christian People's Party with 16.0 and the Center Party with 7.7 pulled it down.

Most of those who expected their own economic situation to get worse could be found in the Center Party, but Labor voters did not expect much change.

When it comes to the general economic development Conservative voters are most optimistic, followed by the Progressives, KRF [Christian People's Party] supporters and the Liberals, while the pessimists vote for SV. People backing the Labor Party expect the general economic situation 12 months from now to be the same as it is today.

The belief in a continuation of lower price increases is strongest in the Conservative Party and the Christian People's Party while Labor voters overwhelmingly expect price increases similar to those we have now and there are more of them who expect greater price increases than there are in the other parties.

Lower Unemployment

Some 36 percent believe there will be less unemployment 6 months from now while around 30 percent believe there will be more. Around 25 percent do not expect any change in unemployment. This appears from studies made in connection with the MMI market barometer.

If one looks 12 months ahead the picture is generally the same, but more people answered "don't know." Some 35 percent expect less unemployment 12 months from now while around 28 percent expect more unemployment and around 24 percent expect no change.

As is the case with the other major questions involved in the market barometer, voters for the government parties and the Progressive Party expected lower unemployment while the Labor Party and SV had more people who expect an increase.

Paper Comments on Poll

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Mounting Optimism"]

[Text] As the government's economic policies produce tangible positive results in more and more areas, optimism also mounts among the members of the public. This can be clearly seen in the MMI/AFTENPOSTEN market barometer for January which was published in our morning edition on Saturday.

As we know it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future. That will probably continue to be the case. But positive expectations should not be despised. According to the market barometer people have greater faith that their own economic situation will improve in the months ahead than they had before. Expectations that the general economic situation will improve in the coming year are also higher than those in similar surveys taken for the last 4 years.

Mounting optimism is an important psychological factor that will have a positive ripple effect on the economic situation the country finds itself in now. We have already seen how increased faith in the future revitalizes various parts of the private business sector. Greater willingness to invest and new initiative show that a growing number of people in the private sector have faith that the government's policies will promote a healthy and correct

development and are worth investing in. That is what creates economic growth and new and lasting jobs.

People's expectations and attitudes, as expressed in the market barometer, reflect an important reality. If there is a widespread feeling that the economy will be better and that one's own economic situation will improve people start making purchases and investments. The result is increased activity in the private sector.

All this helps to reinforce the positive picture of our economic prospects and that confirms the promising statements Willoch and Presthus make about things going much better now. But in order to insure a continued secure development it is vitally important to keep cost increases under control. If we cannot manage that, we risk a dangerous deterioration of our competitiveness and further loss of jobs.

The latest OECD report on economic developments in Norway warned against the effects of what OECD itself called an expansive economic policy. In our view the warning is justified although we fully comprehend the political considerations the government has had to bear in mind.

But the OECD conclusion on this point is also a stern condemnation of the policy of outbidding that the Labor Party still insists on trying to pursue. It is obvious that this would be far more inflationary than the relatively moderate financial policy that is being pursued by the Willoch government.

If people's mounting expectations are to be fulfilled, it will be necessary to continue to follow a firm political course in the future. A new round of inflationary policies according to the Labor Party model would mean that the results that have been achieved under 4 years of nonsocialist control can be regarded as a waste of energy.

6578

CSO: 3639/85

POLITICAL

NORWAY

CENTER PARTY BOOSTED IN POLL, CHAIRMAN SEES CONTINUED COALITION

Only Coalition Party Gaining

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Jan 85 p 6

[Article by Gunnar A. Johansen]

[Text] The Center Party (SP) is rejoicing. After having been in the shadows, party support is again back to levels recorded in the last parliamentary election, according to Norwegian Market Data's December poll.

The Progressive Party (FRP), on the other hand, is experiencing another polling squeeze, registering record low voter support. Furthermore, both the Labor Party (A) and the Conservative Party (H) show declines. The Liberal Party (V) gained a little support.

The Center Party has every reason to be happy about the polling results. During the last 2 months in 1984, the party gained 1.5 percent of the voter support, which is now 6.6 percent, the same as in the 1981 parliamentary election. As late as last October, Center Party voter support was down to 5.1 percent. Other opinion polls have shown party support to be in the 4-percent range.

Experiencing Opposition

The Progressive Party, on the other hand, is now experiencing a great deal of opposition. Since fall of 1983, party support has declined steadily, registering a record low in the December poll--5.4 percent. Party Chairman Carl I. Hagen admits that the trend looks bad.

"However, this is because we have been concentrating on internal party work and thus have not been much in the limelight. We will be addressing voters more between now and the election, and I am anxious to see the results. The mass media seem to be reverting to the old posture that we are not important," Carl I. Hagen told ARBEIDERBLADET.

A and H Declined

The Labor Party (A) and the Conservative Party (H) both registered a loss of

voter support in the Norwegian Market Data's December poll, the Labor Party by 0.8 percent--from 39.6 to 38.8 percent, and the Conservative Party by only 0.2 percent--from 29.4 to 29.2 percent.

The Christian People's Party (KRF) also had to endure a slight decline, from 8.6 percent in November to 8.2 percent in December. The Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Liberal Party (V) both gained voter support in the December poll, SV by 0.5 percent, from 5.1 to 5.6 percent, and V by a respectable 0.7 percent, from 3.7 to 4.4 percent.

POLITICAL BAROMETER

Question: Would you vote if an election were held tomorrow?
IF YES: Which party would you vote for?

DISTRIBUTION OF ANSWERS:

	YEAR	A %	H %	KR.F. %	SP %	SV %	V %	FRP %	DMF %	NKP %	RV %	OTHERS %
	81	37.1	31.8	9.3	6.6	5.0	3.9	4.5	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.2
January	83	39.6	30.4	7.6	6.0	5.6	3.7	5.8	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.2
February	83	37.8	30.5	8.9	6.0	5.1	4.3	5.4	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.6
March/April	83	37.4	31.4	7.0	6.7	5.2	3.9	6.6	0.5	0.2	0.7	0.4
May	83	37.5	30.5	8.7	6.4	5.1	4.2	5.9	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.4
June	83	38.6	30.4	8.0	6.6	5.0	4.0	5.4	0.4	0.3	1.0	0.3
August	83	38.2	30.2	8.0	6.3	5.4	4.2	5.9	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.4
Election 83	83	38.9	26.4	8.8	7.2	5.3	4.4	6.3	0.7	0.4	1.2	0.3
September	83	39.0	27.8	8.6	6.0	4.9	4.3	7.7	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.2
October	83	39.2	26.8	8.1	6.2	5.8	4.0	8.3	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.2
November	83	40.5	26.1	7.7	5.4	5.8	3.6	9.3	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.2
December	83	39.9	27.6	7.8	5.5	5.5	4.2	7.9	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.1
January	84	38.9	28.7	7.9	5.7	5.9	4.0	7.0	0.3	0.4	1.1	0.2
February/March	84	38.4	28.9	8.3	5.7	6.5	4.0	7.1	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.2
April	84	39.2	28.6	8.7	6.1	5.2	3.3	6.7	0.6	0.2	1.1	0.4
May	84	39.0	28.6	7.6	6.3	5.8	3.8	7.5	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.3
June	84	40.1	28.9	7.7	5.3	6.2	4.0	6.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
August	84	39.6	28.0	8.5	5.2	6.0	4.1	7.1	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.1
September	84	39.9	29.1	8.9	5.6	5.4	4.5	5.7	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.0
October	84	39.3	28.5	8.5	5.1	6.0	3.4	6.4	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.5
November	84	39.6	29.4	8.6	6.0	5.1	3.7	5.9	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.4
December	84	38.8	29.2	8.2	6.6	5.6	4.4	5.4	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.2

Interviews were made between 12 December 1984 and 5 January 1985. Number of persons interviewed 1,252. Of these 1,007 responded to question about party choice.

Norwegian Market Data, Inc.

A = Labor Party
H = Conservative Party
KR.F. = Christian People's Party
SP = Center Party
SV = Socialist Left Party

V = Liberal Party
FRP = Progressive Party
DNF = The New People's Party
NKP = Norwegian Communist Party
RV = Red Election Alliance

Jakobsen Expects Nonsocialist Victory

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] "After almost 2 years of working together as a coalition government, the three government parties are now better equipped to deal with parliamentary problems than we were in the beginning." This statement was made by Center Party Chairman, Minister of Transport and Communications, Johan J. Jakobsen, who had this to say about the coalition parties' need for positioning themselves in the election campaign: "This need is legitimate. We may have different views on several issues, but we all have a responsibility to see that it is not focused in such a way that it creates the impression of strife and lack of willingness to cooperate. This is the strategy-" said the optimistic cabinet minister, who grades the government's work "very satisfactory"--and who believes in a renewed nonsocialist government mandate.

Johan J. Jakobsen can be characterized as optimistic, courageous and having a twinkle in his eye some 7 months prior to the parliamentary election.

"It is clear that the government is holding good cards. We have restored the Norwegian economy and this provides the basis for a year of active political work. Moreover, the four opinion institutes have shown the Center Party gaining support in two successive months. Through reasonable cooperation, we should be able to gain at least the same parliamentary representation we have today. This is a sober and realistic goal. Furthermore," the chairman added, "the Center Party usually does better in an election than what the polls predict."

"But first there has to be an election?"

"Yes, you don't count your chickens before they're hatched. My belief in a renewed government coalition between the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party is based on the following simple reasoning: Since the Labor Party has not been able to gain support while we have been in power--during which time the Government has had to enact some unpopular measures to bring about a balanced economy--it is difficult to see how the party can gain voter support in the months remaining before the election.

"The "sure" part of the work is behind us and we have documented to the whole world that the Labor Party's blackmail campaign failed!"

The Minister of Transport and Communications leaned across the desk and reminded us of Guttorm Hansen's statement during the parliamentary debate on the State of the Nation report to the effect that whatever light the Government sees at the end of the tunnel will prove to be an approaching train and not daylight.

"I wonder if Guttorm^m Hansen still feels the same after seeing the Central

Pintasilgo has already entered the final
there is talk that her candidacy will be

General Eanes is coming out of these epics
is incapable of disciplining an adviser
a politician is powerless to contain a man
ing to guide a party? If a leader is not
tial household, how can he aspire to decide

Although not yet an official candidate, P
thing: objectively, she has debunked General

That fact has assumed such proportions that
Pintasilgo have begun to worry about the

He needed to show that he was still a power

He needed to blot out Pintasilgo's candidacy
rectly, he must do it indirectly and through
presidential election by holding legislative

With the resignation of the government and
the Republic, Eanes would regain the political
concerning the presidential election, Eanes
position as the point of reference and could
have the final say concerning the race for
Pintasilgo was stealing from him.

Besides, early legislative elections might
PS [Socialist Party], an advance for the PS
[Social Democratic Party], and the assertion
would increase the scope for presidential

Lastly, if the legislative elections were
would be all the better. There would be
organize the Eanist party, and also strengthen
the republic.

It was an attractive idea--designed for a
an attractive idea all the same. Pintasilgo

With affection and much friendship, but for

Eanist advisers not supporting Pintasilgo
that was that Pintasilgo is not General Eanes
happen: she advances on them. She does not
been decided: she takes risks. She does not
after listening to the drawing on the map
start.

And the answer was not long in coming: circles close to Pintasilgo immediately said that everything was being prepared for her candidacy and that it would be defiantly launched next June. With or without the resignation of the government or the dissolution of Parliament.

In a word, Pintasilgo--an Eanist by conversion years ago, an Eanist out of a sense of its rightness, and an Eanist by conviction--has turned into one more headache for General Eanes.

Obviously, some of our readers are going to ask, and rightly so: but isn't Pintasilgo an Eanist? Doesn't General Eanes value Pintasilgo personally, and doesn't she admire him with all her sensitivity? Was it not he who raised her to the position of prime minister, and has she not been cultivating him politically with extreme solicitude?

No doubt.

But reality can do what nothing else can.

General Eanes is already the past, and Pintasilgo wants to be the future. General Eanes is caught in the inertia of desperate agitation but facing the irreversible end of his term of office. Pintasilgo is caught up in the dynamics of an upcoming term of office.

One must be an exceptionally superior person to experience the end of one's era and accept without acrimony the aggressiveness of someone wanting to announce a new era. This is true even if one knows that what is being announced is merely an extension of one's own era.

The Pintasilgo movement may be the most attractive face of Eanism at the moment (as the polls say it is).

But for the man himself, it is the more painful face of Eanism without Eanes.

11798

CSO: 3542/96

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PINTASILGO CANDIDACY SEEN PROBLEM FOR 'EANIST' PARTY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saravio]

[Text] Before coming into existence, the "Eanist" Party already has a problem to solve: the candidacy of engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo for the Presidency of the Republic.

From what can be ascertained, Gen Ramalho Eanes did not want his adviser to enter the presidential race, at least ~~not~~ now.

The same holds true in the case of the "Eanist" Party--which, sharing the general's doubts, preferred to see the question of the candidacy for the presidency postponed.

Why, then, did Lourdes Pintasilgo launch her candidacy?

Exactly for this reason.

That is to say, because she wanted to make it quite clear that her situation as a candidate in Belem had nothing to do with either General Eanes or the "Eanists."

We could go further.

We could say that Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo felt that, if she left it up to Eanes and the "Eanists" to choose their candidate, they would probably not choose her--and, from that point on, she would have little possibility of becoming a candidate.

With her decision to go ahead immediately, Pintasilgo turned the tables: the problem ceased to be hers and became that of the party which derives its inspiration from the image of General Eanes.

The truth is that the "Eanists" are stuck with a problem which is difficult to solve.

If they support engineer Lourdes Pintasilgo, they will give rise to internal conflicts and be accused, in their first public act, of not being capable of proceeding on their own--having to lean on a candidacy already launched.

But if, on the contrary, they do not support Pintasilgo and decide to launch their own alternative candidate, they will run the risk--with the division of votes--of not having that candidate pass the second time; they will thus acknowledge a clumsy handling of the situation even before showing their worth as a political party.

Therefore, the decision is not a simple one.

Rather, the decision is so difficult that the "Eanist" Party may see itself forced to withhold its support from all candidates, leaving the question to be resolved among the candidates presented by the others.

This, let it be recognized, cannot help but appear as a defeat in the eyes of public opinion, for it will be proof that, despite the prestige of its leader and the hundreds of individuals who have given it their support, the new party was unable to overcome the difficulties imposed by a woman who has little more to offer than herself.

8568

CSO: 3542/106

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

MAJORITY OF PUBLIC REPORTEDLY SUPPORTS LOURDES PINTASILGO

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 25-31 Jan 85 p 6

[Text] A source close to engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo acknowledged to O JORNAL yesterday, Thursday, that "the results thus far supplied by the lists distributed throughout the country to assess public feeling toward a possible presidential candidacy by the former prime minister fully confirm the figures of the polls that have been published in the press, which put her at the head of the presidential hopefuls."

According to the same source, "the lists received thus far number in the thousands" and their results are considered "surprising." "Moreover, if we consider the short memory of people, it is perhaps difficult for us to explain this fact in political terms," he observed.

The same source assured us that although this apparent "mass support" for her candidacy should weigh heavily in the final decision of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo--for whom, listening to public opinion has always been considered basic on launching a presidential candidacy--nevertheless, this fact should not justify any change in the political "timing" originally planned.

Furthermore, Lourdes Pintasilgo admitted yesterday that "if other independent, credible candidacies emerge on the basis of mine, I will rethink whether or not I should run."

Luncheon With Diplomats

The subject of the presidential elections and the possible candidacy of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo was also one of the main points discussed at the luncheon that was held yesterday in the Businessmen's Club in Lisbon, where the former prime minister met with the Diplomats' Association, on the initiative of that group.

Before about 70 representatives of the diplomatic corps present at the luncheon (an extra table was needed), Lourdes Pintasilgo had the opportunity to express her opinion on the Portuguese political situation, which was followed by a period of questions and answers dealing with, among other topics, her possible candidacy.

Immediately after the meeting, a source close to engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo told us: "The diplomats' questions were directed primarily at the political and social consequences of that candidacy in national terms.

"Although it may be difficult to say what may be the reaction of diplomatic circles to a candidacy by engineer Lourdes Pintasilgo, I believe I understood that the majority of those present did not in any way express opposition to such a possibility," added the same source.

Yesterday's meeting was part of the program of meetings that the Diplomats' Association has been holding regularly with political and party leaders to familiarize themselves with the positions of the various groups with regard to the Portuguese situation.

8711

CSO: 3542/104

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

INSTITUTE OFFICIAL DENIES POLITICAL ROLE

Official Retires From Military

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Feb 85 p 36

[Excerpts] Yesterday, Thursday, Major Sousa e Castro entered the reserves by order of the chief of the army's general staff who granted the major's request to take this action. As a result, he was relieved of the duties of president of the Damiao de Gois Institute [IDG], closely associated with the Presidency of the Republic, in which duties he was subject to call by the army; but through another order, again given yesterday, the president of the republic assigned him the responsibility of once more taking up those duties.

Has Marques Junior Also Entered the Reserves?

Major Sousa e Castro is the first military participant in the 25 April event who, having belonged to the Council of the Revolution [CR], is taking advantage of the decree which grants full service status to any members of that sovereign organization who want to enter the reserves. Other members of the CR who could profit by the terms of this decree are Col Costa Neves, Lt Col Vasco Lourenco, Cmdr Martins Guerreiro and Capt Marques Junior.

From what O JORNAL has learned, Capt Marques Junior might also request permission to enter the reserves, although he has not yet reached a decision in that regard. The other three 25 April military participants, former members of the CR, are not contemplating entering the reserves.

Major Predicts Pintasilgo Victory

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 1-7 Feb 85 p 1

[Interview with Major Sousa e Castro on Pintasilgo's chances for a successful presidential electoral campaign, by TEMPO correspondent Carlos Pires; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] "I am thoroughly convinced that engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo will be a candidate and adhere to the independent, nonpartisan

line which she has outlined. If this occurs, I do not have the slightest doubt at this time that Mari de Lourdes Pintasilgo will win the next presidential election." This observation was made by Major Sousa e Castro who, as of now, is no longer a member of the armed forces and is free to engage in any political activities like all other Portuguese citizens. Meanwhile, Sousa e Castro will continue to remain at the helm of the IDG, established in 1979 to help carry out the presidential function; incidentally, the IDG has denied any possibility of serving as a "launching ramp" for any electoral campaign.

TEMPO: A news release appeared recently calling attention to IDG's participation in pre-electoral campaigns. Would you like to comment on that, Major?

Sousa e Castro: The IDG is an institution which gives technical support to the presidential function. There is not, nor can there be, any possible confusion between the viewpoints of individual IDG members and the institution itself (we have experts with leftist ideas and others with rightist ideas). That situation obviously causes a certain amount of confusion, but I can assure you that the institution is not serving nor will it serve as the basis for any electoral campaign.

Naturally, as an institution designed to aid the presidential function, the IDG is one of the sources of information used by the president of the republic, and any studies made in this respect are for that purpose, among others. This is the case of the study made on the Portuguese economic situation recently published in a weekly newspaper with whose inferences, you can be sure, I disagree.

Institute Destined for Extinction

TEMPO: The same news report indicated that the IDG was to be eliminated...

Sousa e Castro: I have no indication that the government has any intention of taking legislative action to eliminate the institution.

TEMPO: Could the government, acting alone, take that action?

Sousa e Castro: The institute was established by law and only by law can it be eliminated. But, as you know, in order to become law, all decrees must be promulgated by the president of the republic...

TEMPO: You are entering the reserves to do precisely what?

Sousa e Castro: I am going to devote my time to business. Moreover, what most people do not know is that I am already in business in the textile sector.

TEMPO: Have you no other motives, Major? Political, for example?

Sousa e Castro: No, not in the least. In fact, it is purely a technical-professional change. It has no political connotation.

TEMPO: Ten years after the 25 April event...

Sousa e Castro: It was worth it! I shall always be of that opinion. However, this does not mean that the 25 April event achieved all of its goals.

TEMPO: Major Sousa e Castro is publicly recognized as one of the supporters of the candidacy of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo for the Presidency of the Republic. Do you sincerely believe that Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo has a chance to be elected?

Sousa e Castro: I am thoroughly convinced that engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo will be a candidate and will adhere to the independent, non-partisan line which she outlined. If this occurs, I do not have the slightest doubt at this time that Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo will win the next presidential election.

8568

CSO: 3542/106

25 March 1985

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SOARES PRESIDENCY WOULD MEAN AN 'ACT OF RESIGNATION'

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 25-31 Jan 85 p 11

[Article by Pedro Henriques Valido: "To Soarize"]

[Text] With the approach of presidential elections, positions are beginning to be defined a little. Although there may not have been any official or announced candidacies as yet (the case of Menezes Alves is so unimportant that it does not even deserve to be considered an exception), the "lobbies" are beginning to go into action and personalities regarded as independent are expressing their preferences.

Mario Soares, who is being as tardy in the official launching of his candidacy as he was premature in its practical preparation, has been the main beneficiary of the choices that are being made. In addition to the already expected support coming from within his party, the secretary general of the Socialist Party (PS) recently received support for his possible candidacy from personalities such as Antonio Barreto, Alcada Baptista and Vasco Pulido Valente--unexpected and truly astonishing support, not so much by their electoral importance but above all by what they signify about the deterioration of the will for change among the best of the Portuguese intellectual community.

Because, above all, it is necessary to think of what a Mario Soares candidacy would mean in the present context.

The situation in Portugal is disastrous; I believe all Portuguese must be in agreement on this. The country's foreign difficulties are becoming almost insurmountable; the standard of living is declining in an alarming manner, not sparing anyone; backwardness in economic terms has increased in recent years corresponding to the ever greater gap that separates the scientifically and technologically more advanced countries from a Portugal that is late in understanding the growing importance of key technologies in modern economic life; insecurity is the order of the day on the streets and in the schools, reaching the limits of tolerance; and a new generation is emerging in a country without solutions for anyone, much less for someone who wants to start.

To this situation must be added the reprehensible behavior of the political class, indolent and undisciplined, and the constant spectacle of corruption that seems to spread all over the country in the face of the lack of interest on the part of the authorities and the outrage of the people.

Thanks to all of that, after a decade of democracy, the Portuguese are more than unhappy--they must be revolted.

For that reason, the Portuguese must feel the desire for change to be, more than a desire, an imperative necessity.

And the presidential elections arise as a propitious moment to implement it. In the face of the exhaustion of the existing solutions and plans, the presidential elections represent a unique opportunity to permit the creation of new plans and solutions in the midst of Portuguese society which offer a new hope to the Portuguese. Furthermore, it is precisely for that purpose that elections are useful.

Well, within that context, Mario Soares' candidacy is profoundly reactionary and conservative. He is the man of this system per excellence. He embodies everything that is good and bad in it. Except that--and the results speak for themselves--the bad side greatly exceeds the good side.

The election of Mario Soares would represent maintaining the current state of affairs, essentially. Something would change, certainly; not only the president but also the government and even, perhaps, the power bloc itself. But it would be no more than exemplifying the maxim of the famous Visconti film: Things have to change so that everything can remain the same.

And that is what those who have been backing a possible presidential candidacy by Mario Soares are supporting.

They argue the need for stability and unity in the exercise of political power, believing that with Soares in Belem there would not be institutional guerrilla fighting because PS control of all organs of power would be guaranteed and we could finally have a governable country.

They forget, however, that the root of the problems does not lie in one or in certain persons or in the relations that exist between them. What is wrong is much deeper and lies in the very essence of a hybrid system such as ours and in the lack of dignity with which politics is practiced.

It would be well for Portugal if all problems could be resolved with the replacement of one man by another. But, no; it requires a total renewal of our way of facing the country's destiny, and that will necessarily require an energizing and credible plan.

To "Soarize" today is to make a pact with unworkableness; it means not acknowledging in the country the strength to improve and to progress, and accepting instability and insecurity. In short, it is an act of resignation.

8711

CSO: 3542/104

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PSD POLITICIAN DE MELO OPPOSED TO SOARES CANDIDACY

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 10 Jan 85 pp 3-4

[Interview with PSD politician Eurico de Melo; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] The presentation of a nonpartisan candidate who can achieve consensus and support among the democratic parties--the PSD [Social Democratic Party], the PS [Socialist Party], and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]--is advocated by Eurico de Melo in statements made exclusively to A TARDE. Eurico de Melo rules out the possibility that he will support any partisan candidate, specifically Mario Soares. He says, however, that he would support a military man. The northern politician, who recently sold the factory he owned, confirms that he is returning to active politics and expresses his support for Mota Pinto's leadership of the PSD.

A TARDE: The presidential election will be held in a few months, and it will be the major political event of the year we are just beginning. You certainly already have a definite stand on this issue.

Eurico de Melo: I will take the position that the party adopts at the proper time.

[Question] As an example, is it possible that you will eventually support the candidacy of Mario Soares?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] I think that at the present time and in the circumstances currently being experienced by the country, there is a need for political stability. But that depends on government stability and on good relations among the democratic institutions: the president of the republic, the Assembly of the Republic, and the government. To ensure the government's stability, it is necessary not to create political facts that will lead to destabilization, and one example would be the presentation of partisan candidates.

[Question] Is that why you say you do not support the candidacy of Mario Soares?

[Answer] Since Mario Soares' candidacy is a partisan candidacy, I consider it a factor for political destabilization, so I will never be able to support it.

[Question] So you are against partisan candidates. What alternative do you propose?

[Answer] The presentation of a nonpartisan candidate who can achieve consensus and win support among the democratic parties.

[Question] What do you mean by democratic parties?

[Answer] When I say democratic parties, I am obviously referring to the PSD, the CDS, and the PS.

[Question] Could that candidate be the member of a party? You have already said that he could not be Mario Soares. But how about another party member?

[Answer] He can be a member provided that he has the consensus of the democratic parties--provided that they accept him. But Soares is a partisan candidate.

[Question] What about a military man? Could the candidate with support from all the democratic parties be a military man?

[Answer] I do not exclude the military. I consider them Portuguese citizens like anyone else and, therefore, as not having any special feature that would exclude them from the office of president of the republic.

Besides, given the current circumstances I have already referred to, we must think more about the nation and less about parties and individuals.

[Question] What about the leadership of the PSD? How do you view your party's internal problems?

[Answer] The PSD's internal problems are well known, contrary to the situation in other parties, which have much more serious problems but conceal them.

[Question] What about the PSD's crisis of leadership, as it is commonly called?

[Answer] There is no crisis of leadership in the PSD. Mota Pinto has been able to solve the problems as they have arisen with full party support, as the National Council meetings and the congresses have shown. The people challenging Mota Pinto's leadership were not able to do any better when they were in positions of responsibility.

[Question] Do you mean that Mota Pinto has your support?

[Answer] I accept Mota Pinto's leadership and the current political committee. But this does not mean that I do not have many individual criticisms to express

or that there is not a lot that needs to be changed at the level of the government and of its actions so that policy can take a new direction that will be more effective for the country.

[Question] One last question. Tension has again appeared in relations between the government and the president of the republic following the president's New Year's speech and the government note that was issued in response. A moment ago you mentioned the need for good relations among the institutions. What is your position on this issue?

[Answer] I fully subscribe to the government note.

11798

CSO: 3542/98

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

AMARAL, JARDIM ACCUSED OF FOMENTING SEPARATISM

Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 3 Jan 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Amaral, Jardim, and Separatism"]

[Text] Providing official protection for separatism and encouraging its subversive activities, challenging the integrity and unity of the state, and directing an unspeakable provocation at the institutions, the democratic system, and the Portuguese people from the North to Algarve, from the Azores to Madeira, and in the numerous Portuguese communities scattered around the world--that constitutes the quick "summary" that can be made of the recent public statements by the chairmen of the regional governments of the Azores and Madeira, Mota Amaral and Alberto Joao Jardim respectively. Those statements were made almost simultaneously, and they brought an immediate and sharp repudiation from democrats and patriots.

Although long accustomed to the pirouettes and intrigues of those two PSD [Social Democratic Party] leaders--who are always to be found on the front line when it comes to low electioneering demagoguery in the islands or the sad spectacle of partisan disputes within the PSD--Portuguese public opinion has just grounds for becoming indignant and energetically condemning the serious stands taken in public by the top officials in the two regional governments.

When Mota Amaral says he sees no drawbacks at all to legalizing the separatist organization that has been active in the Autonomous Region of the Azores and, on the contrary, even says he is ready for dialogue with that association of terrorists, and when Alberto Joao Jardim, in the wake of Amaral's statements, praises the Madeiran separatists and even their attacks and then goes on to say, among other monstrous things, that autonomy is "the midway point between independence and integration" and that the Autonomous Region of Madeira is "an autonomous territory under Portuguese administration"--when the top officials in the two regional governments produce such statements (and those statements are greeted by passiveness and compromising silence on the part of the central government and the coalition parties), it is natural that a few questions should arise in the public's mind:

First, what, in fact, are Mota Amaral, Joao Jardim, and the forces they represent driving at?

The second question is: why are those statements being made at this precise moment?

And third, what objectives are the two PSD leaders trying to achieve?

Along with those and, naturally, other doubts, many Portuguese have probably also been seized with serious misgivings:

First, how can two politicians occupying such responsible positions as the heads of regional governments have the shamelessness (that is the right word) to publicly support and defend terrorist individuals and actions of unhappy memory in the country's recent history?

Second, how can they give the "green light" to such a scurrilous attack on the unity of the fatherland as the would-be separatism being proclaimed by half a dozen social dropouts who are being duly manipulated by the ruling classes on the islands and by U.S. imperialism?

Third, how can they hurl such serious insults as these at legality and the Constitution of the Republic, the country's basic law, and get away with it?

We will say nothing about those misgivings in this brief note. The "answers" are certainly present in the awareness of democrats and the Portuguese people.

As far as the questions are concerned, we can sketch out a rough answer that is already possible and necessary, and it will return to the pages of AVANTE! in a more developed form.

As was emphasized in the note from the Secretariat of the PCP Central Committee last 26 December, "since 25 April [1974], separatism has always turned up as an instrument of the reactionary forces opposing democracy, progress, and the interests of the working and underprivileged masses and also as an instrument of U.S. imperialism." The note from the PCP Secretariat goes on to say: "It is certainly not by chance that it is now being brought up again at a time when--along with intensification of the openly subversive campaigns launched within the framework of the serious economic, social, and political crisis caused by the conduct of the PS [Socialist Party]-PSD coalition--there is being noted within broad sectors of the Portuguese people a growing will and hope for a political turnaround that will open up new paths for the defense, consolidation, and development of Portuguese democracy." We can also add that this "maneuver" does not represent an innovation in the "methods" of exerting pressure that are used by the rightwing forces ruling the islands. Every time an improved political situation favoring democracy appears on the mainland, the "argument" of separatism is immediately waved about and revived.

As is stressed in the note from the secretariat, which we published in full in our last issue, "this form of blackmail is also arising at a time when financial bankruptcy is exposing the disastrous management for which Alberto Joao Jardim's government is responsible and when Mota Amaral is suffering serious electoral and political setbacks. Bringing up separatism and offering it a helping hand also signifies an attempt to divert the public's attention from

the serious problems caused on the islands by wretched management on the part of the PSD governments, which, on the other hand, have never lifted a finger to strengthen the tie between the islands and the mainland within the framework of a patriotic policy for national solidarity and a genuine strengthening of regional autonomy--an important achievement of the April Revolution and a basic instrument for solving the problems and satisfying the needs and yearnings of the inhabitants of the two archipelagos.

11798

CSO: 3542/98

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

ASDI DISSOLVED--With the resolution by the ASDI [Social Democrats Independent Action] congress to dissolve the party having been delivered to the Constitutional Court, two certainties remain: the ASDI will continue as a civic association, and the parliamentary group, consisting of Deputies Magalhaes Mota, Vilhena de Carvalho, and Ruben Raposo, will continue to exist in the Assembly of the Republic. Regarding the options open to the members of the dissolved organization as far as party affiliation is concerned, it is known that Joao Castilho, Dias de Carvalho, and the great majority within the JASD (the ASDI's youth organization) are participating actively in the launching of the new Eanist party and making no secret of their future affiliation with that organization. Magalhaes Mota and Vilhena de Carvalho have also been mentioned as supporters of the Eanist party, but they probably will not join because they would then lose their seats in Parliament. But if they did give up their seats, they could be replaced by other members of the former ASDI under the new Assembly Rules. Ruben Raposo is taken for granted in the PS [Socialist Party], but he will adopt the same attitude and remain in Parliament as an independent. The same is true of Antonio Fontes, chief secretary for the ASDI parliamentary group and a member of the liquidating committee elected by the congress. According to well-informed sources, he may join the PS in the near future. Except for the individuals mentioned above and those participating actively in the formation of the Eanist party, the dissolved ASDI's main leaders will probably stay on as independents, at least until this summer. [Text] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 18-24 Jan 85 p 8] 11798

FLA TO EXPAND ACTIVITIES--According to an announcement by Jose de Almeida at a press conference in Ponta Delgada, the FLA [Azorean Liberation Front] is going to expand the scope of its activities on behalf of independence for the Azores. The leader said that the Azores are "the only piece that Portugal can really play on the international chessboard" and that his movement has been restructured, with ties being reestablished with all the islands in the autonomous region. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Jan 85 p 4] 11798

CSO: 3542/98

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

NEWSPAPER: BODSTROM AFFAIR CLOSED ONLY WITH RESIGNATION

Communists Defend Palme

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Dr Strangelove in Sweden"]

[Text] In the general political debate last Wednesday, the prime minister burned all his bridges. He warned of an all-out battle. In the struggle against the nonsocialist opposition, the Social Democrats would defend peace and independence in Sweden.

Yesterday the vote was held on the nonsocialists' call for a declaration of no-confidence against Lennart Bodstrom. It was this call that triggered Palme's declaration of war.

Something obviously happened in the meantime.

According to Olof Palme, Wednesday's prelude to the big battle had been turned into a "spectacle." The middle parties had suffered a "coup." Clearly, the call for a vote of no-confidence was no longer taken seriously by this Dr Strangelove of the political arena.

It was a spectacle, indeed.

The foreign minister was allowed to remain because his own party in parliament did not believe that he had said what he said, or at least did not mean what he said.

But they never could have saved him on their own. They needed the assistance of the small VPK (Left Party Communists) group in parliament. But they supported him for a totally different reason, namely that he had said and meant precisely what had been reported.

"It is difficult to know what Bodstrom said or did not say, but if the newspaper accounts are accurate, then we agree with him in substance."

"The evidence of submarine intrusions has been extremely thin. After the Karlskrona incident and even after Harsfjarden, I have maintained that we should be skeptical toward the various allegations of submarine activity, since

the evidence is so flimsy.

This was stated last Monday by Lars Werner, head of Bodstrom's small support group, the VPK members of parliament.

Palme's mercenary troops in VPK are not good little soldiers. They are not exactly fighting for the same cause as the general himself.

It is still too early to say if Palme declared war by mistake on Wednesday.

He kept a low profile at the beginning of the Bodstrom affair. His first line of defense had many paths for retreat.

After that, the prime minister dug in deep.

Now, at least for the time being, he has turned back the offensive.

In any event, we should be thankful that Olof Palme is prime minister of Sweden right now. When he goes to war by mistake, at least the effects are limited.

SDP Defense Policy Document

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Feb 85 p 2

[Article: "Palme Failed"]

[Text] "The mudslinging and suspicion by the right creates uncertainty over Sweden's foreign policy. Do not permit them to do this as a government." The choice is between "responsibility for peace and independence and the unpredictability and maneuvering of the right."

These quotes are from the Social Democrats' internal memoranda of October 1984 on campaign planning. They express party chairman Palme's personal line, namely that the voters should be frightened by depicting a nonsocialist government as unreliable on foreign and security policy.

When the Bodstrom affair came up, Palme took a chance and attempted to confuse the issue. In a remarkable breach of logic, Palme attempted to counter the criticism of Foreign Minister Bodstrom by calling it an expression of the nonsocialist parties' lack of responsibility in the areas of neutrality, independence, and peace!

It appears, however, that Palme has gone too far even for many in his own party. Several Social Democratic newspapers have been strikingly cool toward Palme's maneuvering. In Thursday's foreign policy debate on the program Magasinet, Palme was criticized by Sven O. Andersson, former editor in chief of STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN (Social Democratic). He pointed out that it was the job of the prime minister to work toward unity on foreign and security policy.

On the same TV program, long-time interpreter of Social Democratic foreign

policy Ambassador Sverker Astrom said that, in substance, there was general agreement over Sweden's policy of neutrality and that anything else was unthinkable. Previously, Defense Minister Thunborg stressed the unity that prevails with regard to the principles of our foreign and security policy.

Olof Palme has slipped a long way if his own party must give him a failing grade for his actions and remind him of what should be an obvious duty for a prime minister.

Comment Following Confidence Vote

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 10 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "When Will He Learn?"]

[Text] Of course, the Bodstrom affair is not over. It will not be over until the foreign minister leaves his position. The reason is very simple. The six journalists are not lying. The foreign minister made the statements that, to use the prime minister's own words, should mean his political death.

Bodstrom and Palme are in an awkward situation. There are many people in and around the Foreign Service who know that Bodstrom's inability to speak clearly often leads to misunderstandings and that he often speaks as ambiguously of the submarine intrusions and the efforts of the military as he did at the luncheon for journalists.

Consequently, there are many people who hold the fate of Bodstrom and, to a certain extent, of Palme in their hands.

Before the no-confidence vote, six journalists and two nonsocialist United Nations delegates were called liars.

Yesterday former navy chief Per Rudberg was interviewed by DAGENS NYHETER. Until 1 October Rudberg was responsible for the navy's entire system of submarine defenses. He was as much within the inner circles as anyone could be.

According to DAGENS NYHETER, Rudberg believed the journalists' reports "without question."

Rudberg also stated that, while he was responsible for submarine defenses, the foreign minister never asked to be informed by the navy about the intrusions, evidence of intrusions, or the situation in general.

Bodstrom immediately began churning out his denials. He claimed that the former navy chief "based his statements on gossip." Bodstrom doubly denied that he never asked to be informed. First of all, Bodstrom said he reviewed the situation with the defense chief. Secondly, the foreign minister said it was not up to him to keep up with technical military details.

Thus, the person whose job it is to contact foreign countries and report Sweden's positions on various issues and give credibility to these positions does not believe that he needs the technical information on which protests to the Soviet Union, for example, are based.

Anyone who criticizes Palme and Bodstrom is described as a liar and a slanderer.

Sooner or later, of course, the bubble will burst. When it does, it will not affect Lennart Bodstrom alone. Now Olof Palme's handling of the Bodstrom affair is becoming more and more the center of attention.

9336

CSO: 3650/179

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

AMBASSADOR TO POLAND AUTHORS WORK ON USSR TIES TO NORDICS

Constitutes 'Half Official' View

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Jan 85 p 12

[Review by Kristian Gerner of book "Sovjet & Norden. Samarbete, Sakerhet och Konflikter under Femtio Ar" [The Soviet Union and the Nordic States: 50 Years of Cooperation, Security, and Conflicts] by Orjan Berner, Swedish ambassador to Poland, with a foreword by Sverker Astrom, Bonnier/Fakta, 1985]

[Text] When Soviet media attacked Swedish foreign policy during the first decade following World War II, their "purpose was often more to induce Swedish politicians to guard against rash, Western-oriented members of the opposition and military men than it was to describe the Kremlin's actual feelings about Sweden." So writes diplomat Orjan Berner in his book "The Soviet Union and the Nordic States: 50 Years of Cooperation, Security, and Conflicts."

Berner's book includes a foreword by Sverker Astrom. Astrom calms the reader in advance with the reassurance that even though arms buildups in Northern Europe have increased, no immediate threat to Sweden is discernible. The "security balance" has not been disturbed.

Astrom also mentions in his foreword that Berner's book is a "reliable account" that fills a gap in our knowledge of the Soviet Union's relations with the Nordic countries over the past 50 years. It is with eager expectation, therefore, that one begins reading "The Soviet Union and the Nordic States."

Berner does not have much to say about the background of Soviet policy. In various places in the book, he assumes or takes for granted that the Soviet leaders may have disagreed on this or that move and sometimes expresses surprise that the Soviet leaders act against their own interests--for example, when they arouse suspicion in Sweden through certain submarine or air operations. But Berner does not attempt a consistent analysis of Soviet policy from the standpoint of the prospects for conflict--an approach that has assumed a prominent place in Soviet studies in the West over the past 30 years. Berner's premise is that the Soviet leaders act on the basis of their national interest, which in the Nordic region is defensive and has remained unchanged throughout the period being described.

"The Soviet Union and the Nordic States" is divided into periods--1936 to 1945, 1945 to 1964, and 1964 to 1984--and discusses the Soviet Union's policy toward each of the five Nordic countries. The arrangement is clear and makes the book valuable as an easy-to-grasp summary. Its chief failing is the fact that it is written in the language of diplomatic reports, with cautious reservations and a desire to tone down anything that might seem alarming or indicate changes which should have led or ought to lead to a reconsideration of the policies of the five Nordic countries toward the Soviet Union.

Berner's sources for the background to Soviet policy are Soviet mass media and books--no unprinted documents exist, as we know. He treats Soviet statements as being relatively meaningless and talks about the Russians' "liturgical political prose." But Berner makes no attempt at a systematic interpretation of that liturgical prose in accordance with the methods worked out over the past 30 years by serious Kremlinologists. Instead, he seems to rely on his intuition.

The framework of Berner's interpretation is not Russian or communist, however, but Swedish--both Lutheran and "welfare state" Swedish. He thinks the Russians are both comical and irrational. It was odd, Berner says, that Moscow allowed Kuusinen to incorporate Soviet Karelia into his Finnish republic (the Terijoki episode in 1939), and it was unwise of Stalin to go to war against Finland "to obtain an unimportant piece of land." But by reversing one's perspective and considering earlier Soviet behavior, one finds it more reasonable to interpret the generosity toward Kuusinen as an unmistakable sign that all of Finland was soon to have been incorporated into the Soviet Union. There would then be no room for any Karelian Republic at all. Looking at it that way, we see that it was not an unimportant piece of land but all of Finland that was at stake in the fall of 1939.

Berner emphasizes that both NATO and the Soviet Union have sharply stepped up their armament programs, and he also states that the worsening international political climate during the early 1980's has made it necessary for Moscow's rulers to "prepare for armed conflict." But in his account of the Soviet submarine policy against Sweden during the 1980's, he treats the military aspect as being entirely separate from the political aspect. Berner sizes up the U-137 incident as being a "routine mission" that failed because the submarine commander was "foolishly careless." The possibility that the submarine and air intrusions might be a sign that the Soviet Union wants to draw attention to its supremacy in the Baltic Sea is dismissed by Berner with the argument that anyone asserting such a possibility is underestimating the Soviet Union's self-confidence. Moscow does not need to prove anything. Berner refrains from discussing the possibility that what is involved is not Soviet self-esteem at all but stepped-up military activity in preparation for a feared armed conflict.

"The Soviet Union and the Nordic States" adopts the thesis--unspoken and therefore not critically discussed--that trade between the Nordic states and the Soviet Union is something good in itself. Iceland's trade with the Soviet Union is "favorable for both parties," Finland's is "mutually beneficial," and Sweden's modest trade with the USSR is "an anomaly which it would be best in the long run to rectify through trusting cooperation."

One wonders: what would be the point of trade that was not favorable for both parties, and by what criterion can it be said that Sweden's trade ought to be rectified? What one would like to see is a discussion of whether Finland's sizable trade with the Soviet Union does not create a position of dependence for the smaller state, for example, and whether it may not be dangerous in the long run to trade on a market--the Soviet market--which does not have the same quality standards as global capitalism. Czechoslovakia's regression, for example, can be explained in part by its loss of a world market as a result of many years of exporting engineering products to the Soviet Union.

The thing in Berner's book that can be interpreted as Lutheran--and therefore difficult to understand from the Russian viewpoint--is his tendency to make the victim as guilty as the one committing the offense. He writes, for example, that the "discovery"--not the presence--of Soviet spies in Sweden on several occasions made contacts more difficult, and he calls the Catalina incident of 1952 "unfortunate," feeling that the fact that the countries were able to enter into an agreement on sea rescues in 1954 was a "fortunate sequel" to the downing of the Soviet plane. And according to Berner, it would have been "painful for both parties"--in other words, not just for the Soviets--if Khrushchev had been forced to cancel his trip to Sweden in 1964 because of the Wennerstrom affair the year before.

Sweden is supposed to accept its share of the blame for all unpleasant incidents in its relations with the Soviet Union. From that standpoint, it constitutes a "reason for conflict" when the Swedish Government starts pushing the Wallenberg case actively--not when the Russians seize the Swedish diplomat and take him away.

Astrom's foreword and the fact that Berner is a diplomat at the ambassadorial level make "The Soviet Union and the Nordic States" a half-official publication. It is first rate, since the thoughts it expresses are in close agreement with the thinking that guides Sweden's Soviet policy. "The Soviet Union and the Nordic States" emphasizes the requirements of Realpolitik and geopolitics: the need for the small states to pay attention to their big neighbor to the east. Here we have a publication to offset both "Western-oriented members of the opposition" and "nervous reports in the mass media." That last quotation is from the blurb on the book's back cover, which also states that Berner received special training at Harvard enabling him to put together a "unique compilation."

The result is that Lev Voronkov's book on the Soviet Union's view of the Nordic states (published in the fall of 1984) has been given a worthy Swedish answer.

Soviets Seen Accepting Neutrality

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Jan 85 p 2

[Commentary by Mats Svegfors: "From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reviewing Mill"]

[Text] Being published today is the book by Sweden's ambassador to Warsaw, Orjan Berner, entitled "The Soviet Union and the Nordic States."

According to the publisher's advertising, it provides "essential information as a background to nervous reports in the mass media."

If I may say so, that is insolence on the part of the publisher--and of the author to the extent that he had anything to say about the blurb on the book's back cover, which is where that statement appears.

Berner originally wrote his book in the form of a study at Harvard in the United States, where he submitted it as an academic paper before it was transformed into the form in which it is now being published. According to the foreword, the views presented are solely those of the author. And formally, of course, that is true. But if we compare the finished book with the paper on which it is based, we see that considerable deference must have been paid to Swedish foreign policy in making the transformation.

The result is that Berner's book obviously does not provide essential information as a background to "nervous reports in the mass media." If anything, it indicates that a nervous Foreign Service is trying to manage Swedish foreign policy more or less the way it was able to manage the Swedish National Union of Students in the 1950's or the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] in the 1970's.

This is not to say that Berner has written a bad book or, more accurately, a bad paper. On the contrary, lengthy passages in the book are excellent. But the fact that it passed through the hands of the Foreign Service's censors and through their word processing equipment makes the result somewhat annoying in places.

The small but significant changes in the text on its way from academic paper to book are ludicrous in many respects. Were it not for the fact that the changes are creations of one of the Swedish Foreign Service's various incarnations, one could smile at the whole thing.

But as highly transparent and slightly amateurish foreign policy, the book is naturally not harmless. Anyone with access to the original paper can compare it directly with the book and see what urgently needs to be said or should not be said from the standpoint of the Social Democratic government.

Some censor, for example, unable to let things alone, added a section idolizing the postwar Soviet Union, this in connection with a discussion of the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union following the war:

"The three countries tried to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. This was natural. The Soviet Union was a large and powerful country that was then emerging as a dominant neighbor, although it was still fairly unfamiliar in the Nordic capitals. Alarm over that colossus was mingled with admiration and good will. Russian armies had defeated Nazi Germany, and the Soviet population had suffered enormously for that victory. Old socialists who were in power in Scandinavia at the time were certainly opponents of communism but had great respect for those who had overthrown the reactionary Russian czardom."

One can actually picture fair-skinned workers and peasants in the Soviet Union marching arm in arm to greet their brothers and comrades in the Scandinavian reformist worker movement.

Later, in a section devoted to the strained relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union in the early 1950's, we find that a section on the Swedish Right has been inserted in the middle of the account of the Catalina incident. It had been stated by way of introduction that the Soviet Union was challenging Swedish neutrality. The censor added this:

"Soviet analysts had undeniably been given something to ponder. In 1950, for example, the leader of the Conservative Party had proposed 'technical military' cooperation with NATO members Denmark and Norway. He was supported by the opposition's leading politicians but sharply opposed by the government."

Among the really interesting features of the rewrite job done on Berner's book by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--if not by the Cabinet Office--is the revelation that the Swedish Government has written off all theories that the submarine intrusions were the result solely of military decisions. Explicit statements have been added in two places to the effect that it is completely out of the question that the intrusions could have occurred without political approval.

One of the more remarkable additions reads as follows:

"The actual fact is that Stockholm's foreign policy line on issues important to Moscow--that is, armament issues in the Nordic countries and Europe--has seldom run as parallel with Soviet points of view as it has during the 1980's."

In the original version, the wording is concerned with the biased way in which Soviet mass media report on Swedish positions and reads as follows:

"Swedish viewpoints on issues on which Stockholm's opinion means anything to Moscow--an example being problems related to disarmament in the north and in Europe--were given extensive coverage during the early 1980's and were usually presented as being parallel with Soviet positions."

The question that can undeniably be raised here is: what Swedish interest is served by changing the original text?

But the really big change was not made within the text. Instead, it occurs in the final section, headed "Conclusions," which has been expanded to about twice its original length. The effect is to change the book's message completely.

In the original paper, generally speaking, the presentation in the form of description and analysis spoke for itself.

The purport of the expanded concluding section is that conditions in the Nordic region are stable, that nothing has really happened as far as the Soviet Union's posture toward the Nordic region is concerned, that the Soviet Union should not

be criticized too loudly, and that the intrusions will stop if we will just go on as before.

"Basically, there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union accepts, perhaps appreciates, and in either case does not think it can change Sweden's neutrality." Those are the concluding words in the book.

The paper, on the other hand, concluded with the observation that the buildup in the North Atlantic by both the East and the West must receive close attention "because those counteracting forces are increasing tension and, together with other factors related to military developments, are resulting in an intensified change in the Soviet Union's efforts and policy with respect to the Nordic countries."

By means of small distortions here and there in the text and by the addition of two pages at the end, a good paper of superior quality has been transformed into what is in some places a nonsense book. It is nonsense because the censors were not able to distort the entire text. Analysis still leads to the original conclusion. But no matter: in the book, that conclusion had to be replaced by its opposite.

Does anyone in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs really imagine that this will meet with respect in Moscow and Washington, assuming that anyone there still pays any attention to what is said and written in Stockholm?

11798

CSO:3650/153

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

VPK CONGRESS AFTERMATH: CHAIRMAN WERNER CONSOLIDATES POWER

Critics of Policy Co-Opted

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Feb 85 p 8

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] Two of the sharpest critics of Communist Left Party (VPK) Chairman Lars Werner's policy of cooperation with the Social Democratic Labor Party (SAP) have been asked to join the VPK Executive Committee. This came as a surprising epilogue to the Party Congress controversy in January.

The two nominees are parliamentary group chairman Bertil Mabrink and parliamentary representative Lars-Ove Hagberg. Both have served on the Executive Committee (VU) before; Mabrink left the post only 10 months ago.

This action can hardly be seen as a concession to groups within the party that disapprove of Werner's political settlements with the Palme government. It must be seen as a tactical move on the part of the party chairman himself to coopt the leading critics, thus forcing them to assume responsibility for the party's decision-making process, both in and out of Parliament.

Assault

This is one way of ending the assault against the party leadership.

The informal Election Committee, which was appointed from within the newly elected party leadership after the Party Congress, is headed by Werner himself. The other two committee members are the noncontroversial Paul Lestander from Norbotten and Britt Rundberg, Stockholm. The Election Committee has only met once, when it agreed on the proposed appointments.

Hagberg, who was the most prominent critic during the press debate prior to the Party Congress, as of last Friday did not know about the elevation plans and explained to DAGENS NYHETER that it was very doubtful he would accept the offer.

Reward

The Party Congress minority, which openly criticized the leadership for blurring the party's profile and for catering to Palme, sees the appointment of Mabrink-Hagberg as an advancement of its position in that Werner has been forced to yield and that the opposition is now being rewarded.

At the same time, VPK members who support Werner fear that the party's political profile will become more dogmatic and that the policy of cooperation will be checked.

While Hagberg says he prefers not to serve on Werner's Executive Committee, he criticizes the present Executive Committee for being "inert" and for not having "a sufficiently sensitive ear."

He wants the Executive Committee to be more "effective" and pay more attention to signals from the party's top decision-making organ between congresses, the party leadership.

There could be further personal conflicts when the party leadership convenes Saturday and Sunday to determine the party's new management and election strategy.

Confidants Leaving

At the same time, two of Werner's closest confidants on the Executive Committee will be leaving. One of them is Bo Hammar, former party secretary, who was sacrificed at the Party Congress and must step down from the party leadership position, and the other is parliamentary representative Margo Ingvardsson, who distinguished herself in connection with the government's new BB-taxes. Another member, Marianne Johansson, will be leaving the Executive Committee for family reasons.

Included in the power struggle is a proposal to add two deputy chairmen under Werner. If the proposal goes through, parliamentary VPK secretary Viola Claesson and Bertil Mabrink would assume second and third positions within the party.

The new party secretary, taking Hammar's position, will be Kenneth Kvist, who is also a parliamentary VPK secretary, a tax expert and one of Werner's top confidants.

Werner Introduces New Leaders

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Feb 85 p 8

[Text] Viola Claesson, Kenneth Kvist and Bertil Mabrink are the new VPK leaders under Party Chairman Lars Werner.

Kvist is the new party secretary following Bo Hammar, who was forced to

resign due to severe criticism of the party leadership at this year's Party Congress. Claesson and Mabrink will be the two new deputy chairmen.

Lars-Ove Hagberg is a new Executive Committee member. He has been one of the most persistent critics of the VPK leadership for flirting too openly with the Social Democratic Labor Party. Mabrink was also among those who openly attacked the party leadership, but who during a press conference last Sunday announced that he was part of the leadership again and explained that he had nothing against parliamentary settlements with the Social Democratic Labor Party as long as the leadership did not forget to explain to party members what the purpose of the policy was.

By including the bitter critics on the Executive Committee, Werner has forced them to take responsibility for party decisions and he can again work in peace.

Among those who will be leaving the Executive Committee are Jorn Svensson and Margo Ingvardsson, both parliamentary representatives. The latter was exposed to the same pressure Hammar was at the Party Congress, but she managed to keep her party leadership position through an appeal.

"We will do everything to prevent a nonsocialist election victory," said Lars Werner during a press conference following the election of the new Executive Committee.

"But the more the Social Democratic Labor Party is influenced by modern liberalism, the harder it will be for us to actually cooperate politically," said Werner.

VPK has also drawn up guidelines for the upcoming election. Among the top items on the agenda will be peace, disarmament and international solidarity, areas in which VPK feels Sweden has played a constructive role, but the exportation of weapons and our own arms policy are seen as stains on the nation's honor. Other items include environment and energy management, the demand for strong measures against unemployment, a new distribution policy, including higher real wages and the abolition of Value Added Tax on food, together with the demand for a 6-hour work day.

Besides Bertil Mabrink, Viola Claesson, Kenneth Kvist and Lars-Ove Hagberg, Gudrun Schyman and Britt Rundberg were also elected new members of the Executive Committee.

Party Newspaper on Support Loss

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 31 Jan 85 p 2

[Editorial: "VPK's Dangerous Life"]

[Text] One of the theses in Soren Holmber's well-known and interesting study

"Voters in Change" is that the Left Party-Communists (VPK), despite its surprisingly good election results, "lived dangerously" during the 1982 election campaign.

As far as we can ascertain, this statement is based on three conditions.

The first being that VPK did not gain voters until late in the election campaign.

The second being that a relatively large share of VPK voters constitute voter groups that are more mobile (i.e. more inclined to change parties) than average. This applies to big-city voters, for example.

The third being the so-called tactical votes for VPK.

With respect to the first condition, it is unfortunately almost a rule that VPK "lives dangerously." It has to do with the fact that election campaigns in themselves are especially important to VPK since they represent the only opportunity the party has to penetrate the mass media on somewhat the same terms as the other parliamentary parties.

As far as the second condition is concerned, one could turn it around and even consider its positive aspect. It not only represents the risk of losing voters, but also the chance of gaining same.

With respect to the tactical votes--a concept that has a negative connotation--the following should be pointed out: Only 60 percent of the voters consider themselves to be absolute supporters of a particular party. One can expect to find the rest of the voters in between the various parties politically/ideologically, voting for one party in one election and another party in another election without violating their convictions. Hence, we would do well to tone down the talk about tactical voting. On the other hand, this would not actually solve the problem, of course, which as far as VPK is concerned consists of convincing the greatest possible number of voters who vacillate between SAP and VPK to vote for VPK in every election.

Were we to accept the basic premise in Holmberg's thesis that VPK was living dangerously during the 1982 election campaign, what might we conclude?

First of all that the party must once again engage itself in a very good election campaign. (According to Holmberg, VPK's 1982 election campaign was the best of all the parties'.) And this would especially apply to big-city areas.

Secondly, it might be very important to resist all possible temptations to use slogans and outbidding policies, seeking to prove to uncertain and potential voters that it pays to vote for VPK.

It seems altogether possible to accomplish these tasks.

POLITICAL

TURKEY

ECEVIT, WIFE INTERVIEWED ON MILITARY RULE, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jan 85 pp 102, 103

[Interview with Bulent and Rahsan Ecevit by SPIEGEL editor Mareike Spiess-Hohnholz in Hamburg, date not given: "No Leader Behind the Scenes"]

[Text] Bulent Ecevit had been the Turkish prime minister three times, and Chairman of the Republican People's Party for eight years when the military putsch affected him in 1980. As minister of labor (1961 to 1965), the 59-year old Ecevit--disparaged by the party conservatives as a romantic socialist--had established the right to strike in Turkey. He was at the apex of his political career just at the time that he was the "Hero of Cyprus." He had organized the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island republic in response to the Greek military junta provocation. However, he could not cash in on his popularity for an electoral victory through which his party would have achieved a governing majority. The coalition partner voted against new elections. Bulent Ecevit's childhood sweetheart is Rahsan Ecevit. Since their marriage in 1946, the childless couple have been inseparable. Rahsan, whose hobby is painting, is "the driving force behind Ecevit," according to a CIA study.

[Question] Mr Ecevit, the new Turkish constitution which was introduced two years after the September 1980 military putsch forbids all prominent former politicians like yourself from engaging in almost all political activity for 10 years. Will you obey these orders?

[Answer] One does not have to be an active politician to contribute to the political development and democratization of one's country. I don't believe that the bans that have been placed upon me can or should hinder me from fulfilling my duties as a citizen. Furthermore, I strive to disseminate social democratic values and culture in my country. What bothers me more than being excluded from active politics are the fetters imposed on my freedom of speech.

[Question] You are not allowed to express your opinions on Turkish policies--"past, present, and future." Turkish newspapers which wrote articles about you have been temporarily closed. Occasionally your words have been

published abroad. You have been thrown into jail three times for insubordinate statements, once for an article in SPIEGEL. Could this happen again?

[Answer] Anything can happen, but I hope not. In any case, I read not long ago that the "civilian" government in office now which is theoretically committed to extending various freedoms in stages is ready to impose new restrictions on myself and other former leaders. Apparently, the government has prepared a legislative bill which would now prohibit me from even working with foundations.

[Question] In Turkey a few months ago, a party called the "Party of the Democratic Left" introduced itself with the publication of a draft program. That's your party, correct?

[Answer] I make no bones about the fact, and I also make no bones of the fact that I do not take any of the presently existing "social-democratic" parties in Turkey seriously. All parties are organized top down and not bottom up. They have to receive approval from the authorities instead of asking the people to participate in its founding. From their inception, they are all too compliant.

[Question] Will the Party of the Democratic Left introduce a change?

[Answer] All my hopes rest on this risk. The new party is different. It is attempting to begin its work from the bottom up.

[Question] With your help?

[Answer] No, of course I cannot be involved with it.

[Question] But your wife Rahsan can and everyone knows for whom she speaks.

[Answer] She is actively involved in the preparations for this party and has openly made this public.

[Question] How will you accomplish founding the party, what with the many hurdles placed by the law on political parties, Mrs Ecevit?

[Answer] It is not simple. For example, all parties are not allowed to maintain any branch offices except in the center of the cities. That means that the majority of the members have no opportunity to participate in the discussion, formulation and dissemination of the party's policies. They are condemned to passivity and have to leave everything to the small closed cadres. Furthermore, they are not allowed to have any contact with unions, associations, foundations, professional associations, and all clubs.

[Question] Additionally, officials, soldiers elementary and high school teachers and their students are forbidden to be members of political parties. Where do they find their members under these circumstances?

[Answer] Presently the party is organized in 44 of the 67 provinces. Over 60 percent of the future founding members are rural residents and workers, the rest are craftsmen, small businessmen, enlightened industrialists, former university professors and, of course, women.

[Question] Mr. Ecevit, the old parties in Turkey were always fixed on a charismatic leader. Who will be the leader--man or woman--of the Democratic Left--Mrs. Ecevit, perhaps?

[Answer] In my opinion, one of the main tasks of the new party should be to put an end to this tradition of personality cults. A social democratic or leftist democratic movement or party should be lead by the people instead of individual persons, whether they are charismatic or not. A mass movement which is dependent on one person or the leadership of one or several individuals runs the risk of being seriously damaged when that person or those individuals are lost.

[Question] Everyone will surely know that Bulent Ecevit is behind the scenes directing the new party.

[Answer] It isn't my intent to act as leader behind the scenes. That would neither be right nor practical.

[Question] Your former Republican People's Party, i.e., the party of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, had a purely central style. In spite of this, do you claim to be its political descendant? There is still a social-democratic party, the Sodep.

[Answer] The Republican People's Party was dissolved in 1981 by the military regime. I publicly protested and was thrown in jail for that. Otherwise, no one else raised a public protest at the time. In my opinion, any one who preferred to keep his mouth shut when Ataturk's party was outlawed cannot lay claim to its legacy.

[Question] Who, then should represent social democracy in Turkey? Delegates of Sodep have already initiated contact with the West German Social Democrats but the SPD appears to be like other members of the Socialists International--undecided as to who they should name as their Turkish sister party.

[Answer] The picture could become clearer if the new party officially began its work. I am sure that the Social Democrats of Europe will compare the programs, by-laws, party structures and its appearance in public and will decide for themselves. I have no right to make their decisions for them. I must add that I place great value on the reinstitution and continuation of the fraternal relations between the European and Turkish Social Democrats.

[Question] If the new party could begin its work, then its first test would be the parliamentary elections projected for 1988. What would be its chances?

[Answer] Until now, the ruling motherland party and Ozal has profited from the lack of any credible alternative to it. But the disappointment with this party is spreading very rapidly. I am convinced that when the Left introduces a credible alternative in the next elections, then the motherland party doesn't have a chance of remaining in power.

[Question] Ankara is rife with rumors that the National Security Council could dissolve the government and form a "large national coalition" because the Security Council is certainly not happy with elected Prime Minister Ozal. Do you consider this a possibility?

[Answer] From a democratic viewpoint, it is not important whether the military is happy or unhappy about the government. What counts is how the people feel about that government. The likelihood of a forced change in the government doesn't interest me. A natural change should take place through elections as an expression of the people's free choice.

[Question] The last elections were apostrophized by the military as the "return to democracy." But the human rights situation remains the same as ever in Turkey--doubtful. Thousands upon thousands of union members, intellectuals, members of the peace movement, thousands of Kurdish men, women and children are in jail. Many have already been sentenced to years of imprisonment, some to death. Many have been waiting for years for their trial. The great majority have leftist views. Very few have been guilty of separatist or terrorist criminal behavior. What do you think their chances are for amnesty?

[Answer] The concept of the so-called political crime, crimes of conscience or conviction, for me is incompatable with democracy, as long as militancy and violence are not involved. I do not support amnesty for that kind of crime. I also support changing the law so that they are no longer considered a "crime."

12348

CSO: 3620/242

MILITARY

DENMARK

DEFENSE MINISTER PLEDGES TO CONSULT UNION, YARD ON BOAT ORDER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Feb 85 Sect III p 1

[Article by Dan Axel: "Danish Shipyard Decides Where Warships Are to be Built"]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell awaits a meeting in the Department of Defense's Board of Materiel Acquisitions before he asks for money for the Navy's first 6 or 7 warships. Danish industry and labor will therefore be consulted on the almost two billion kroner contract.

It is the Danish yard getting the main contract for the Navy's 16 warships that will decide who will supply the fiberglass hulls for the ships--so long as security demands are fulfilled.

So says Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative) to BERLINGSKE in a commentary on the Union of Plastics Producers' statement claiming that the fiberglass hulls can and should be built in Denmark. The Navy has earlier considered letting a prototype be built in the Swedish Karlskrona Works, which have great experience in building fiberglass ships.

"The Standard-Flex project will first be discussed later this month in the Department of Defense's Board of Materiel Acquisitions on which sit representatives from the Department, labor and industry. Afterwards I expect to get a collective recommendation for the project so that I--hopefully before Summer--can submit a document to the Folketing's Finance Committee on the building of the first 6 or 7 ships," says Hans Engell.

The Defense Minister stresses that no decision whatsoever has been taken to build the first fiberglass hull in Sweden. "And I would like to point out that in the previous deliberations there was only talk of a single prototype being completed at the Karlskrona Works," says Hans Engell.

Competitive Price

The Union of Plastics Producers--which is a branch organization of the Danish plastics industry--claims that Danish firms can build the fiberglass hulls--the first one as well--for a price competitive with the Swedes.

The branch adds that Danish fiberglass boats have a reputation outside Denmark for being of very high quality and that 90 percent of the Danish production is exported. In its statement, the Union writes that there is already currently being built several hundred million kroner worth of fiberglass hulls.

Therefore the branch is of the opinion that the Standard-Flex contract--which in all will come to between 2 and 2.25 billion kroner--will be an important contribution to the continued technological development in Denmark. If the contract goes outside Denmark, it is feared that jobs and the ability to compete will be lost.

The branch mentions that the Danish fiberglass producers can participate in a catamaran ferry project, which Oresundsselskabet--which is owned by DSB (Danish State Railways)--has plans for on the Denmark-Sweden crossing.

Finally it is mentioned that fiberglass--in the form of barrels--is also in the picture as environmentally secure containers for the transport of toxic substances. Such fiberglass barrels will not sink in case of a maritime accident, thereby avoiding the high cost of salvage off the ocean floor.

12819

CSO: 3613/105

MILITARY

DENMARK

AIR FORCE'S F-16s PLAGUED BY RUST

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Hakon Letvik]

[Text] The Danish Air Force has imposed a flight ban on most of its F-16 fighter planes. The reason is that rust has been discovered in the airplanes' landing system. A comprehensive project is now under way in Denmark to investigate the extent of the rust ravages.

"The reports we've gotten from Denmark are not alarming, and we will await further details before special initiatives are launched here at home," Air Force Inspector General, Major-General Magne T. Sorensen informed AFTENPOSTEN.

The rust attack on the Danish F-16 plane was discovered after the attack plane was hit last Friday by the fifth such breakdown of an F-16 in the second half of this year. Denmark today has 54 F-16 aircraft.

There is extensive cooperation among the NATO countries who operate the same type plane, and the Air Defense Ministry will send us all the data from the Danish attack plane as soon as it becomes available. Thereafter it might become of topical interest to examine the 69 Norwegian F-16s more closely.

The Norwegian Air Force has had the F-16 plane since the mid-seventies when it succeeded the Starfighter. In the course of recent years, three F-16 planes have been lost in accidents. The third such mishap occurred this fall when an aircraft burned up at the Rygge air station. After this accident, several of these fighter planes were banned from flight until they were more closely inspected. A new F-16 plane today costs nearly 90 million kroner.

12723

CSO: 3639/43

MILITARY

DENMARK

CONSCRIPTION PERIOD FOR COMBAT, ENGINEERING TROOPS TO LENGTHEN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Jan 85 p 7

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Twelve-Month Compulsory Military Service Gives Education Points; Panel Contemplates Differentiated Compulsory Military Service with Period of Service According to Abilities and Education"]

[Text] A 12-month period of service will be introduced for combat troops and the corps of engineers as of 1 Apr 1986, Defense Minister Hans Engell confirmed yesterday to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. The decision regarding the extended period of service was made in connection with the armed forces compromise which went into effect at the New Year. The objective of the 12 months of compulsory military service is, among other things, to limit the number of professional soldiers in the combat forces and thereby to save money. It has evoked surprise that a full year of the 3-year armed forces compromise is to go by before the decision can be carried out, "But it takes time," Engell says.

"Before the period of service can be lengthened, it is necessary to have a proclamation regarding this," Lieutenant Colonel Jørgen Svanbjerg of the Armed Forces Command compulsory military service section adds. "The present proclamation sets compulsory military service at nine months, and before it is changed, presumably during the spring, we cannot begin."

In addition to this is the fact that a panel has been appointed which, among other things, is working on the possibilities of introducing differentiated compulsory military service, i.e., a call-up period of a duration which is determined by the abilities of individual draftees.

Lieutenant Colonel Svanbjerg emphasizes, incidentally, that he does not figure on there being problems in procuring voluntary draftees for a 12-month term of service. "We know that many would rather take on the nine months in the army than the six months in the Civil Defense Corps, among other things, because it gives more points toward a higher education, and," he concludes, "there is no reason to believe that they will not accept the additional points which 12 months make possible."

8985
CSO: 3613/104

MILITARY

DENMARK

LIFE GUARDS BATTALION TRAINS FOR ROLE IN MOBILIZATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Jan 85 Sect II p 7

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Deep-Frost Guards"]

[Text] It was snowing, was eight degrees, and it was biting cold in the empty stable building on the Ledreborg estate in Central Zealand when the Life Guards' first and second training companies were "mobilized" the other day on the way back after a completed Saturday and Sunday leave.

The young draftees had been told to report at Roskilde Station instead of returning home to the "Yellow Hell," which the Sandholm camp is called among the men in daily talk.

All the men were met on the platform by a reception committee of comrades in complete field gear, with rifles over their shoulders and with camouflaged painted faces. A little cold in their civilian clothes, they were shooed out to the awaiting trucks, and as the trucks were gradually filled, they drove away to the mobilization areas in order to be clothed and be supplied with their weapons.

Supplied With Rags and Tatters

The whole thing was part of the Life Guards training battalion's normal routine as the supplier of mobilization units to a number of Zealand regiments, and BERLINGSKE SØNDAG was invited along so that, as the regiment's leader, Colonel J. Schousboe said, we could see that the Royal Life Guards were real field soldiers and not just blue guards in the changing of the guard.

"Every half year we call up two companies--about 260 men," the leader of the training battalion, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Lauritsen, relates. "They receive five months of actual training time, where we attempt to teach them everything a field soldier should know and be able to do. It is hard, and there is not much free time left over--neither for the draftees nor for regular personnel. It is extra hard because the materiel we have is the oldest and most worn out in the armed forces. Our vehicles, old Bedford trucks and jeeps, come from the 50's as far as many are concerned. It is normal for 40 percent of them to be in the repair shop. Many of the combat uniforms people have been supplied are sheer rags and tatters, and the

weapons are American Garand rifles, which the Danish army calls model 1950, after the year we got them, but which as far as most are concerned served through the Second World War."

"The strange thing is that many of the mobilization battalions would receive better vehicles in a real war situation, where the armed forces would conscript thousands of new and newer civilian vehicles just for the use of the mobilization force. That the soldiers then on the other hand cannot wait to receive a different uniform from a jumpsuit and a pair of rubber boots is a totally different story."

Enemy Dressed in Latest New Clothes

"The men are fantastically positive and as good as 100 percent voluntarily joined the Life Guards," the colonel relates. "They live without exception up to the battalion's motto: Quamois sit merda Tameu sit effica. Literally translated, 'Let there be however much crap, it must still be effective.'"

And it apparently was effective when the two training companies the other day set out in the Zealand frosty weather--dressed in their rags. Padded with private thermal underwear and knitted sweaters under the army's prescribed clothing, and with old shabby undershirts and long underpants pulled on outside the tatters as improvised snow camouflage.

Would Not Let Guests Lose

It looked poor compared with the exercise's enemy--an American company which was visiting the Jaegerspris camp and which had brought along all the latest in individual equipment, including the new helmets, which to a troubling extent are reminiscent of the old German ones, M-16 automatic rifles, and bullet-proof vests for everyone.

But there was nothing wrong with spirits, when the G.I.'s changed from civilian clothes in the horse stable and gave free rein to their imagination by decorating the helmets with white strips of clothing so that they came to resemble "desert sheiks."

"The training companies encounter two exercises during the training period. The first is the so-called Rex Round, the real original 'arse round,'" the lieutenant colonel relates with a very telling smile. "It is this which forms the conclusion to the actual training period and which ends with the men's being supplied with 'rexes,' the royal monograms, to put on their epaulets. They are real guards first after they have received them."

The second exercise has a stronger touch of reality. It is the so-called "Guards Round." Here they are permitted to try all the tactical skills which are intended for them in a war situation. This time it concerned the defense of a coastal stretch against a foreign invasion force, which was played by the American guests from West Germany.

From the mobilization areas in Central Zealand the force was on the second day pulled out to the exercise ground near the Jaegerspris camp, where it moved into position along the coast--by a bit of an accident right at the place from which it is believed that an unknown submarine was observed in Ise Fjord shortly before Christmas.

"Dig in," the order sounded after a good 14 days of severe frost. Fortunately two ditch diggers had been rented--they would have been requisitioned in a war--and they were able slowly but surely to nibble holes down through the concrete-hard frozen earth's crust.

Who won the battle? The Americans did, of course. Not so much because their equipment was so much better, but because the Royal Life Guards are, well, polite and courteous people who would not dream of letting guests lose.

8985

CSO: 3613/104

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ARMY'S FIRE CONTROL COMPUTER SYSTEMS DESCRIBED

Geneva REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DEFENSE in French Jan 85 pp 58-59

[Article by Egbert Thomer: "West German Computer-Aided Artillery Fire Control Systems:"]

[Text] "Our objective is to be capable of delivering the most effective immediate supporting fire possible. To achieve this objective, we must have suitable weapons plus computer-aided command, fire control, and reconnaissance systems." A Defense Ministry specialist thus defined the military requirements established for future field artillery command and fire control systems whose performance characteristics will be appreciably superior to those of the present FALKE (FeldArtillerie-Lenkdaten-Digitairechner fur Fuerkommandos) system which became operational in 1973-1974.

Adler Command and Control System

The new Adler (Artillerie-Daten-Lageund Einsatz-Rechnerverbund) command and control system is scheduled to become operational during the next 3 years. It is designed to manage radio communications handling data transmissions between regimental headquarters and firing batteries. Immediate transmission of information, orders, commands, and reports is of prime importance in obtaining accurate concentrated fire, optimum ammunition expenditure, and the best possible reaction times. To accomplish this, all information obtained by reconnaissance and observation elements will be fed automatically into the Heros (Heeresfuhrungs-informationssystem fur Rechnergestutzte Operationsfuhrung in den Staben) C³I [Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence] system, with the Adler system handling the exchange of such information with superior artillery command, fire control, and information systems.

Programs for coordination of the different computers permit intercommunication between the Adler system and other command and control systems. In addition, extensive use of common components will make a high degree of standardization and interchangeability possible. Standard components of the Adler system include: a dual storage-capacity MR80-20 computer (furnished by ATM Computer); a 70-Mbit RDS 80 disk unit (Miltop, United States); a DEA-64 input-output terminal (SEL: Standard Elektric Lorenz); a PLG-39 program loader (ATM Computer); an SEM 80-90 radio (SEL); and the general-purpose MT 120 printer (Mannesmann-Tally).

The Adler system's display units are made by SEL. Meanwhile, the MR 80-20 computer has been selected as standard equipment for German Army command, control and information systems. The Federal Defense Ministry will shortly designate the prime contractor for the Adler's interconnection system.

Ifab Artillery Fire Control System

While the Adler system manages computer-aided data transmissions between artillery headquarters and their batteries, the Ifab (Integrierte Fuerleitmittel fur Artillerie Batterien) is a fire direction and control system for field artillery cannon batteries. Thyssen-Henschel is the Ifab system's prime contractor. ESG (Elektronik-System-Gesellschaft) is subcontractor for the system's electronics.

Ifab is designed to perform the following tasks: battlefield surveillance; target detection, identification, and location (the new observation armored vehicle has a decisive role in performance of this task); computation of firing data; preparation of fire commands; determination of the positioning and laying of a battery's guns; and transmission of data. The Ifab's display terminal is manufactured by ATM Computer and its input-output terminal equipment by SEL.

Ares Rocket Launcher Fire Control System

Like the Ifab system at field artillery cannon battery level, the Ares (Artillerie-Raketen-Einsatz-System) handles tactical and technical fire direction and control tasks at the battery level of MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System] and LARS battalions.

Dornier is currently developing the Ares system whose tasks will include: determination of the best firing positions; preparation of firing missions; determination of sectors of fire; exercising fire direction by selecting the most appropriate types of ammunition; and determination of ammunition requirements. The system's computer, input-output terminal equipment, and programming language will conform to standardization requirements and be compatible with the Adler system.

Each LARS and MLRS firing battery consists of two platoons of four rocket launchers each. A LARS battery also has two radars and a fire direction center. An MLRS battery has a fire direction center. Unlike the LARS, the MLRS has its own system for determination of the positioning and laying of the rocket launchers and computation of firing data. This system's components include vehicle navigation equipment, a fire control computer, a display screen, and a console. It is used to obtain accurate target location, prepare "datagrams," and correctly lay the rocket launchers.

Several NATO countries have adopted the MLRS. Consequently a data-transmission interface will be needed to connect it to the various national command and control systems.

Lastly, the battery's fire direction center receives information and orders from higher headquarters, transmits information and messages, and continuously updates its system's data bank.

M113 GA2 Artillery Armored Observation Vehicle

This tracked vehicle will serve as a forward observer in the new artillery command and control system. It can perform such tasks as battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and target ranging by means of the following items of on-board equipment: electronic sensors; a PERI-D11 dual periscope fitted with a laser rangefinder and angular sensor manufactured by Steinheil-Lear Siegler; an input-output device; and an FNA 615 vehicle navigation system produced by Bodenseewerk-Geratetechnik. Target information is processed within the vehicle and translated into fire commands that are immediately transmitted to the artillery pieces. This same information is simultaneously communicated to the battalion fire direction center where a printer converts the fire commands into printed form. The German Army is to receive a total of 320 M113 GA observation vehicles. They are being produced by Thyssen-Heuschel as prime contractor in collaboration with ESG.

Acquisition of Hostile Artillery Targets

Hostile artillery is located mainly by sound ranging techniques and by radars and electro-optical devices. The target acquisition battalion's command post transmits its orders to the artillery target locating devices via the Adler system. The information obtained by these devices and sensors is processed centrally.

The SMA 64 sound ranging system made by SEL is to be replaced by the more advanced SMA 085. Hostile artillery firing positions are located by measuring the relative times at which sound waves generated by firings reach several different microphone positions on the ground. Each measuring station has four microphones, a data transmission unit, and a microcomputer. Current studies are aimed at broadening the sound-ranging sector. One SMA 085 system will cover a division front out to a depth of 25 kilometers forward of the line of contract. Data on the artillery positions thus located will be transmitted by radio to the target acquisition battalion command post's Adler command and control system. The entire process from measurements to data transmission is automatic. Special sensors will also be used to locate hostile rocket launcher positions.

The electro-optical OZA artillery target acquisition system will replace the current flash ranging system. The OZA system will likewise be a passive means of locating targets. Each system will consist of several electro-optical measuring stations and a central data processing computer, all deployed within a division's zone of action. These electro-optical devices measure infrared emissions from the flash of hostile artillery firings. Data processed by the central computer unit are transmitted by radio to the Adler command and control system where they are directly converted into fire orders. The OZA is still in the design phase which should be completed in 2 to 3 years.

The currently operational Green Archer target location radar is to be replaced by the speedier and more accurate AOR artillery target location radar. The task of developing the AOR's basic design has been assigned to a consortium composed of SEL, AEG, and Seimens. In addition to determining the location of the impact points of friendly and hostile artillery and mortar rounds, the AOR radar continuously scans the horizon of its search area until an incoming mortar or artillery projectile is detected. Its electronically controlled lobes then track the projectile, calculate its trajectory on the basis of which the radar's computer computes the coordinates of the weapon that fired. The AOR will also be linked directly by radio to the Adler system.

The SMA-085, OZA, and AOR active and passive target location systems should optimize artillery employment. The Adler command and control system used in target acquisition battalion command posts ensures immediate processing of the data and information furnished by these systems and also by other technical target acquisition means.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 58 The Bundeswehr's M113 GA2 artillery armored vehicle is equipped with a PERI-D11 dual periscope fitted with a laser rangefinder, an FNA 615 vehicle navigation system, and a data transmission terminal. An on-board computer immediately converts target position and range information into fire commands for the artillery pieces. The modification program begun in 1982 is scheduled for completion in 1985 with delivery of the last of the M113 GA2 tracked vehicles ordered by the Bundeswehr.
2. p 59 The SEM80-90 radio made by SEL is a component of the Adler command and control system which is to enter service within the Bundeswehr during the next 3 years. This radio operates in the data transmission and voice modes. It has 16 channels and an automatic channel selector. Its all-wave antenna has an output power of 40 watts. Its operating voltage can be either 24 or 48 volts. As shown here, the set consists of two piggyback transceivers mounted above a vehicular BITE [built-in test equipment] unit. The SEM 80-90 is now in production and will replace the Bundeswehr's present SEM 25 radio as standard equipment.
3. p 59 The M577 A1 is a modification of the light tracked M113 armored personnel carrier. It is used as a command post vehicle at brigade level. Construction of this version with a raised hull roof by Detroit Diesel in the United States dates back to 1962-1963. Special modifications to meet German requirements are being made by Thyssen-Henschel. An auxiliary power unit provides electric power for the vehicle's considerable radio equipment. The Bundeswehr has more than 115 of these command post vehicles.

MILITARY

FINLAND

MILITARY GENERATIONAL CHANGE: LAST WARTIME OFFICER RETIRES

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 18 Dec 84 pp 6,7

[Article by Sampo Ahto: "Still 12 Veterans in the Ranks"]

[Text] The director of the Military Academy, Maj Gen Risto Setala, went into retirement on the 10th day of this month on reaching 60 years of age.

This time the replacement of the director marks a greater than usual turning point in the history of the Military Academy. With Setala's departure, the last officer to have participated in World War II has retired from the service of our top military training establishment to enter civilian life.

The passing years mean that war veterans are now finally retiring from the ranks of the Army. As for administrative officers, the process occurred decades ago, but those officers too who know the smell of gunpowder on a real battlefield are nowadays getting to be rarer and rarer. Because only generals and colonels may serve until the age of 60, the last of the war veterans are to be found among them.

Twelve Veterans

If we use a fine tooth comb and a bit unjustly omit from our survey special personnel and those who were only volunteer underage militiamen, we arrive at the result that there are eight veterans serving in the Armed Forces at the end of this year. The total rises to 12, however, if we include those underage volunteers who served in combat zones even though they did not manage to receive basic training during the war.

The number of soldiers who have had wartime experience has rapidly declined. As recently as 1979, only two of our 25 generals had not taken part in World War II. Half of the 80 colonels at that time were war veterans. At the end of our decade, however, only Armed Forces Commander Jaakko Valtanen, who, because his retirement age is greater than that of the others, will be retired during the first half of 1990, is left.

Served As an Orderly As a Boy

Valtanen is even now a rare individual in our Armed Forces in the sense that he is the only one who managed to serve as an officer in time of war. He is also the only one who served who was awarded the Freedom Cross, Fourth Class.

Valtanen was promoted to ensign in early June 1944 after having completed the reserve officers course at the Naval Academy during the first half of that year. He acquired his experience at the front at Fort Vanhakylänmaa, serving there as an artillery observation and fire control officer in the summer of 1944. At the time in question several shooting matches had taken place and the fort was again a target of air attacks.

Valtanen's wartime career is in other respects reminiscent of the careers of other war veterans still in service. All of them went to war as boys, Valtanen as a 14-year-old, when the war broke out. His job too was a typical one: orderly on the Turku sector staff.

In Turku Valtanen was trained to be a radio operator and when he again volunteered at the outbreak of the Continuation War, he was ordered to Åland to serve as a radio operator. In connection with the capture of the Karelian Isthmus, he was transferred from there to the coastal fortifications at Seivasto and Ino where there was daily combat action. He left to return to civilian life, however, as early as the fall of 1941 when the marshal [Mannerheim] issued an explicit order to send underage youths home.

When he finished school in April 1942, Valtanen was nevertheless in the Army again, this time as a communications and radio noncom since he had managed to get into noncom school the preceding fall. In the fall he had to go back to civilian life and his "real" military service did not begin until March 1943 when Valtanen was drafted in the normal way. He served as a draftee on a fortified island off the coast of Helsinki, this time receiving artillery non-com training at his own request.

From Viipuri to Porkkala

Another coastal artillery war veteran in active service is the chief of the Satakunta Military District, Col. Olavi Aspinjaakko. Volunteering during the YH [special exercises] in the fall of 1939, Aspinjaakko had reached his 13th birthday only a few months before. An orderly's post was, however, found for him, first in Viipuri and then in Sakkijärvi. In Sakkijärvi the boy was given a snow suit and even a pistol, but, when the Russians crossed [the border], the youngest soldiers on the Bay of Viipuri were, to be sure, moved farther back.

In the summer of 1941 Aspinjaakko was an orderly on the Hanko front. The marshal's return-home order affected him too, but the next summer he returned to Hanko. He spent the winter of 1942-1943 attending school, the summer of 1943 performing compulsory labor as a logger and the following winter in school again.

Regular compulsory military service began for Aspinjaakko in May 1944 and he performed it at the forts of Russaro, Hasto-Buso and Makiluoto. On the last-named island the garrison had to take part in the evacuation of Porkkala, which went on for days and after which the battery further grouped to defend the western side of the lease zone. When he was sent home in October 1944, artilleryman Aspinjaakko returned to civilian life with rather empty hands; he was wearing a summer blouse stripped of its military insignia, the back of which was ripped open and on his feet boots one of the soles of which was missing.

To the Front Without a Ticket

The current commander of the Southwest Finland Military District, Lt Gen Lauri Koho, left for the Continuation War in the most peculiar manner. He still had a uniform he had had during the Winter War when he served as a 13-year-old orderly at the Elisenvaara Air Defense District Center. When his father left for the new war the day before, the boy too put his uniform on and concealed himself on a military train at Matku Station that was transporting a heavy artillery battery.

The men who were on the train shared what they had equally with the underage volunteer and so he made it as far as Varpaiset without a ticket. During the inspection made there the battery commander, Major Hallakorpi, discovered the uninvited stranger, but he ordered him to join the ranks along with the others since he had gotten as far as he had. That is how Koho wandered through the Karelian Isthmus with the battery, participating in the fighting around Kilpola and Porlampi among other places. In early fall the battery moved to Eastern Karelia and the objective was then Petroskoy. At Jessoila, however, Koho was sent home due to the above-mentioned order of the marshal. In the summers of 1942 and 1943 he served in air defense units in the Kakisalmi area.

Regular compulsory military service began for Koho during the first half of 1944 in the customary way: a crewcut and harsh commands. That evening, however, it became clear that the recruit was indeed a corporal and his recruit stage ended there and then. Only he did not get his hair back.

Koho's new unit was the antiaircraft regiment that was defending Helsinki, so he participated in combatting the last big attack on Helsinki. At the end of the summer of 1944 he was ordered to take the reserve officers course which had just been initiated, but the officer promotions that followed this did not occur until later in peacetime when the supervisory commission looked into the matter.

Underage Militiamen's "Squirrel Battery"

Major General Setälä, mentioned above, the director of the Officers Training School, Col Aimo Airola, and the chief of the Topographic Corps, Col Lauri Vilkkö, served as infantrymen at the front. Setälä and Vilkkö participated in the Winter War as underage volunteers.

Setälä participated in the 1941 summer offensive in the 14th Light Artillery Battery Section, the crew of whose so-called squirrel battery was made up of underage militiamen. The battery did well in the section, as did the others, although the first real shots were not fired until they were at the front.

The boys were sent home in the fall of 1941 and, when Setälä was called up about a couple of years later, he was assigned to the infantry. In the ranks of the First Light Infantry Border Battalion he participated in the exhausting delaying and defensive fighting in Eastern Karelia and the Ladoga area of Karelia, gaining first-hand experience in the bloody battle of the Tuulos bridgehead, among others.

Having participated in the Second Division advance into the Karelian Isthmus, Airola too was sent home in the fall of 1941. In the fall of 1943 he entered the service at Huuhanmaki where he received antitank training. In April 1944 he left for the front at Vaskisavotta in the ranks of the 12th Detached Battalion. The battalion saw action in the battle at Sirranmaki, among others, where Airola too distinguished himself by destroying a T-34 tank. A rare decoration for close combat with tanks sewn onto the sleeve of his combat jacket is still a memento of that.

In the fall of 1941 Vilkkö too had to leave the military service in which he had participated in a number of different patrol assignments. He was drafted into regular service at the training center located at Kyminlinna in the fall of 1943.

When the big Russian attacks started, Vilkkö was at the replacement depot in Uuras from which men were shipped directly to the front. The young soldier wound up in the battered 10th Division and the confused delaying battles in the middle of the isthmus. One of his first combat experiences was swimming across Kaukjarvi while enemy tanks were firing on everything that appeared above the surface. He lost his boots, but Vilkkö nevertheless succeeded in carrying his rifle to the opposite shore. Later he participated in the battles at the Bay of Viipuri, among other things taking part in the recapture of Hapenensaari.

Guarding Prisoners of War

Among our war veterans Maj Gen Erkki Vanninen, the commander of the Pohjanmaa Military District, represents the Engineer Corps. True, Vanninen was not originally an engineer, but he came close to being in his future branch of service as early as the summer of 1941 as a volunteer guarding the bridges at Koria. Later Vanninen was assigned to the Fourth Corps and his duties among other things included the guarding of prisoners of war at Vakkila and Porlampi. In the summer of 1942 Vanninen served as a gunner in an antiaircraft unit at Kouvola, a time that remains indelibly fixed in his mind since he witnessed the arrival of Hitler's air escort when he came to congratulate the marshal.

When Vanninen was drafted in April 1943, he was assigned to the Engineers Training School at Utti. The following year during the delaying tactic phase,

he served in the 12th Engineers Battalion at Karhumäki, withdrawing with his unit to Korpiselkä via Porajärvi and further participating in road construction in Ilomantsi.

With Lagus at Aanislinna

Lt Gen Pentti Vayrynen, the chief of the Military Economy Department, and Lt Gen Ilmari Kirjavainen, the chief of the Border Patrol, were not called up until February 1944, when both were assigned to the Antitank Training School at Huuhamäki. They did not manage to get to the front again as recruits since those who were being trained at Huuhamäki were moved to Kymenlaakso about Midsummer's Eve when the rumbling of artillery began to be heard. However, both of them were volunteers in the Armed Forces starting as early as during the Winter War in the same fashion as the others mentioned in our article. Vayrynen even succeeded in readying himself for not quite a half a year in the Aanislinna Armored Division. The achievement was an exceptional one because the division commander, Major General Lagus, did not want little boys among his troops, who had a tough reputation.

On Talvela's Staff at Aunus

Of those war veterans who had not received basic training because of their age, chief of General Staff Lt Gen R.W. Stewen, antiaircraft inspector Col Aimo Heinaro and Western Uusimaa Military District chief Col Pentti Laamanen managed to get into action as early as during the Winter War. At the time the boys were only 12 years old.

Stewen, who was orderly for his father, the Fourth Corps chief of staff, in the Ladoga area of Karelia and at Aunus from July 1941 to January 1942, got to experience especially interesting periods. Observing the actions of the corps staff and particularly its commander, General Talvela, left Stewen with many lasting impressions. Stewen later noted that Talvela was a respected, but also violently explosive master: "There wasn't the slightest doubt as to who was leading the Fourth Corps."

Navy commander Rear Adm Juha Tikka and Joensuu Military District chief Col Raimo Savolahti participated as underage soldiers only in the Winter War, but nonetheless in a theater of operations. On a couple of occasions Savolahti was an orderly on the staff of the Aunus Group, whereas Tikka served Finland's most-bombed target, the Kotka antiaircraft units.

Our article would be very incomplete if President and Commander in Chief Mauno Koivisto, who is at the top of the military hierarchy, were left unmentioned. Koivisto too left for the war as a volunteer and, when he was later serving in the 35th Infantry Regiment and the First Division Light Infantry Company, that is, the detachment at Tornio, he proved to be reliable and fearless as a light machine gunner who was later not underservedly promoted to sergeant.

In view of the above, it would appear that after 1990 just our commander in chief in civilian dress will be the only one in the Armed Forces system who has learned to recognize the face of war through personal contact with it. This naturally heightens Koivisto's prestige among soldiers, although there is

certainly no need for that. It is generally known in the Armed Forces that, in addition to his achievements at the front, the president has such an extensive and thorough knowledge of the military and especially of military history that he could teach most professional soldiers a thing or two.

Wartime Experience Is Important

In Finland people have always felt good when their men have not had recent wartime experience. Those who serve in the Armed Forces too hope that they will never have to obtain it again. On the other hand, wartime experience is of indisputable value in the military profession. History demonstrates that many an army has been crushed when it gets into a tough spot because it has become overly unfamiliar with the harsh reality of war.

So our Armed Forces are losing a lot when they have to give up those of their officers who have been through a war. Although, for example, wartime battalion commanders — the last to retire were Lt Gen Magnus Haaksalo and Gen Lauri Sutela in 1980 and 1983 — and company commanders — the last to retire were Lt Gens Ermei Kanninen and Aarno Sihvo a couple of years ago — have been out of the military for some time now, their experience in the ranks has been especially useful.

The current Armed Forces commander has drawn attention to the fact that wartime experiences must continue to be impressed on the minds of younger soldiers as being as real as possible. For example, at the Military Academy the wishes of the commander have been implemented by striving to more actively than before invite retired officers who have been through the war to appear as lecturers.

World War I light infantrymen were teachers of and models for younger World War II officers. In their time those light infantrymen had set out to liberate the fatherland. The same sense of duty drove our veterans who are still in service to don their field-gray uniforms in the years of their youth. Insofar as these officers who have now turned gray have been capable of passing on their legacy to those who have remained in the service, they have performed their most important duties with honor these past few years.

11,466

CSO: 8117/0790

MILITARY

NORWAY

PAPER COMMENTS ON DEFENSE BUDGET DEBATE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Nov 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Ends and Means in Defense"]

[Text] There will probably be divided opinions concerning to what extent Tuesday's Storting debate on next year's defense budget gave an adequate picture of Defense Department's factual situation. In our judgment this was not the case. In some quarters, the capacity to sweep problems under the rug is manifestly more prevalent than the will to do a thorough analysis of the fundamental conditions for a credible defense.

Like Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad, we also declare ourselves naturally to be satisfied that there prevails in the Storting a broad cross-party consensus for an increase in defense appropriations. Nor is it uninteresting to what extent the approved budget increase stands in relation to real needs, most especially in the area of materiel.

Surely these needs are, at all events, no less urgent than they were when the good friends of defense in the present government coalition found themselves in opposition and applied constant pressure to correct the defects. Today we seem to notice a striking modesty in the same circles.

It is one thing that, from a standpoint of political unity, a budget increase of 3.5 percent probably is the maximum obtainable. But the defense debate becomes scarcely meaningful if on tactical grounds one chooses to overlook the flawed connection between ends and means. Obviously that must be mentioned, even when one is in the government. We dare to recommend to the bourgeois majority that it think this over a bit more carefully when--or if--it should again get the chance to bring the defense budget safely into port.

That the Labor Party for its part has proposed to reduce the defense budget by 70 million kroner comes hardly as any great surprise. Moreover, it is correct, as was pointed out in Tuesday's debate, that one seldom sees demonstrated so obvious a defect in the symmetry between life and doctrine as in this case. As is known, Labor has said that it wishes to strengthen conventional defense in order thereby to reduce NATO's dependency on thermonuclear weapons. But this was only at the level of rhetorical phrases, for as soon as the question is appropriations, the Labor Party is not at all inclined to follow its own ostensible statement of goals.

During the debate the Defense Minister reminded us of two circumstances which cannot be stressed strongly enough: first, that Norway's defense effort, because of our strategic location and limited resources, could only have meaning in the context of an alliance; and secondly that a strong Norwegian defense effort is a condition for political and practical support from our allies.

Another matter has to do with the threat-evaluation factor which the Defense Minister himself gave as a reason; this is a sufficiently realistic ground, granted the Soviets' military rearmament, not least in our country's immediate vicinity. The defense debate was scarcely enlightening on this point.

12723

CSO: 3639/43

MILITARY

NORWAY

POWER AGENCY OFFICIAL: ELECTRICAL SUPPLY VULNERABLE IN WAR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Feb 85 p 10

[Text] Norway depends more than any other country on the supply of electricity since electricity comprises approximately 70 percent of our total energy consumption. In terms of output, slightly over 80 percent of hydroelectric power plants are built into mountains. "However, we cannot ignore damages during war and sabotage acts against outside stations, transformer and relay installations," Secretary General Sigmund Larsen of the Norwegian Waterways and Electricity Department told the Oslo Military Association in a presentation on Monday.

Director-General Larsen emphasized that the tens of thousands of kilometers of power lines, which extend over deserted areas, are also vulnerable:

"Somebody with evil intentions can quite leisurely blast poles and cut lines. The only thing we can present against such situations is our high repair readiness with reserve equipment inventories and well trained crews. It is also very important for our preparedness to have a domestic industry which produces everything in material and equipment we need," said Sigmund Larsen.

Besides, the managing director pointed out that a dam constructed with concrete can be damaged more easily than one consisting of stone.

"The dams are being checked regularly, and more so when a state of readiness exists. In a specific situation the reservoirs can be drained. To warn the settlements downstream in catastrophic situations, warning systems are being built into certain dams," Larsen said.

There are restrictions on visiting and photographing dam installations in order to prevent foreign intelligence services from obtaining information on the energy supply. A number of larger dam installations are earmarked for being guarded by the military, and in case of mobilization and war the watch will be tightened.

12831

CSO: 3639/82

MILITARY

NORWAY

MORE NIGHT EXERCISES FOLLOWING LESSONS FROM FALKLANDS WAR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Dec 84 p 12

[Text] The Defense Supreme Command wants Norwegian officers and soldiers to take a lesson from the experiences of the Falklands War. The Inspector-General for the Army has given orders to staff and divisions throughout the country that the experiences are to be learned and to be given the necessary consideration.

The material to be used is a study generated by the Army Staff School II. The study enlarges upon the most available public sources about operations in the war between Great Britain and Argentina in the Falkland Islands in 1982.

In a summary of the study it is pointed out that combat in the dark is becoming more and more necessary, and that commensurable techniques must be found for such nocturnal operations. This applies especially to equipment to conduct fire-support operations.

Supplying divisions off the main road takes a longer time than assumed and the problem of the evacuation of the wounded and of POWs is significantly greater than had been estimated--so the summary says.

It has been established that brigade operations must be conducted with very simple means. The bureaucratic paperwork is largely superfluous and is not capable of being practically executed over time, the report says.

Among the most important experiences mentioned are the helicopters' vulnerability to all anti-aircraft defense, the convoys' and amphibian forces' vulnerability to low-flying anti-ship rockets. The need for defense measures for civilian ships against such rockets was prominently cited as an important lesson.

According to the study from the Army Staff School, the Falklands War has also given a basis for the following conclusion: The technical experiences should give us confidence in the equipment we have. The greatest weakness lies in the sensitive electronic systems of advanced weapons in the front line.

12723

CSO: 3639/43

MILITARY

NORWAY

BRILL

F-16 DEFECT REMEDIED--A portion of the Defense's F-16 jet fleet will be grounded for some days to come while a defect in a particular engine part undergoes repair. The flaw was discovered during the investigation of an F-16 accident at Rygge on 13 November when the plane caught fire. Press officer Ole R. Bollmann of the Defense Supreme Command would not release to NTB [Norwegian News Agency] the number of F-16s that would be grounded. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Dec 84 p 9] 12723

CSO: 3639/43

MILITARY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

EXERCISES NEAR NORWEGIAN BORDER--In February, 22,000 Swedish soldiers will march toward the Norwegian border to train in defense against an invasion from the West. It is not the fear of 1905 which crops up again in Sweden writes the FREDERIKSSTAD BLAD. Military exercises near our border simply go by rotation after earlier exercises in other parts of Sweden. The Swedes are careful to place their military exercises in such a way as to reinforce or emphasize the country's neutrality. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Dec 84 p 14] 12723

CSO: 3639/43

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

WAGE RESTRAINT SEEN AIDING JOBS INCREASE IN INDUSTRY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Feb 85 Sect III p 1

[Article by Anne E. Jensen: "Thirty Thousand More Jobs in Industry and Construction"]

[Text] The restrained growth in wages has provided a bonus in the form of many new jobs in industry and construction.

Employment in private industry is increasing above all expectations. Between November 1983 and November of last year there came a whole 17,000 more jobs in industry and 13,000 more in construction.

And there is much to indicate that more new jobs in industry are coming. Business leaders from especially that part of industry which produces investment goods, for instance, figure that more should be employed during this quarter.

This is also the part of industry which has had the lowest wage increases the past year. In November the hourly wage for workers in the investment goods industry was only three percent above the level of a year before, whereas wages in the consumer goods industry and semifinished products industry increased by, respectively, five and six percent.

On the other hand, the prospects for construction are more pessimistic. Housing construction is declining and it is a question whether industrial construction and public works jobs are increasing sufficiently to balance the negative effect on employment of a lower level of housing construction.

The growth in industrial employment confirms that the growth in the Danish economy is now taking place in the part of industry which produces for export and investment. This is in contrast to the situation of one year ago, where it was especially housing construction and private consumption which gave a boost to the economy. And a little too much of a boost, some believe, referring to the dismal growth in the balance of payments.

The new trend will benefit the Danish economy. Exports will help us out of foreign debt. The investment will cost foreign currency at the beginning, but is necessary in order for Danish firms to be able to manage in competition with foreign firms.

8985

CSO: 3613/104

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

YOUNG FARMERS DEEPLY IN DEBT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Jan 85 Sect III p 1

[Article by Anne E. Jensen: "Young Farmers in Debt up to the Hilt: The Total Agricultural Debt Almost 80 Billion Kroner]

[Text] At the end of fiscal year 1983/84, the agricultural sector had a total debt of nearly 80 billion kroner according to an account rendered by the Danish Department of Statistics.

This means total interest payments by farmers of 9 billion kroner every year--or 95,000 kroner per farm.

In agriculture, debt accounts for 54.6 percent of total assets--a rise in comparison to last year when it was 48 percent.

It is especially the young farmers who are deepest in debt. For farmers under 30 years of age, the debt percentage is 103 percent, and thus they are statistically insolvent. The farmers in the 30-39 range have a similarly high debts, namely 84 percent. But when the farmer reaches 50 years of age or over, the indebtedness falls sharply. Thus the 50-59 age bracket had 45 percent indebtedness, and for the over 70 farmers the debt burden falls to under a fifth of total assets.

It is therefore also the young farmers who must contend with large interest payments. Yet the farmers under 30 have secured cheaper loans than the next age group and therefore paid an average of 161,000 kroner in interest last year while the 30-39 group had to hand over 180,000 kroner.

On the whole, farmers paid lower rates than the year before. Even though the greatest part of the debt is fixed rate, there is also a considerable amount of variable rate debt from which the farmers have profited with the sharp fall in interest rates during the period. At the end of 1983/84, the variable rate debt in agriculture made up 10 billion kroner of the total 80 billion kroner of debt.

12819

CSO: 3613/105

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

BRIEFS

FREE TRADE PACT WITH NORWAY--Oslo--Norway entered into an agreement with Denmark yesterday for free trade with Greenland. The agreement came into existence because Greenland has withdrawn from EC and therefore no longer is covered by Norway's free trade agreement with EC countries. Grethe Vaerno from the governing Norwegian party, the Conservatives, states that the new free trade agreement improves trade conditions for Greenland and that the agreement is an important part of closer Nordic cooperation. "It is highly desirable to include Greenland in Nordic cooperation as much as possible," she adds. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Mar 85 p 8] 12578

CSO: 3613/122

ECONOMIC

DENMARK/GREENLAND

ISLAND'S MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS HEAVILY INDEBTED TO STATE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Greenland's Mayors Must Halt Increasing Debt"]

[Text] Unpaid bills to the government in Greenland now exceed 150 million kroner. Greenland Minister Tom Hoyem is giving immediate orders for every Greenland municipality to give attention to the unpaid bills.

Greenland Minister Tom Hoyem (CD) has written to Greenland's 18 mayors to put the brakes on the increasing amount of unpaid bills to the state for, among other things, heat and rent. The state's overall credits now amount to 150 million kroner.

"I view the increase in the outstanding debts with great concern, and unfortunately, the amount has increased yet more during 1984," Greenland Minister Tom Hoyem states.

The National Auditor has criticized the lack of collection of the outstanding amounts.

"Now we will see whether the amounts are paid. I think that we are going in the right direction, but if that does not occur, I personally will visit the towns in Greenland which do not get the amounts brought down," Tom Hoyem told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The latest report from 1983 shows that there are unpaid bills for rent and heat in the amount of 27 million kroner, for electricity and water in the amount of 35 million kroner, and 44 million kroner for construction. The additional remainder, for housing subsidy loans, adds an additional 17 million kroner. The balance for business subsidy loans reached 50 million kroner at the beginning of the year, but these now have been assumed by the home rule government.

The balance for rent and heat involve the government's 7,000 rental houses. The law provides the possibility for seizing the money for rent, but it is not possible to throw people out of their homes because the housing shortage makes it difficult to rehouse them.

The shutting off of water and electricity supplies for people who have not paid their bill, by and large is not possible in that that would create problems with harm from the cold.

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

FOREIGN COMPETITION'S IMPACT ON FRENCH MARKETS

Paris LES ECHOS in French 5 Feb 85 p 5

[Article: "Foreign Competition: A Drop in France, Stability Abroad"]

[Text] According to the quarterly INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] survey, the intensity of foreign competition decreased slightly on the home market during the second quarter, particularly in the area of semiprocessed goods and consumer goods (except cars where competition is very acutely felt). The competitiveness of cost prices continues to level out, which permits an increase in the profit margin. The disparity between cost prices and delivery times by comparison with those of foreign competitors remains stable.

On foreign markets, foreign competition remains as keenly felt by business leaders as in the first quarter. The competitiveness of cost prices is worsening, while the profit margin level has stabilized.

The margin of cost prices compared with those of foreign competitors is diminishing, particularly in the auto industry, agro-alimentary industries, and equipment. Delivery times are being shortened to the point where they have almost become equal to those of the competition. This is good news!

According to the replies of industrialists, the volume of export orders continues to increase. They expect a stronger development in exports than in sales on the French market during the first quarter of 1985.

This prognosis is based on national demand remaining weak and international activity continuing at a good level.

In the area of semiprocessed goods, foreign competition in France is losing ground in chemistry and rubber. In the glass industry, construction materials, and metal processing, profit margins are improving (with no change in the cost price differential).

In exports, industrialists noted a drop in competitiveness and growth in profit margins. This follows a classic pattern which illustrates the preference for French businesses to the detriment of sales abroad.

Export orders continue to increase but, during the first quarter, the foreign export share of the total sales showed a decline.

In current consumer goods, the strength of foreign competition continues to decrease. It is only increasing in household appliances and furnishings, and on foreign markets, in clothing. Competitiveness in cost prices shows no significant variation but fluctuations in profit margins vary according to the markets.

A note of warning: in textiles, export delivery times are growing longer. During the first quarter of 1985, apart from furnishings and the shoe leather industry, the growth in exports should be greater than that of sales on the home market.

In the agro-alimentary industry, competition remains stable and profit margins are decreasing, which reduces the disparity of cost prices by comparison with competitors. The share of exports in total sales should remain stable during the first quarter of 1985.

In professional equipment, the strength of foreign competition decreased at the end of 1984, due to gains in competitiveness not reflected in profit margins. Hence there was a drop, particularly in engineering and the smelting industry.

On the other hand, there was an upturn in the electrical and electronic industries. During the first quarter of 1985, the proportion of exports in the sales total should grow.

In the automobile industry, competition remains very strong on all markets. The cost price margin is increasing on the French market but is decreasing to the point of even becoming negative on foreign markets (these results are relative since only one large business replied).

Delivery times, moreover, are shorter than those of competitors. During the first quarter of 1985, the share of exports out of the total sales should increase.

9824

CSO: 3519/189

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

DIFFICULTY IN ABSORBING MAJOR LABOR FORCE INCREASE

Paris LES ECHOS in French 31 Jan 85 p 6

[Article by Philippe Eliakim: "From 1975 to 1982: An Unprecedented Increase in the Active Population"]

[Text] In 7 years, between 1975 and 1982, France's active population* increased by 7.7 percent, going from 21.8 to 23.5 million people. In plain language, this means that each year during this period about 250,000 people entered the work force. Too many for the capacity of our economy to absorb. A report, published yesterday by INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies], analyzed the details of this development and its consequences for employment.

The main cause of the growth in the active population was the increase in the active rate of women which in 7 years jumped from 53.1 percent to 63.5 percent. Women represent 92 percent of those newly active (1.5 million out of 1.7 million). This, of course, reflects sociological development (mothers of one or two children are now looking for work), but also the weight of economic factors (production equipment is drawing more and more on tertiary, feminine labor).

INSEE also observed greater continuity in women's professional life--fewer and fewer of them interrupt their careers⁰⁰ and their interest in part time work which affected 21 percent of them in 1984, compared with 15 percent in 1975. The part played by men (+130,000), and immigrants (+70,000) appears to be marginal in the growth of the active population.

This unprecedented increase in the number of active workers is matched by a shortening of the length of active life: people begin work later and retire earlier. This development issues in a paradoxical fact: the active working population is growing older, while at the same time hundreds of thousands of young people are looking for jobs. The increasing numbers of those taking early retirement (330,000 at the end of 1982, 700,000 at the end of 1983) should nevertheless help to offset this tendency.

*The active population includes all who are employed as well as those who want a job. Those out of work are therefore included.

n terms of jobs, development is less marked. The French economy created barely 500,000 jobs between 1975 and 1982, an increase of 2.5 percent. These general figures, moreover, hide considerable differences according to the sectors concerned: industry, in free fall, has lost 10 percent of its manpower and now represents only 26 percent of the total. The main sectors affected include semiprocessed goods (-16 percent of the total, but -28 percent for iron and steel, -22.8 percent for base chemistry), textiles (-25 percent) and equipment -13 percent).

The BTP [Public Works and Construction] has fared better since it has registered a drop in its work force lower than the national average (-7.5 percent). Finally, some sectors have seen growth in employment, particularly the agro-alimentary industry (+3.8 percent), and the printing and publishing industry (+2.8 percent).

Young People, the Misfits of the Crisis

There has also been a sharp drop in agricultural employment (-16.6 percent) which now represents only 8 percent of the active population. Tertiary industries, fortunately, redeem the situation; by creating 1.8 million jobs between 1975 and 1982, it more than compensates for the drop in other sectors (this is no longer the case, however, since 1984). Development affects all activities, hotels, cafes and restaurants as well as insurance services and services which cater to businesses.

When all is said and done, this development seems to be favorable to women, who are still poorly represented in industry but numerous in the tertiary sector.

Young people, on the other hand, are the misfits of the crisis. Their numbers have diminished not only in industry (-35 percent), but also in the tertiary sector which, nevertheless, is developing (-7 percent). The situation looks as if businesses, whose numbers in personnel continue to drop, choose to give hiring preference to experienced workers.

Finally, the twofold development of the active population and employment can be represented by scissors with diverging blades. Between the two, joblessness is gaining ground. And the trend threatens to continue; INSEE predicts that the active population will continue to increase in the years to come.

9824

CSO: 3519/191

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY CONTINUES DOWNWARD TREND

Paris LES ECHOES in French 31 Jan 85 p 9

[Article: "First Estimates of the Nation's Accounts for 1984: A New Setback in Commercial Activity"]

[Text] The year just ended was marked chiefly by a drop in consumption and an unprecedented fierceness in competition, particularly between the large supply groups. In addition, there was a general decline in the markup rate which, it seems, was consequently greater than that imposed by regulation. Even though the report did not mention the fact, it may be assumed that business results in 1984 again showed a decline.

The initial provisional data--the final report will be issued in June--note a 0.5 percent decline in the sales volume of the retail trade as a whole for the second year in a row. This figure hides disparities according to the sectors concerned. The wholesale trade, in particular, seems to have experienced growth in the volume of its activity.

Decline in the Non-Food Sector

Considering the retail trade alone, the food sector increased by 0.9 percent whereas the non-food sector registered a 1.9 percent decline. But if pharmaceuticals are excluded, the decline reaches 2.9 percent.

If one looks at market-affecting household consumption, there has been a slight increase of 0.5 percent in food products, but on the other hand, it has dropped by a volume of 1.2 percent for non-food items. Particularly affected were household purchases of home appliances (a volume of -3.6 percent in 1984 compared with -2.4 percent in 1983), and personal equipment, since the drop in purchases will reach 3.2 percent this year compared with 2.1 percent in 1983.

Retail food sales increased by a volume of 0.9 percent compared with 1983. Although sales in general foodstuffs have increased by a volume of 1.6 percent, it should be noted that developments vary as a function of the forms of distribution, since "hypermarchés" and supermarkets show an increase in volume of 5 percent and 5.8 percent respectively, whereas small shops and outlets of less than 400 square meters show a decline of 2.9 percent and 5.1 percent respectively.

In the area of non-food retail sales aside from pharmaceuticals, there was a decline in activity of 3 percent compared with 1.9 percent in 1983. Here too, the household and personal appliances sectors have been equally affected.

Market Share: Large Firms Gain Ground

To judge by the overall estimate of the wholesale sector, the latter has come off quite well. Market activity in food products increased in 1984, whereas the non-food sector showed a proportionately larger decline. By contrast, interindustrial or international trade showed a substantial increase.

On the other hand, sectors such as construction and public works experienced a drop in activity with negative consequences particularly for wholesale wood and construction materials companies.

Taking into account this overall setback in activity, trade accounts show "a trend towards consolidation of the commercial apparatus," a provisional estimate largely in view of difficulties in making statistical surveys. Nevertheless, the tally of large outlets of general foodstuffs continued its growth in 1984 with 28 "hypermarchés" and 373 supermarkets.

As a result of fierce competition, large outlets gained 2 points in the food market, and 0.5 of a point in the market for non-food products.

In the area of employment, the report has only "rough estimates for the first three quarters" of 1984. It seems that the rate of elimination of paying jobs has slowed for the trade sector as a whole (-0.2 percent between October 1983 and October 1984, as against -0.4 percent between October 1982 and October 1983).

Nevertheless, the decline in the work force affected the wholesale food trade and was an increasingly important factor in the non-food wholesale trade. The non-food retail trade has experienced a continuing decline in its wage earning work force at an annual rate of 0.8 percent. The retail food trade alone saw the creation of 6,400 jobs in the first 9 months of 1984.

The same cautious estimate holds good for investment. But the report concludes that one can assume a decline in the latter for trade in 1984 "based on startup statistics." As for the financial situation of businesses, it can be observed in the continuation of the tendency begun in 1981, characterized by a general deterioration in results.

[table in box]

Trade for 1984 in Figures

Retail sales turnover: Fr 1.161 billion (+7.1 percent in value;
-0.5 percent in volume:

--Foodstuffs: +0.9 percent
--Non-foodstuffs: 1.9 percent
(-2.9 percent apart from pharmaceuticals)

- 1) General foodstuffs:
 - Hypermarkets: +5 percent (in volume)
 - Supermarkets: +5.8 percent
 - Shops: -2.9 percent
 - Small outlets (less than 400 square meters): -5.1 percent
- 2) Market-affecting household consumption: -0.6 percent
 - Foodstuffs: +0.5 percent
 - Non-foodstuffs: -1.2 percent
- 3) Employment as of October 1, 1984:
1,957,700 wage earners (compared with 1,962,500 as of October 1, 1983)
- 4) Business failures:
 - 1984: 7,146 (+10.4 percent)
 - 1983: 6,475 (+8.7 percent)

9824

CSO: 3519/190

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

GOVERNMENT STATISTICS OFFICE REPORTS ON 1984 PERFORMANCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Jan 85 p 31

[Article by Cecilie Norland: "Strong Economic Growth in '84, More Difficult in Future"]

[Text] Norway's income and production increased strongly in 1984. The country's disposable real income increased by 5.4 percent from 1983 to 1984, and the gross national product increased by 4.3 percent. Oil operations are still of great importance for economic development, but the demand from "Mainland Norway" has increased in importance. The economic upswing continued in 1984, but we cannot count on the fact that international demand will stimulate the Norwegian economy just as strongly in the years to come as it did in 1984.

The Central Statistical Bureau writes this in its economic perspective of the year 1984. The growth in the gross national product was the highest since 1980. The strong economic growth can be traced first and foremost back to increased oil and gas production; the increase in production was 2.6 percent, calculated without the oil business and shipping. Growth outside the oil sector was the strongest in outside-competing industry and private services. Although Norway had strong growth from 1983 to 1984, the rate of growth is low, seen in the longer perspective. Both 1983 and 1984 were increase years, but international economic development has all the same been weak. In the short term Norwegian economic growth is strongly influenced by international economic growth.

For the year 1984 the international upswing made a considerable contribution to growth of the Norwegian economy. However, during 1984 the importance of the growth in exports for domestic development diminished, and the importance of increased investment in industry increased.

Structure Problems

Problems and changes in Norwegian industry and the industrial structure lessened the growth in production and income. The most important circumstances are the reduction in the shipbuilding industry, a strong drop in housing construction and a decline in public investment. According to the Central Statistical Bureau, these changes can also have contributed to lower

price increases and lower cost levels domestically, but all in all they lessened economic growth in 1984.

The oil business was in 1984 as previously of great importance to the growth in production, among other things, because this business stimulates demand in "Mainland Norway." However, during 1984 "Mainland Norway" took over the role of the most important driving force behind increased demand and economic growth. This is true both of increased investment and increased domestic private consumption of goods. Viewed totally, the growth in production outside oil and shipping was stronger in 1984 than it was in 1983.

On the whole, Norway's exports of goods and services increased by about six percent in 1984. Exports of oil and gas constituted about 36 percent of total exports, while exports of ships and platforms declined. The volume of exports outside of oil and shipping increased by 5.7 percent in 1984.

As far as investment outside the oil business is concerned, this dropped by four percent from 1983 to 1984, but investment demand increased all the same during 1984. Industrial investment was of especially great importance, and during the year this increased by 13.5 percent, if 1984 is viewed in comparison with 1983. In addition, it was of importance that the decline in housing construction stopped.

Increased Employment

The number of unemployed was 66,000 in 1984, the highest number in the postwar period. However, unemployment went through a peak in the beginning of 1984 and later the situation improved. A new development feature is that total employment increased by one percent, whereas the number of employed increased by only 0.7 percent. Previously this situation was the opposite.

The wage level for industrial workers increased by 7.7 percent in 1984. Thereby 1984 is the first year with a growth in real wages since 1977. The average growth in wages was larger than the growth in protected trades.

The rise in prices continued to decline in 1984, and the growth in consumer prices was 6.2 percent from 1983 to 1984. However, the growth in price increases in the countries we trade with is even lower. According to the Central Statistical Bureau, the decline in domestic costs and publicly regulated prices are the most important reasons for the low increase in prices.

In 1984 Norway had a balance of payments surplus of 28.5 billion kroner, or 6.4 percent of the gross national product. This is the biggest surplus which was registered since the war.

More Difficult in Future

Compared with the situation in other Western industrial countries and growth in previous years, the development of the Norwegian economy was distinctly positive in 1984. But in the time to come, too, development in Norway will be

heavily dependent on international economic conditions, and here the situation appears comparatively gloomy. OECD's forecasts indicate weak growth and increasing unemployment internationally, and there is little to indicate that the Western industrial countries will coordinate their economic policies to increase growth and reduce unemployment.

In addition to the fact that Norway cannot count on international growth and increased demand as a driving force, we have a distinctly growth-inhibiting industry and industrial structure. Our dependence on changing international market conditions is increasing, and we have been successful to too little an extent in developing new and competitive industries.

8985

CSO: 3639/71

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

BRIEFS

EXPORTS TO GDR DOUBLE--Norwegian exports to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) doubled last year. Then Norway sold 100 million kroner worth of goods to the East Germans, versus 50 million the year before. However, there is a long way yet before Norwegian exporters will have regained the position they formerly had in the GDR, says the leader of the Norwegian delegation to next week's meeting of the GDR-Norway economic commission, Bureau Chief Janne Julsrud of the Ministry of Trade. Today's exports are concentrated around rather few products. Trade Minister Asbjørn Haugstvedt will be present this year at the Norwegian exhibition stand at the Leipzig Fair during its opening on 10 March. [From NTB [Norwegian Wire Service]] [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 31 Jan 85 p 35] 8985

CSO: 3639/71

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

CENTRAL BANK CHIEF SEES CONTINUED STRONG ECONOMY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Feb 85 p 6

[Article: "Bengt Dennis Sees Bright Swedish Economy"]

[Text] "We had an extremely good year in 1984 and there are many indications that 1985 will be almost as good. But this must not tempt us into becoming complacent. Many fundamental problems remain to be solved."

This was stated by central bank chief Bengt Dennis in a TT (TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA) interview.

"You would have to be blind not to see the improvements that have occurred in recent years. It is true that the government has been helped by an international economic upswing, but without correct economic policies the turnaround would not have occurred," Dennis said.

But the chief of the central bank warned against exaggerated optimism.

"It is never possible to say that a country has come out of an economic crisis. It must constantly adapt itself to new realities."

Dennis believes that many problems remain to be solved and points to three major areas:

"The trade balance must be further improved."

"We must continue gradually reducing the budget deficit."

The third problem is the most important, according to Dennis:

"We must gain control over internal price and cost rises. Basically, everything else in our economic policy is dependent on how successful we are at reducing costs, so that we can maintain our competitive strength toward other countries."

"We can manage a slight increase in private consumption. It would be unreasonable to ask wage earners to accept another year of reduced real wages."

The central bank chief is happy to note an increased level of economic awareness among the Swedish people.

"The economic crisis has been so severe for most people and so much has been written and said about it that people are now much more conscious of economic issues."

"The high level of saving in ordinary savings accounts, savings bonds, and premium bonds means that households are now financing a much higher part of the budget deficit--20 of the 65 billion kronor of the estimated budget deficit for this fiscal year."

The share of household savings in financing the budget deficit is indicated by the following figures: in 1983 households accounted for 9 of the 83 billion kronor in the deficit (11 percent), while last year the figure was 14 of 73 billion (19 percent), and this year it is estimated at 20 out of 65 billion (31 percent).

"This is an extremely encouraging trend," Bengt Dennis said.

Dennis believes that the large national debt--now about 560 billion kronor--creates a heavy interest burden, but is not a repayment problem.

"The domestic national debt will not be repaid, but renewed. The foreign debt, on the other hand, is a problem. It must be reduced eventually. We are now on the right track, since we are not increasing this debt, but simply taking out new loans to repay bad old debts. Eventually, however, we must begin to pay off these debts. We can do this if we have several years of surplus in our trade balance," Dennis said.

"In the past, companies have taken out large loans abroad. Now that our industry is experiencing an upswing and companies are highly solvent, they want to repay their foreign debts as soon as possible."

"In order to prevent too much money from flowing out of the country, we must have a strict monetary policy and maintain a relatively high interest rate with respect to other countries," Bengt Dennis said.

9336

CSO: 3650/179

ENERGY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORWAY, UK PROPOSE WESTERN COUNTRIES SET UP OIL DATABASE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Feb 85 p 34

[Text] Norway and Great Britain would like to bring in several countries as participants in the ongoing expansion of a database for research and development projects associated with oil activities and petroleum chemistry. In the database, research institutions, industrial concerns, government agencies, and other interested parties can search for information on projects which have already been started. In this way, they can avoid wasting money and efforts or reinventing the wheel.

Preparation of the base started in 1980, and so far information about more than 1,100 Norwegian and British projects, both continuing and recently completed ones, has been entered. The base, which is called INFOIL II, is sponsored by the Norwegian Oil Directorate, the British Department of Energy, as well as Norway's Research Council for Technology and Natural Sciences.

"We are now working towards including more countries such as France, Canada, the United States, Denmark and West Germany," Grete Schanche, chief engineer of the Oil Directorate told AFTENPOSTEN.

She stressed that interested parties in Norway, Great Britain and other countries are welcome to both use the database and to provide information on new projects which should be included in the base.

According to Schanche interested parties in many countries are already using the database. The Norwegian Center for Information Science A/S in Oslo is the operational center for the database. It can be accessed directly by people who have access to a terminal, or as an alternative, print-outs can be ordered from the operational center.

In addition, information about almost half the projects can be obtained from a recently published catalog, which has both a Norwegian and an English edition. Grete Schanche points out that many potentially interested persons are afraid of computers and that they in particular will like the printed catalog. However, she thinks that even after publication of the catalog, it will be difficult to reach everybody who could conceivably be interested in the available project information. "It is very difficult to market something like that. We aren't exactly selling soap, you know," she says.

12831
CSO: 3639/82

REPORT ON CURRENT EXPEDITION TO ANTARCTICA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jan 85 p 64

[Article by Torill Nordeng: "Researchers Look for Minerals"]

[Text] The Western Mountains in Queen Maud Land stick up like some small peaks on an otherwise unbroken white surface. In there five Norwegian researchers have pitched tent, at an altitude of 870 meters above sea level. The ice around the mountains is 1000 meters deep and hides perhaps several secrets. But the geologists have come a little way. They know that these are volcanic rock types, that the mountains are up to 330 million years old, and that Antarctica is a piece of the big jigsaw puzzle of Gondwanaland. Now they will collect rocks, chart and study. Each rock and mineral specimen will be studied in laboratories at home in Norway.

Camp Norway 6 became established with a Norwegian geological research camp in the Western Mountains. In the future it will form a little dot on the enormous map of Antarctica, at 73° 19' south and 13° 50' west. The dot will give information about a place on a continent which has very few names, for the majority of Antarctica has still not been visited by human beings.

It is Geophysicist Reidar Løvlie and Geologist Harald Furnes from Bergen University; Snorre Olaussen, a geologist and observer from Statoil; Stig Johnsson, a geologist and observer from the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat; and Kåre Bratlien, a stock manager at the Norwegian Polar Institute, who are now experiencing life deep within the Western Mountains at Camp Norway 6. From the main camp they will wander far and wide all the way into the Heimefront Mountains which are about 200 km from the coast and 2600 meters above sea level. They figure that the mercury can creep down to 25 degrees below freezing.

"The immediate reason that we are exposing ourselves to such an extreme working situation in isolation and the cold for four weeks is that we have been here before, gathered data and gotten results. These results led to new problem formulations which require new answers," Geologist Reidar Løvlie says.

It is eight years since Norwegian researchers have been in the Western Mountains. Studies of rock types there showed that the mountains were much older

than assumed. The lowest types of rocks were the youngest, while the oldest were closest to the coast and not farthest into the continent. They hope to find an answer to why this is so.

"Geological and geophysical research in the Western Mountains is pure basic research. We are not placing it in the context of finding oil. But what we learn can perhaps be used in an applied context some time further in the future," Løvlie stresses.

He has no doubt that there must be large mineral resources concealed under the antarctic ice. Quite simply because there are minerals in all rocks and in Antarctica there are many rocks, although they are concealed.

Geological studies in Antarctica are being made, in addition, by Indian researchers this winter. The work is concentrated on exploring for radioactive substances in rock types. "And we all know that there are greater or smaller quantities of uranium in all rocks. It is the abundance which decides whether the uranium will ever be worth extracting," Snorre Olaussen of Statoil says.

One hundred and fifty million years ago there was a gigantic continent which has been given the name Gondwanaland. It consisted of South America, Africa, Australia, India and Antarctica. Then something happened. The regions began to separate from one another, brought about by forces in the earth's interior. The separation process is taking place slowly today, by 3 cm a year.

8985

CSO: 3639/71

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORTH SEA OFF FRISIAN COAST INCREASINGLY POLLUTED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Feb 85 p 15

[Article by Mats Holmberg: "Stinking Bird Corpses Mute Evidence--North Sea a Gigantic Garbage Dump"]

[Text] Helgoland, February. In the dawn the trawlers are coming home toward Helgoland.

The closest are visible through the spume and the snow mist, and one expects that the seagulls which are resting in their path will rise and fly away.

Playful seals chase each other among the dunes. Men with buckets go on the rocks collecting blue mussels.

When the boats keep coming and the gulls do not rise, one realizes for the first time that the gulls are dead.

That day 28 dead birds were found along Helgoland's sandy beaches. Earlier in the week about 300 bird corpses were collected, all with oil in their feathers or stomachs, frozen to death or poisoned to death.

Too Gruesome

On the rocks and along the surf, oil damaged birds wait with days or hours left to live.

"Nothing special has happened..."

Gottfried Vauk sounds tired. He is the head of the bird station on Helgoland, and time after time during the week he has been asked about what the West German press calls a sudden oil epidemic.

Now he answers again. There is no epidemic, no catastrophe has happened, dead birds drift ashore on the island because it is where it is, in the North Sea where oil spills are a daily occurrence.

"It seems to be too gruesome for people to be able to interfere," he said.

He believes that if sufficiently many people interfered, the North Sea would no longer be used as the world's garbage dump.

For the third day in a row the storm comes in from the east. The salt spume freezes to ice before it finds its way inside clothing, and the bird bodies must be pried loose.

They are grotesquely distorted. The bodies are emaciated, because oil kills slowly.

Every day they are brought in knapsacks and plastic bags to the bird station to be cut up and analyzed.

Affects All

When Gottfried Vauk came to this rocky island in the sea 30 years ago he had a very vague idea of how the years ahead would be.

"I was to look after the birds," he said. "Especially I was to conduct research and train zoologists."

In any case he had not expected an existence among rotten bird bodies in a stinking laboratory.

Still he remained there. And he says that long before the bird deaths had reached today's numbers he sensed that they showed something important and frightening--something which in time would affect the millions of people who live in the vicinity of the North Sea.

Vacuum

An environment which kills birds will sooner or later kill people, he said. And if several thousand birds die under "normal" circumstances, this is our chance to change the meaning of what is normal.

Some day, he said, people are going to realize that the birds of the North Sea did a service for us by dying.

For several years Gottfried Vauk and his colleagues worked in a political vacuum to collect knowledge about a problem which was not clear enough to awaken general interest. They took samples of oil and other poisons from dead birds, and when the catastrophe became clear in the beginning of the 1980's the documentation was at hand.

Between 1981 and 1982 the number of oil-killed birds tripled along West Germany's North Sea coast, and since then it has been between 15,000 and 20,000 per year.

And confronted with concerned political questions Gottfried Vauk was forced to say what he later often said when the number of dead birds floating ashore occasionally became unusually large.

"Nothing abnormal has happened," he said. "It became normal during the 1970's to run ships on cheap oil which left large amounts of residue in the tanks. It has always been normal to rinse out the tanks at sea. We have created a chronic and completely normal catastrophe."

As long as the maritime nations of the world permit tank cleaning at sea the catastrophe will continue.

Long Suffering

The stink of rotten fish oil surrounds the bird station laboratory. The bird bodies are brought here to be analyzed, and black oil-soaked balls of feathers in the opened stomachs are witness to the suffering which preceded death.

With oil in their feathers the birds lost the ability to protect themselves from the cold. They tried to clean themselves by pulling the feathers out of their skin, and the poison entered their bodies with the feathers.

And so they died after several days suffering from the cold, poison and starvation.

"We almost never find the same oil in several birds," said Gottfried Vauk. "Often one bird has been poisoned by oil from more than one source."

The problem has been created by several ships and several countries in cooperation.

All Are Hit

Gottfried Vauk's warnings are no longer unheard. The pollution of the North Sea has become an internationally recognized problem. West Germany, Holland and Denmark, with the support of Sweden, are demanding that the North Sea be classified as a special area, as is the Baltic. With a prohibition against the discharge of oil and other chemicals.

But the poisons which are discharged in the North Sea do not affect all the coastal states equally. Thanks to the winds and currents the coasts of Britain and Norway are relatively protected, and Britain and Norway are opposed to intensified environmental regulations.

"That is shameful and thoughtless," said Gottfried Vauk. "If the catastrophe grows, it is not going to stop with the Brits and the Norwegians."

In the evening the storm died down. The lighthouse was lighted on Helgoland's crest, and lights of ships blinked around the entire horizon.

A few birds flew in black silhouette over a glassy, slate-gray death.

Key: 1) The North Sea
2) East Frisian Islands
3) Denmark
4) FRG
5) The Netherlands



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CSO: 3650/187

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BALTIC SEAL POPULATION SUFFERS DECLINE AS TOXINS SPREAD

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Mar 85 p 42

[Article by Lasse Johansson: "Poisons and Ice Torment Seals"]

[Text] It is truly not an enviable life to be a knubb seal in the Baltic just now. The seals have been severely tormented by environmental poisons for many years, and the hard winter makes them stressed prisoners of the ice.

In Sweden there are three types of seals: knubb seals, gray seals and bristled seals. All three are hard hit because we have discharged so much environmental poisons. They have the same concerns with new growth as we Swedes: we are born to have young ones, and the family is dominated by the pensioners.

Of the three types of seals, the gray seals and the bristled seals are well adapted to hard winters. They have their young when the ice conditions are worst, and are largely unconcerned about the cold and ice.

It is harder for the small family of knubb seals which lives in the southern Baltic. The water around Kalmar Sound and west of Bornholm has frozen, and there are colonies of about 200 knubb seals which remain in the area.

"We do not know how the knubb seals manage. Naturally they first try to reach open water. But when it freezes they are prisoners of their breathing holes which they must keep open," said Docent Mats Olsson of the National Museum in Stockholm. He has studied the seals of the Baltic, and how they are affected by environmental poisons.

During this extremely cold winter one could expect that the knubb seals would have a problem keeping their breathing holes open, but probably they are managing well. Usually they remain in the water and move up to the surface every 5 minutes to breathe. In this way they keep the hole open. Nor does it become too cold for the seals in this horrible cold weather; despite everything the zero degree water is a real heat wave compared with the temperatures we are forced to withstand.

Seals are naturally not bothered by drying out, as are the poor reindeer. It does not bother them if the fish run out in the vicinity of their breathing hole, because they are used to living with long periods of starvation.

"The knubb seals are surely managing, but probably they are rather stressed, and that can be troublesome if the flocks are split," said Mats Olsson.

For the approximately 2,000 gray seals and between 5,000 and 10,000 bristled seals the frozen winter is no great worry. The bristled seals instead depend on finding strong ice banks to dig their lairs in, and the gray seals give birth to their pups on the ice floes.

The seals have to be careful so that they do not make the same mistake as the female gray seal that Mats Olsson met the other winter when he was marking pups.

"The female lay with her pups on a large floe, and when we came they went down in the water through holes in the ice. One of the females had been a little lazy and had not kept her hole sufficiently open, so when she went to escape she got stuck with her head in the hole, and stood like a tulip in a flower vase and waved her lower extreme lies."

(The female managed to escape from this awkward situation through another hole).

"No, what causes the greatest problems for Baltic seals is not the cold winter, but the environmental poisons. The problem is going to remain, despite the DDT and PCP contents declining."

It is mainly the reproduction which is being hurt. Scientists believe that only two out of ten female seals will have offspring, instead of the normal eight out of ten.

Dead Seals

Mats Olsson, together with Anders Bergman of the Veterinary University, investigated fully 30 dead seals and found an alarmingly large occurrence of illness.

"It is a common picture of illness for basically all animals," said Mats Olsson, "there are changes in the adrenal cortex, damage to the kidneys, deformed claws and all this has to do with organic chloride compounds.

In post mortems they have seen wombs grown together in seals. Despite the fact that it is not known exactly what causes that, one suspects that it is connected with environmental poisons.

Environmental poisons damage the adrenal cortex, and that in turn influences production of sex hormones which control reproduction.

Fewer Seals

Exactly how the dramatically lower birth numbers are affecting the seal families the scientists do not know, since they do not systematically go out and collect seals, but the ones they get in are obviously old. A Finnish study in which they caught seals with nets also showed an enormously high average age among the seals.

The faulty combination of ages means that information about the increase of seals is incorrect.

It is instead, according to Mats Olsson, that the seal families in the Baltic are going to decline until the year 2000 even if today we could stop all hunting and all environmental damage.

The fact that today we receive more reports about seals means instead that the seals have become less shy because of sanctuaries. Furthermore that the increased cod fishing has caused more conflicts between seals and fishermen than previously.

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SWEDEN

PAPER URGES 'RADICAL' ACTION AGAINST POLLUTANTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Swedish Acidity"]

[Text] The world repays by ingratitude. When the government presented an action plan to reduce Swedish sulphur emissions by 65 percent during the period 1980-1995, critics immediately pointed out that 60 of the 65 percent has already been accomplished now in 1985. The additional five percent in the next 10 years would not be much to brag about.

That's the way it goes when the emissions have declined much more and more quickly than the planners expected--from 800,000 to 300,000 tons of sulphur dioxide during the years 1976-1983, because the use of oil for heating and in industry was halved since the top years. On the other hand, automobiles have not reduced their oil consumption at all! And their emission of nitric oxide, the other main source of acid pollution, is unchanged over the past 15 years.

A dilemma is that whatever we do to Swedish sulphur emissions, it will not have a great effect on the fallout over Sweden. Over 80 percent comes from abroad, from East German, Soviet, British and other polluters of international air. Sulphur comes on the wind, and what does the wind care for prohibitions?

Still we must reduce our own emissions as much as is technically and economically reasonable. Because the resistance of Swedish soil to acid pollution is worse than many others, who are also better able to afford to not care about the consequences. We must proceed with an extra good example in the hope that the big polluting countries will go with us somewhat. If the 20 countries in the 30 percent club fulfill their obligation to reduce their sulphur emissions by 30 percent by 1993, the fallout over Sweden will decline by more than double the amount that we can reduce our own emissions.

The Center Party Youth League and others have pointed out that over the long term earth and water can manage with 3-5 kilos of sulphur fallout per hectare per year, and that Swedish emissions must therefore be reduced from the present 300,000 to a maximum of 110,000 tons per year, and that foreign emissions must be reduced by the same amount!

The domestic goal is certainly attainable. Within the next decades we can, despite greatly increased production of goods, reduce the domestic use of energy from 360 TWH to say 250 TWH per year, according to expert reports made to the 1981 Energy Committee. The reduction is twice as great as the nuclear power which will be eliminated, so even that should go rather painlessly. The reduction of acid emissions can be expedited by for example an annual fee of 10,000 kronor per emitted ton of sulphur dioxide, as CUF [The Center Party Youth League] recommends.

Oil consumption for heating has already been reduced by four or five times more than the oil which nuclear power could have replaced. The 1976 Energy Commission misled politicians and the public on two central points. It gave the false impression that nuclear power would replace a large part of oil consumption, and that sulphur fallout over Sweden largely resulted from our own oil consumption. In some quarters this pretense continues.

As to the foreign sulphur war against Sweden, we hope that shock effects such as the death of forests in Central Europe and the disintegration of Westminster Abbey and other British sacred relics can cause the pressure of domestic opinion to fight sulphur emissions even harder than the goals of the 30-percent club. But that is still a fragile hope.

Here at home we should quickly take radical action against acid pollution's other suspected villain, nitric oxides, especially since nitrogen fallout is largely a close fallout, and the acid effects are therefore almost exclusively self-caused.

Automobiles are the main source. Use the tax carrot to expedite the change to lead-free gasoline by means of an ethanol blend and the like, and in order to stimulate voluntary conversion of new cars to catalytic emission control even before it becomes obligatory. Why wait until 1987 and 1989 for something which can come sooner. The death of the forests will not wait.

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SWEDEN

GOVERNMENT PRESENTS LONG-RANGE EMISSIONS REDUCTION PROGRAM

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Feb 85 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Government's Plan for a Better Environment--
Emission Control for All Cars by '89"]

[Text] So-called catalytic emission control will be obligatory on all new cars beginning with 1989 models. That was proposed by Minister of Agriculture Svante Lundkvist in an action plan for the Riksdag with recommendations for measures to minimize pollution in the air and on the ground.

A condition for changing to catalytic emission control, by which exhaust gas is burned, is access to lead-free gasoline. Without access to lead-free gasoline emission control is destroyed.

Lead-free gasoline will therefore be introduced in the entire country by the summer of 1986, and all gasoline stations will be forced to sell lead-free gasoline beginning 1 July 1987. Voluntary conversion to catalytic emission control can begin with the 1987 model cars.

Both Volvo and Saab have the new emission control technique.

Conversion to catalytic emission control requires an international agreement, but work toward such an agreement is moving slowly.

Japanese

The Swedish measures will be coordinated with developments in West Germany. The problem is that the EC countries can not come to an agreement. The EC Commission has so far recommended that all member countries should have lead-free gasoline from 1989, but there is no recommendation yet for conversion to catalytic emission control.

The reason for the hesitation is that the automobile-manufacturing EC countries such as Italy, France and England are afraid primarily of Japanese competition in automobiles.

On Swedish initiative 10 countries--Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Canada, Lichtenstein, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, West Germany and Austria--have tried to coordinate the rules for automobile emission control and test methods.

A meeting of ministers from the group of 10 will be held in Stockholm in the spring to confirm the conversion to catalytic emission control.

The question of more effective emission controls for trucks and busses will be investigated later.

Great Risks

Svante Lundkvist says in his action plan that the problem of air pollution has quickly developed to a general environmental problem with effects on the ground and vegetation, surface and ground water and furthermore brings great risks for human health.

Pollution depends mostly on the emission of two substances: sulphur dioxide and nitric oxide. Most emissions come from the combustion of coal and oil. On the ground, the sulphur dioxide converts to sulphuric acid and nitric oxide to nitric acid.

Through various measures the sulphur dioxide emission has been reduced from 900,000 tons in 1970 to 30,000 tons in 1983.

Risk of Cancer

On the other hand the emission of nitric oxide is largely unchanged since 1970. Two-thirds of the nitric oxides come from automobile exhausts. This is the background why the agriculture minister in his undertaking will introduce catalytic emission control. Automobiles emit a total of 200,000 tons of nitric oxide and furnace installations, etc, contribute an additional 120,000 tons.

Besides damage to the forest and plants, automobile exhausts bring illness in cancer through the respiratory systems of people in big cities.

The background as to why sulphur dioxide was reduced from 800,000 tons to 300,000 tons in 1983 was the decisions made in the Riksdag concerning changing to low-sulphur oil, etc.

Svante Lundkvist's goal is that sulphur dioxide emission will be reduced by 65 percent and sulphur emission by 30 percent by 1995.

As to the sulphur, the 60 percent goal has already been reached. The remaining 5 percent will in the first place be taken from industry, especially from emissions in the forest, chemical and metallurgical industries.

Within the forestry and agriculture industries, forest soil fertilization will be limited, as will the use of acid fertilizers. Research on the increased mixing of broad-leaved deciduous trees in the Swedish forests will be expedited.

Within general environmental protection research, acidification questions will be prioritized, and special inputs will be prepared for damage to the forests and acidification of the ground water.

The total appropriation against acid pollution is increased by 50 million to a total of 135 million. A significant part of the increase goes to a program for lime treatment of lakes, waterways and ground water resources.

The Riksdag will now first take a position on Svante Lundkvist's action plan. When that is done, the question arises about concrete decisions to reduce acid pollution. The question then arises about special tax reductions in connection with conversion to catalytic emission control. In West Germany the tax reduction for car owners who convert to effective emission control is 3,000 marks. The Automobile Exhaust Committee recommended for Sweden a tax rebate of 20 ore per liter with conversion to lead-free gasoline.

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